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ABSTRACT
The attacks on New York and Washington on September 11 2001 constituted a singular media event.
On the front pages of America's newspapers and in its pre-eminent news magazines unfolded, in the
immediate wake of the blitz, a portrayal that uncontroversially legitimised claims to American
innocence, fomented moral certitude through parallels with previous wars and anticipated retaliation
that would soon enough engulf Afghanistan.
Showing, first, that accounts of reality are always social constructions, the "framing" of September 11
in America's press will be evaluated with reference to 122 newspaper front pages, most from
September 12, some from the day of the attacks, and two American news magazines. The
emergence of a discourse of war will be considered, as well as the perpetuation within and without of
the press of dominant views on America's role in the conflict. The extent to which this "popular frame"
selectively excluded inconvenient truths is illustrated in critiques of john Pilger and Noam Chomsky,
and an assessment of the politics of defining "terror".
The analysis is placed within the normative framework of orthodox joumalism ethics, particularly the
values of impartiality and objectivity, concluding that, in democracy, a responsible media better serves
the public interest through sustained criticism than compliant patriotism.
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ABSTRAK
Die aanvalle op New York en Washington op 11 September 2001 was 'n uitsonderlike media-
gebeurtenis. Direk daarna het 'n uitbeelding op die voorblaaie van Amerika se koerante en in twee
voorste nuustydskrifte ontvou wat aansprake op Amerikaanse onskuld sonder omhaal sou legitimeer,
parallelle met vorige oorloë in die diens van morele daadkragtigheid sou oproep, en wraakaanvalle
sou antisipeer wat kort daarna inAfghanistan sou woed.
Met as vertrekpunt die argument dat enige weergawe van realiteit 'n sosiale konstruksie is, word die
uitbeelding ("framing") van die aanvalle in die Amerikaanse pers op 122 koerantvoorblaaie,
hoofsaaklik van 12 September maar insluitend enkeles van die aanvalsdag self, en in twee
Amerikaanse nuustydskrifte hier geevalueer. Die ontluiking van 'n oorlogsdiskoers word bekyk, asook
die voortsetting binne en buite die media van heersende sienings oor Amerika se rol in die konflik. Die
mate waarin hierdie "populêre omraming" ("framing") ongemaklike waarhede selektief uitgesluit het,
word aangetoon in critiques van John Pilger en Noam Chomsky, en 'n oorweging van die politiek agter
'n definisie van "terreur".
Die analise voltrek in die normatiewe raamwerk van joernalistieke etiek, veral die waardes van
onpartydigheid en objektiviteit, en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, in demokrasie, 'n verantwoordelike
media die openbare belang beter dien deur volgehou kritiek as deur onderdanige patriotisme.
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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of 11 September 2001 the unthinkable happened. In a nightmare of devastation terror-
ists hijacked four aeroplanes, destroyed the towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, marred the
American defence headquarters in Washington, D.C. and crashed in rural Pennsylvania. Thousands
were feared dead. This was an act of war; a new day of infamy. Freedom itself came under attack in
the "apparent terrorist attacks" said US President George W. Bush. "Our nation saw evil" (Newsweek
Extra Edition, 2001: 30). But America would not falter, he vowed. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
soon gathered more than 700 leads and within fewer than four weeks America was indeed at war in
Afghanistan, aiming to "smoke out the folks who committed this act", among them the chief suspect
harboured by the Afghan Taliban government, Osama bin Laden.
In the above words the American press framed an event that caught the world's attention. Although
millions of pairs of eyes on September 11 were transfixed on television screens beaming live broad-
casts of the second attack on New York minutes after the first at 8.45 ECT, the world's press began
preparations to tell the story to millions of readers who, by the next day, would doubtless already know
the attacks had taken place, but, nevertheless, would want to know more. Although hardly heralding
the first news, the newspapers of the next morning (and some extra editions of September 11) offered
readers the first tangible documentation of unusual episodes that dominated public debate for months
and purported to justify a war inAfghanistan.
These newspapers played a vital role in assigning definitions to a phenomenon that was alien to Ame-
ricans, putting a "context round experience" (Morris in Eldridge, 1993: 4), inadvertently suggesting
appropriate interpretations of facts and establishing a discourse within which reactions to the disaster
could be properly constructed. The media had to decide how to portray the tragedy responsibly, guide
a nation toward acceptance of the past but also a thoughtful approach to what might lie ahead.
Orthodox media ethics dictate that responsible media seek to report truth as fully as possible, minimi-
se harm and remain independent so that they may stay unremittingly loyal to the truth instead of some
partisan ideal (Black, Steele and Barney, 1995: 2-3, see chapter 3). Faced with a disaster such as that
of September 11 that claimed thousands of lives during a Pax Americana if not a Pax Universalia
(Lloyd, 2001), most people, including journalists, found it difficult not to deplore what had happened. A
surge in patriotism invited American flags into newsrooms and enabled critics of America's war effort to
be uncontroversially dismissed (chapter 2).
What are the duties of the journalist? Do orthodox values such as impartiality and objectivity hold sway
in the face of evidently hostile acts, especially if the public, as opinion polls suggested (see 1.5.1.),
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valued a war in Afghanistan higher than a free press? Did the media hide propaganda within accepta-
ble news genres (Clark, 2001), thus placating the gatekeepers of American democracy?
With reference to selected newspaper front pages of 12 September and the influential newsmaga-
zines Time and Newsweek, this assignment will examine the American print media's immediate re-
sponse to September 11. For reasons stated, that response was significant in its ''framing'' of the
attacks, as subsequent events would be likely to be interpreted within the framework fixed and even-
tual reactions steered by the altematives suggested by the media.
It is contended that, just as in previous wars.' the media were not only the victims of censorship in
America and abroad, but also often complicit in appeasing those in power in its calls for a patriotic
press and uncritical support for a war in Afghanistan. The merit of "truthful propaganda" in the media
will be considered. It is also contended that the press often espoused a simplistic discourse of war that
did not best serve the public interest. Arguing in favour of a free press in democracies, it will be shown
that orthodox joumalistic values such as impartiality and "objectivity" should not easily be sacrificed in
the interest of "national security" or the "public interest" as defined by the powerful.
It is contended that the discourse the media choose to fashion in times of "war" has a profound impact
on the way citizens in a democracy think about war, the justifiability of conflict and the point at which
the publicised suffering even of the enemy becomes too much to bear, as was suggested by adverse
responses of British audiences in the Gulf War to seeing dead bodies on television screens." After
weighing the media's response against these considerations, and reconsidering the appropriate inter-
pretation of a value like impartiality in the light of the findings made, the aptness of a more involved,
less "objective" joumalism of attachment will be considered. Should the media try to remain indepen-
dent in times of war? Is truth still the most important value?
What follows will risk an answer.
I War is often fought in a "fog of falsehood", as Susan Carruthers shows (2000: 5-9). "Governments, mindful of their own popularity, generally
seek to harness mass media in wartime to persuade citizens of a war's justness and the enemy's implacability." This "fog", however, seems to
serve a justified purpose in the eyes of the "war citizenry". In the Falklands-Malvinas war of 1982, 34% of British audiences said they approved
the principle of government issuing false information to the media if it would help win the war, and 21% condoned the media in so doing (2000:
154). Censorship was also rife in the Gulf War, but public support for policies such as limiting journalists to reporting "pools" to ensure tight
control over news flow, suggested audiences were "prepared to suspend their right to know, provided they believe the war to be just and the
anticipated gains worth the price of the deaths of a number of professional soldiers" (Carruthers, 2000: ISS).
2 Only 8% of Britons said in a survey they thought it acceptable to see close-up pictures of British dead in the Gulf (in Belsey, 1992: 160) and the
Daily Telegraph argued against the publication of pictures showing the toll ofa "massacre" by Allied forces at the Al-Ameriya bunker in
Baghdad where 400 Iraqi civilians had died, as it would "further the agenda of Saddam" and "weaken morale".
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1. FRAMING SEPTEMBER 11
Who was to blame? Who was the scoundrel? Who were the victims? Who started first?
Thus the real battle after the attacks in America on 11 September 2001 was joined. A battle, argued
the Israeli columnist Doran Rosenblum (2001) in the Ha'aretz daily, over the narrative, waged strikingly
on the pages of newspapers. This battle was troubling, wrote Rosenblum. After the attacks, it was
dear who the aggressor was. But that realisation grew "vague", casting cause and effect into an "inse-
parable melange". Some portrayed the response to terrorism itself as an act of terror, even conceived
as the reason for the attacks, "as proof that the hatred of the terrorists was justified from the outset,
and, therefore, also understandable."
Rosenblum bemoaned a post-modem ism in which "everything is chaotic ... and relative." But she
proved a point - by admitting to the battle over the narrative, one acknowledges that there are multiple
ways to portray the same event and, as Rosenblum portends, each portrayal has consequences.
Acknowledging, further, that not all story-tellers amass equal influence and authority, the ability to es-
tablish discourse, the framework of meaning and interpretation within which events are understood,
depends largely on the power of the story-teller. In an open society with multiple voices, this power of-
ten rests with the media, a heterogeneous, amorphous body of interpreters who act as society's "privi-
leged story-tellers", as David Campbell argues in his study on terrorism and the media (1993: 7).
In this chapter, I will show why the media's primary task, that of the transmission of information, can
never be completely value-free. From analyses of newspaper front pages on September 12 and cove-
rage in America's two biggest newsmagazines published shortly thereafter, a dominant discourse
emerged in which America and its adversaries were depicted in a certain way, often belying the incli-
nation of the "story-teller". This discourse sustains a bipolar world in which an innocent, freedom-loving
America, its people caring for one another in a troubled time, is juxtaposed to a foreign hatred of and
opposition to America, "not for what it does, but for what it is" (Zakaria, 2001). Goodness is juxtaposed
to evil, the "land of the free"3 to an austere menace antagonistic to America. The significance of refe-
rences in the press to war and past conflicts will also be quantified and considered. The purpose is to
show how the press framed the attacks in America and that framing itself is inevitable.
3 In a speech to the American Congress on September 20, 2001 Bush elaborated on the reasons for the attacks, re-igniting the belief that
American values represent the ideal and would only be opposed by those who oppose democracy itself: "Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda,
but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. Americans are asking,
why do they hate us? They hate what we see right here in this chamber - a democratically elected government. Their leaders are self-appointed.
They hate our freedoms -- our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other ... "
(Bush, 200 Ib).
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1.1. Constructing reality
It has been suggested that the media should reflect society in the same way a mirror reflects, showing
objects as they are, without, in the showing, changing them. The integrity of this model depends on the
theoretical possibility of depicting anything precisely, showing without selecting; reflecting without dis-
torting on news pages. This, indeed, is a widely recognised goal in joumalism. Among the media insti-
tutions that explicitly vow to strive towards such reflection is America's Society of Professional Jouma-
lists. In the interest of "accuracy and objectivity" the Society bids members in its code of ethics to
report the "facts", find "truth" and be "objective" (Black et al., 1995: 6-7).
But changing insights in the media and language suggest that the mirror analogy is flawed. The mere
analysis in this assignment of news in terms of "framing", "narrative" or "discourse" appreciates that an
unaffected reflection is impossible. There are seemingly simple ways of showing this. Veteran televi-
sion journalist Martin Bell has stated that "a mirror does not affect what it reflects, the television image
does" (cited in Kieran, 1998: 18). For example, the presence of television cameras during the Serb
siege of Sarajevo in 1992 turned an apparent military victory into a political defeat for Siobodan Milo-
sevic by showing cruelty to civilians.
The mirror analogy, however, also falters at close examination of the nature of language and the
omnipresence of discourse, suggesting that ideology influences media representation, thus substitu-
ting the mirror with the notion of a construction of reality through language in the news. Based on the
premise that news is a representation of the world in language, Robert Fowler (1991: 4) employs the
theory of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure to show that language is a semiotic code that imposes a
"structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented". Inevitably, it follows,
news also constructively patterns that of which it speaks. "News is a representation in this sense of
construction; it is not a value-free reflection of 'facts'." The constructed nature of the "reality" in news is
also apparent from the "complex and artificial set of criteria for selection" that determines what is de-
fined as news in the first place, Fowler contends (1991: 2).
This view resonates favourably with prevalent orthodoxy about the role of the observer. The consumer
of news - call her an observer of "mediated reality" - has not the same relationship to "reality" as the
joumalist, for she cannot overcome the first level of representation and interpretation that constitutes
the journalist's observation. Even the seemingly unmediated observations of the journalist are situated
in frameworks of news values. "A report," writes Walter Lippmann, "is the joint product of the knower
and the known, in which the role of observer is always selective and usually creative. The facts we see
depend on where we are placed, and on the habits of our eyes" (cited in Cohen, 1992: 161).
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After selection, news undergoes a further transformation in the way it is presented in the news me-
dium. Is it afforded prominence by publication on the front page? Does a photograph that entices
accompany it, or one that offends? These decisions are guided by ideas and beliefs about the merit of
the myriad possible messages that news could transmit, and infuse the mirror's reflection with value
and ideology. They also often hide the provisional nature of accounts of reality, leaving media consu-
mers unaware that the epistemological status of news often varies (Eldridge, 1993: 6).
In examining "ideology" in the news, Croteau and Hoynes posit in Media/Society that the media can-
not but be purveyors of underlying messages and images about society (1999: 157). In an exhaustive
examination of portrayals of society and power relations within society in the media, the authors pro-
pose that media texts are "sites where cultural contests over meaning are waged" by serving as a fo-
rum for a struggle between different ideological perspectives, each representing different interests with
"unequal power". "[L]arge numbers of the public ... perceive the media as purveyors of ideology -
even if they don't use the term. Media sell both products and ideas, both personalities and worldviews;
the notion that mass media products and cultural values are fundamentally intertwined has gained
broad public acceptance" (1999: 159).
Croteau and Hoynes recognise that "ideas and attitudes that are routinely included in media become
part of the legitimate public debate about issues. Ideas that are excluded from the popular media ...
have little legitimacy. They are outside the range of acceptable ideas. The ideological influence of me-
dia can be seen in the absences and exclusions just as much as in the content of the messages"
(1999: 161). The formation and exclusion of content, to which I refer in this assignment as "framing", is
influenced by a "hegemony" in culture, power and ideology, subtly dictating the "assumptions we make
about social life and on the terrain of things that we accept as 'natural'." Thus, the powerful determine
through cultural leadership what we regard as "common sense", take for granted and therefore place
in a realm that is uncontested, with neither a need nor room for questioning assumptions (1999: 164).
The media become "places where certain ideas are circulated as the truth, effectively marginalising or
dismissing competing truth claims" (1999: 166).
By casting the September 11 attacks uncontroversially as a declaration of war, for example (see
1.4.2.), altemative understandings of the acts and America's possible responses are stifled. In the for-
mation of an "uncontested realm", rules of discourse are not admitted to but ever present. They re-
main, said the late modern French philosopher Michel Foucault, "unvoiced, unthought," and so safe
from public scrutiny (in Young, 1981: 48). These rules and categories are "assumed, a priori, as a con-
stituent part of discourse and therefore of knowledge," says Foucault. They manifest in "discursive
practices" that include the "definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge and the fix-
ing of norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories". And these rules make it "virtually impossi-
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bie" to think outside of them and so delineate a range of "acceptable" and "unacceptable" ideas.' To
think outside of the "possible" would "by definition ... be mad ... beyond comprehension and therefore
reason. It is in this way that ... discursive rules are linked to the exercise of power". Foucault5
suggests that the ''founding subject is given the task of directly animating the empty forms of language
with his aims ... " (Young, 1981: 65).
1.1.1. Who framed 9-11?
Asking not if, but how the media "framed" the attacks on September 11, suggests that the American
media told the story from a particular view of the world and America's role in it. A fair amount of ''fact''
about September 11 is common cause and "objectively" true: four planes were hijacked that moming,
did crash into buildings and a field off Pittsburgh and caused deaths and a chaos in the streets of
News York and Washington. But "framing" becomes pertinent when the attackers are either described
as "Bastards!" as the San Francisco Examiner did (11 September 2001, 2001: 12), or as "desperate
zealots" and a "ragtag bunch of disorganised thugs",6 in Newsweek (Extra Edition, 2001: 26,47). "Fra-
ming" constitutes the choice between talk of the World Trade Centre as buildings destroyed in an aer-
ial assault or as "cathedrals maimed" in an "empire" that had "lost its innocence," in Time magazine
(Special Edition, 2001). "Framing" emerges from portrayals of the attacks as "An evil Act" in the Otta-
wa Citizen or as an "act of war" in several other US newspapers. And each framing decision has con-
sequences for public interpretations of the attacks and the responses a government regards as politi-
cally viable amid public opinion shaped principally by the media.
Saying, as in Time magazine, that the WTC towers were "planted" at the base of Manhattan, lends
these lifeless mammoths a permanency and wholesomeness seldom associated with beacons of ca-
pitalism. They were not "built", suggesting temporality and the possibility to destroy them, but "planted",
symbolising perhaps the colonisation of North America, that they are endemic features of the land
4 John Eldridge (1993: 6) likens such limited discourse with the definition in George Orwell's 1984 of so-called Newspeak, which exposes the
often latent relationship between truth and power: "In (Orwell's) fictional anti-utopia, 'the purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a me-
dium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible'."
5 In The History of Sexuality Foucault affords discourse a more flexible role in sustaining or undermining power structures: "Discourses are not
once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowances for the complex and unstable
process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a
starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it
fragile and makes it possible to thwart it" (Young, 1981: 51).
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which grew from and at the same time nurtured it. The towers were also oft personified. In Time, the
buildings "shuddered" and "cringed" before being reduced to "jagged stumps"; Newsweek wrote terror-
ists struck at "our heart" (p. 2) and The New York Times (Schemann, 2001) referred to the "smoking,
ash-choked carcasses of the twin towers".
Frames are thus drawn at the media's behest. Framing the attacks as "terror" places the focus on the
effects of hostile action, the destruction of property, the loss of life, fear, chaos and panic. A population
can be terrorised from within or without, by human acts and natural catastrophes (Clark, 2001b).
Framing September 11 as an "attack" sets in motion "the rhetoric of war". "It comes as no surprise that
allusions to Pearl Harbour have ... become part of the national outrage. The language of war has
consequences," Clark warns. "It anticipates formal declarations. It imagines counter-attacks. It begins
to define and dehumanise an enemy. Within the current frame, that enemy is 'likely' to look a certain
way and dress a certain way and practice a certain religion. The collateral damage of building a culture
of war is xenophobia and paranoia, much of it directed at our own (American) citizens."
In an interview late in September 2001, the American commentator and philosopher Noam Chomsky
(2001a), bemoaning scant coverage of displays of dissent to American plans to launch military action
against Afghanistan, criticised the framing of the "terror attacks" as if it were a war. Not that the media
first named them so - it was president George W. Bush who, after learning of the attacks, turned to his
staff and said, 'We're at war". At that moment, "what might have been treated as a crime became a
causus belli," contends Paul Reynolds, former Washington correspondent for the BBC (in Baxter et al.,
2001: 85, 88). But the media adopted Bush's jargon, notwithstanding the suggestion in New Yorker
magazine that information available to the US administration shortly after the attacks was worse, or no
better, than that available to the television viewer.
Although Chomsky concedes that the attacks were "terrible crimes", they were no war. "There is a
reason why it is not called a crime, which it is, but a war, which it isn't ... Crime is specific, and if it is a
crime you have to present evidence ... [I]t's very likely that the evidence the United States have is not
6 Although not obviously prevalent in the examined newspapers and magazines after September II, the framing of the enemy in the guise of a
hated, "universal" enemy has been a preferred method of justifying military action in the public domain in past wars, as appears from analogies
likening Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler in the Gulf War, argues Carruthers (2000: 42). In August of 1990 alone, at least seven British
newspapers likened Hussein to Hitler, and in America the Gannett Foundation (later the Freedom Forum) listed 1035 references to Hussein as
Hitler between I August 1990 and 28 February 1991 in the American print media (Keeble, cited in Kieran, 1998: 73). ''The endlessly repeated Hitler
analogy represented a highly selective, ideologically motivated use of history by the USA and its prominent allies. For its essential purpose was to draw on
pre-Cold War rhetoric to silence many histories, in particular the imperial roles of the USA and UK in the Middle-East and more globally" (1998: 74).
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credible." Chomsky was, arguably, later proven wrong,? but the initial coverage of the attacks enforced
a prevalent system of popular beliefs about America that was evidently not value-free.
If it were, then conflicting renderings of the same event would necessarily imply that one storyteller got
it all wrong, or wrote about a different event by mistake. Instead, conflicting reports testify, after
September 11, that the press often chooses - albeit sometimes unintentionally - to use news toward
ideological ends, and that these ends may differ. They might suggest that America is first a victim of
terrorism, but could never perpetrate terror itself. Or depict America as the leader of the ''free world",
something which is not self-evident but owes an "ineluctable debt to interpretation", as Campbell
argues all language does. Understanding always entails rendering the "unfamiliar in terms of the
familiar" and if interpretation is unavoidable, then discourse is, too. The prudent thing for joumalists to
do, Campbell implores, is at least to consider the "manifest political consequences of adopting one
mode of representation over another" (1993: 8).
Sensitivity to discourse in news representations is crucial when evaluating the coverage of America's
foremost journalists after September 11. It is to this evaluation that I now turn.
1.2. Time magazine
"If you want to humble an empire, it makes sense to maim its cathedrals. They are the symbols of its
faith, and when they crumple and bum, it tells us we are not so powerful and we can't be safe. The
twin towers of the World Trade Centre, planted at the base of Manhattan island with the Statue of Li-
berty as their sentry, and the Pentagon, a squat, concrete fort on the banks of the Potomac, are the
sanctuaries of money and power that our enemies may imagine define us. But that assumes our faith
rests on what we can buy and build, and that has never been America's true God" (Gibbs, 2001).
In this introductory paragraph to a textual exposition over 13 pages of "the bloodiest day on American
soil since our civil war," Nancy Gibbs, senior editor of Time, touched on powerful narrative strains cha-
racteristic of coverage of September 11 in general (see Addendum A). In one paragraph, America is
grandly depicted as an "empire", suggesting power and global influence, the targets of the attacks as
7 Perhaps still "circumstantial evidence", a videotape released on April 152002 "strongly suggested" that bin Laden was involved in the
September assaults, the New York Times reported (Golden, 2002). Ahmed Alhaznawi (20), identified as one of the September Il hijackers of
United Airlines flight 93 which crashed in Pennsylvania, said his death was intended to send the message that "it is time to kill Americans in their
own homeland". Showed on the Qatari satellite channel Al-Jazeera, a segment of the same tape showed bin Laden "sitting contemplatively beside
his second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri," as al-Zawahiri hailed the attacks a "great victory," the Times reported. "Those 19 brothers who left
us made efforts and offered their lives for the cause of Allah," al-Zawahiri said of the hijackers. "Allah has favoured them with this conquest,
which we are enjoying now." At one point, al-Zawahiri reads from a spiral-bound notebook entitled the last will "of the New York and
Washington Battle Martyrs". Of course, here the attacks are branded a posteriori as a "battle," suggesting that American aggression preceded it-
a wholly different "framing", predictably, than any in the American press.
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"cathedrals", suggesting the sacrilegious nature of its destruction, and the victims of the attacks as
"we", suggesting the media's solidarity with rather than distance from story subjects."
Prominently, Time placed America within a context of spiritual and material superiority, at once alluding
to the abundant money and power which the World Trade Centre ryvTC) and Pentagon signified, but
also severing the supposed dependence of its people on worldly success by alluding to spirituality.
Analogies to Pearl Harbour employed in Newsweek and in Time (in references to "a new day of infa-
my", see infra), introduced a rich discourse of war, and stirred expectations of an isolated America for-
ced once again to engage in the world. Reiterating the war-like aftermath, Time spoke of crowds in the
streets of New York as "refugees" marching "away from the battlefield", of "war-like mobilisation" and
"highly trained enemy terrorists". It reported that some Administration officials were considering drafting
a "declaration of war" but that the State Department was "leery since nobody knows precisely whom
the war would be against." This is an important observation, the absence of which would have skewed
the conflict into a traditional war symmetry in which the enemy is clearly defined.
Indeed, only on the penultimate page did Time speculate about the attackers' identity. Palestinians,
Iranians, Libyans and Iraqis were all discounted as unlikely suspects, with a brief account of reasons.
Such speculation is legitimate. It would be inimical to the purposeful stimulation of debate in society if
speculation about the attackers' identity were deemed beyond the scope of sound joumalism,
although the discourse alluded to in the language employed in speculations needs always to be care-
fully considered. In Time, Osama bin Laden was not overtly cast as "evil", although attributed the ''will,
wallet and gall to attack America" after initiating attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar
es Salaam in 1998 and the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000 (Marsden, 2001: 57; Baxter et aI., 2001: 76).
Gibbs also did not cower from vivid descriptions of the horror of death, hinting at least at an unwilling-
ness to hide the brutality of attacks notwithstanding the danger of "hurting morale". "People bumt from
head to toe; hands, legs, whole bodies falling from the air ... " and 'Whole stretches of street were slick
with blood, and up and down the avenues you could hear the screams of people plunging from the
burning tower". It drew on controversial alliances: "Terror has struck us ... Now we are all Israelis," a
rabbi said. But Americans prevailed: "There was remarkably little panic - more steel and ingenuity."
When considering the creation (or continuation) of discourse in the news, Time's religious analogies
are notable. The metaphors in the lead paragraph ("cathedrals", ''faith'', "God") echoed throughout
8 Time did not number the pages of its special edition after September 11. All references to text are to the article by Gibbs, cited in the
bibliography at the end of this assignment.
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Gibbs's copy in references to people beginning to "say their prayers", a quote of a survivor urging his
fellows to "breathe, breathe, Christ is on our side", and "houses of all kinds of worship" across the
country filling with "grieving Americans singing America the Beautiful, wiping away streams of tears". It
appears to be a story of a nation humbled, but also strong in courage and faith.
On a double page spread, amid 28 pages of photographs, Time employed a powerful symbol of de-
fiance against the onslaught of "Islamic fundamentalism", a theme which seethed into news coverage
as the supposed inspiration of the chief terrorist suspect, Osama bin Laden. Against the jumbled back-
ground of the tumbling WTC, a stone cross protrudes unscathed from a rooftop in a photograph by
Time's James Nachtwey. With the caption "Holy War", this picture (see Addendum A) communicates
the resilience of Christian (or Westem, post-Judea-Christian secular) society in spite of the attacks.
The combination of the caption and photograph moulded the conflict simply into a religious dichotomy:
"As large swaths of lower Manhattan were tuming to dust, further uptown, at First Presbyterian on Fifth
Avenue, the faithful gathered to hear the Rev. Jon Walton's 'service of mouming and lament'."
The conflict depicted here between the cross and the devastation supposedly spawned by extremism,
reinforces a psychosis of moral rectitude in America which draws on the fervour of medieval Crusades
(Bush later equalled the "war on terror" with a "crusade", Baxter et aL, 2001: 92, 141) as well as on the
pervasive fear in the West of the consequences of a "jihad" or "holy war". Time's pictorial narrative was
powerful, and complemented the text by illustrating destruction, but also "unselfish" civilians perfor-
ming triage, carrying bodies, and watching teary-eyed in an Iowa classroom as the WTC crumbled. It
purported to be a historical document, and in the scope of its material, succeeds.
Its editorial account refrained from calls for revenge, as opposed to an essay on its last page in which
Lance Morrow called for a "unified, unifying, Pearl Harbour sort of purple American fury - a ruthless
indignation that doesn't leak away in a week or two". Whereas Morrow exploited the findings of a Time
opinion poll which found that 80% of Americans were "ready to go to war", deemed a ''fatuous rhetoric
about healing inappropriate and dangerous" and wamed against a "corruptly thoughtful relativism" in
response to the attacks, the news report displayed remarkable restraint.
1.3. Newsweek
The "breathtaking audacity" of the attacks permeated the text of this magazine's eight articles on what
it dubbed "black Tuesday". Compared with Time, Newsweek (see Addendum B) did not shy away
from inflammatory language, nor from tainting all "Arabs" with suspicion in its simplistic rejection of
avowals of innocence in the attacks by the Taliban, Palestinian Authority and president Saddam
Hussein of Iraq (Newsweek Extra Edition, 2001: 28).
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In an article which named the Saudi dissident and AI Qaeda-Ieader Osama bin Laden as "suspect No.
1", Libya's colonel Muammar Qaddafi and Hussein were pictured alongside a photograph of the con-
victed 1993 World Trade Centre bomber Ramzi Yousef under the caption "the foes we face" (p. 38,
see Addendum B). After basing its accusations against bin Laden on preliminary information leaked
from an unnamed source "with access to intelligence", Newsweek discounted sceptically denials of in-
volvement in the attacks: "The Taliban, known for harbouring terrorists, insisted that bin Laden could
not possibly have arranged so devilish a plof'. Also Yasser Arafat "insisted" he was "shocked" by the
attacks. These denials, clothed in similar language and thus regarded as equally plausible, were juxta-
posed to celebrations in the West Bank, Gaza and Baghdad, discrediting Arab avowals of innocence.
That "Arabs" were perceived to be a coherent group of dangerous people, appears from a reference
to so-called "Arab watchers" who, like a former US ambassador to Syria and Saudi Arabia, Richard
Murphy, feared that the successful attacks might "inspire" other Arabs to attempt similar feats (p. 28).
Against these foes, America could not fight alone, Newsweek contended. "It needs the help of
freedom-loving nations around the globe". This dichotomy between untrustworthy Arabs and freedom-
loving Americans is entrenched in descriptions of the "cowardice" of the "killers" versus the "resolve" of
American "heroes" in events the cause of which had been "evil". "America is the last great superpower,
held hostage by a few desperate zealots armed with pocket-knives ... They, and their mysterious c0-
conspirators, showed considerable clevemess as well as a willingness to die for Allah" (p. 26).
Whereas Time alluded to the notion of a "holy war" in a photo caption and subtle textual religious
metaphors, Newsweek cast the reasons for the attacks explicitly within the foreign domain (for Wes-
temers) of the '1ihad", suggesting that the reason for the attacks was not political grievances that could
be dealt with in a reasoned way, but an irrational Islamic extremism. For the journalist attempting to
interpret events, a simplistic suggestion that the attacks were carried out because of a "willingness to
die for Allah", does not go far enough. The only attempt at explaining the reasons for the attacks in
terms of America's foreign policy, or anything other than the capricious aggression of Islamists is made
on the magazine's penultimate page (p. 63). "Nini Halkett asked her 11th-grade AP American-history
class why terrorists hate us so much. 'Because we get involved in foreign affairs when it's not our
place,' said Cami, 16, 'and because we have an elitist attitude'."
Even admitting to the merit of Ms Halkett's question one does not escape a dominant discourse of un-
questioned American innocence. The discursive rules which place terrorists outside of the familiar
sphere, depicting them as a group of hateful "zealots" with "suicidal fervour", makes it impossible, as
Foucault suggests, to speak of Americans themselves as terrorists. The moral opprobrium of such
terminology (see 2.1.3. infra) is thus declared invalid in references to American actions.
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That Americans were innocent victims of terror is emphasised by the image of small-town America su-
perimposed on New York City in the depictions of individual victims of the attacks. Instead of portray-
ing a faceless body of office-workers (as was the case when referring to the homogeneous "Arabs",
previous page), stories about people like a 22-year-old financial worker strengthen the narrative with
personal accounts of terror or sadness. "In New York City, it was 8.45 a.m. Rush hour was just winding
down. Jason Braunstein, 22, was finishing a plate of hash browns at his desk in a stock brokerage on
the 87th floor of Tower One of the WTC when the first plane ... augured in about 10 floors up ... "
Likewise, Ms. Barbara Chandler, human-resources director at a consulting firm on the 77th floor, saw
"glass flying" and felt a "crash, rocking" (p. 26).
Through personal accounts, sometimes comprising banal details such as a reference to Braunstein's
hash browns, a familiarity with the victims is bred through shared human interest, and the foe of
Braunstein and Chandler becomes the readers', too. Indeed, the human interest story can be an effec-
tive propaganda tool, argues Richard Keeble, because it "simplifies an enormously complex history,
seriously distorting the representation of the conflict and drawing attention away from other important
social, political, geostratic, religious and economic factors" (cited in Kieran, 1998: 72).
Time and Newsweek avoided "human interest" accounts of high-profile executives who doubtless
occupied many offices in the towers. Voice was given, instead, to ordinary people, the "foot soldiers" of
capitalism and the American monetary system of which the WTC was symbolic. In depicting victims as
"ordinary men and women, sitting down to begin a day's work" (p. 46), the pool from which empathy
could be drawn was broadened. The power of the human-interest story is clear and a first-person
narrative of "us" and "we", lavishly used, made somehow more plausible.
1.4. The front page: A discourse analysis
Across the United States, newspapers in diverse markets searched for ways to report on the attacks
that would best serve local readers. Residents of small towns who knew family or friends working in
the WTC were called on for interviews, local war veterans pronounced similarities with the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941, and the "faithful" gathered in churches everywhere to pray.
Overwhelmingly, the attacks were described as acts of "terrorism", echoing a speech by Pres. George
W. Bush shortly afterwards in which he said "terrorism against our nation will not stand" (The San Die-
go Union-Tribune, Poynter, p. 10). Many other echoes of Bush's speech (see Addendum C) perme-
ated front pages of American newspapers. The words, "Today, our nation saw evil", was widely quoted
or used in headings. Bush also quoted from the Bible (Psalm 23): "Even though I walk through the
valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil for you are with me". Several papers recounted this.
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From a quantitative survey of the headings and text on 122 front pages of American newspapers se-
lected by the Poynter Institute of Media Studies in St. Petersburg, Florida, it appears that in spite of the
pervasive use of common news sources (especially a story by David Crary and Jerry Schwartz from
the Associated Press), the packaging and focus of each product aimed to impress the consequences
of New York and Washington's woes on the entire nation and its local constituencies. Table 1 (see also
Chart 1) shows which were the most used phrases in describing the attacks, and thereby indicate,
simply, how the attacks were understood and portrayed.
From different language use schisms also appear about the perceived role of the media. Hence, a
brief analysis follows, with specific reference to headings and historical references to war.
1.4.1.Headings: The news, in a word
In its entirety, a newspaper is a "text". Every component of this text seeks to convey information, be it
the heading, news copy, photograph, graphic, or even the way in which a page is designed. Each
component represents another portrayal or description, and some rely on their self-evidence and im-
pact to lure a "reader" (because this text is "read" merely by looking at it) from one component to ano-
ther. Thus a photograph or heading is mostly regarded as the primary "entry-point" to a page. They are
almost without exception the dominant design elements; they take up the most space and are first
seen. As such they play an important role in defining the initial "angle" of a news story: the heading
should capture, even read in isolation, the single most important facet of a news event.
Thus, as seen in Chart 1, the most common word in American newspaper headings was "attack" or
"attacked", used 41 times in the 122 papers surveyed. In combining "U.S." and "attacked" in "U.S.
Attacked", The New York Times (see Addendum D), among others," employed a most lucid, cautious
description. Indeed, this is "objectively" true, and describing the events as an "attack", although it might
evoke the fear of war, involves no evaluation or interpretation. There were many variations; among
them The Orange County Register Extra in Califomia's "America Attacked","? "Attack" (on five front
pages), "Attacks Level Trade Centre" (The Philadelphia Enquirer, Extra, p. 91) and "Target: America"
(The Tampa Tribune, Florida, p. 28). Some headings, like The Denver Post's "ATTACK", spanned the
entire width of the page and thus attested to the magnitude of the events.
9 The same headline was used in The Arizona Republic (p. 2), The Flint Journal, Michigan (p. 53), and The Free Lance-Star, Virginia (p. 107).
Front pages not included in the addenda are referenced by their page number in Poynter, 2001.
10 See also Newsday, Extra, New York (p. 69). Papers using "America under attack" were the St. Petersburg Times, Extra (p. 27); The Oakland
Press, Extra (p. 55) and The State, South Carolina (p. 94). "U.S. under Attack", said the Chicago Tribune, Extra (p. 32). Two papers used the line
"Attack on America" - the Daily Southtown, Extra, Chicago (p. 33), and The Kansas City Star, Missouri (p. 60).
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TABLE 1: LANGUAGE USE INTHE PRESS AFTER SEPTEMBER 11*
In contrast to the restraint of The New York Times stood the indignity at the attacks that slight punctua-
tion changes suggested. So the Globe Gazette Extra in Iowa proclaimed "Attacked!" (p. 39), with an
exclamation mark as if to say, "Can you believe it?", and the Philadelphia Daily News Extra, "Attack!"
(p. 90; Addendum E). The News & Advance Extra in Lynchburg, Virginia, used the same heading (p.
108). There is a difference in tone. "ATTACK!" acknowledges at least the magnitude of the attack in its
exclamation, and implicitly also the rarity of such events on American soil. It marks a first level of
interpretation, beyond mere reflection, which is what "U.S. Attacked" attempted.
Progressing toward more manifest interpretations, several papers voiced what most Americans
thought, How could this happen to us? Not since the bloodiest single day in American history when
more than 6000 were killed or wounded at Antietam in the Civil War on 17 September 1862 (The
Economist, 2002b), and the attack on Pearl Harbour in 1941 which claimed 2300, did Americans wit-
ness such carnage on American soil. The attacks were "Unthinkable", proclaimed five papers, among
them the Arizona Daily Star (p. 3, see Addendum F).11 Such a framing resonates with Foucault's argu-
ment that rules of discourse delineate a "legitimate perspective" outside of which events cannot
reasonably be interpreted. To deem an attack on America "unthinkable" denies legitimacy to a para-
digm of American vulnerability and possible complicity in fomenting hatred towards its people. The
Il The Star was joined in this depiction by the The Register-Guard, Eugene, Oregon, (84); The Patriot-News, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (87);
Bucks County Courier Times, Extra, Levittown, Pennsylvania (88) and The Salt Lake Tribune, Utah (106).
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CHART 1: Predominant language use in press, 11-12 September 2001
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(based on 122 front pages of American newspapers - see Table 1)
attacks are "unthinkable" precisely because America is a "superpower" and "terrorism" usually occurs
abroad.
The Star published a large picture of United Airlines flight 175 a moment before it crashed into the
south WTC tower, with a caption, "Moment of horror". In this "framing", it is arguably the nature of the
"weapons" (passenger jets) rather than the fact of the attack that is "unthinkable". Others deemed Sep-
tember 11 an "Outrage", a "Disaster", "Nightmare" (see Addendum G) or an "American Tragedy"
(2001: 29, 34,11,99,48). The latter depiction is a stark juxtaposition to the "American Dream". Seven
newspapers described it with "Horror" or variations thereof.12 The Virginia Pilot excelled in its sombre
design, with an enormous (larger than 200 points), red "Horror" on a black background, a radical de-
parture from its usual, black-on-white make-up and again a testament to the singularity of the day.
Besides its description of the September Tuesday as "America's Darkest Day", The Detroit Free Press
in Michigan (p. 51) wrote, "not since Pearl Harbour has a day suggested such infamy" after "the worst
attack ever on the United States".13 Others shared this view. Louisiana's The Times-Picayune (p. 44)
carried in bold print "Darkest Day" and "Terror Hits Home". The Philadelphia citypaper proclaimed
"Nothing will ever be the same" (p. 89, see Addendum H), echoing "Our World is Changed" (p. 93) of
The Gamecock at the University of South Carolina, Columbia, "None of us will ever forget this day" in
12 The Virginia-Pi/ot. Norfolk (p. 110) likewise leaded with "Horror". "American Horror", said The Fresno Bee, Extra, California (p. 5); "Horror!"
the Los Angeles Daily News (p. 7), and "Day of Horror", The Roanoke Times, Virginia (p. 112).
13 The same heading was used in Richmond Times-Dispatch, Virginia (p. 111), and a variation in the Staten Island Advance, New York (p. 73), with
"The Longest Day".
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the St. Louis Post-Dispatch in Missouri (p. 61), "None of us will ever forget" in the Seattle Post-Intelli-
geneer,Washington (p. 115) and "America Savaged, Forever Changed" in The Detroit News (p. 52).
The significance of the events was not lost on the world community - newspapers as far afield as
Cape Town ("Moment the world changed" in the Cape Times) and Norrkëping in Sweden ('Varlden i
chock efter attacken" I 'World in shock after attacks", p. 144) suggested that "terror" in America neces-
sarily reverberates elsewhere and, in a way, legitimises Americans' suggestion that nothing would ever
be the same. The sudden significance the date would assume as supposed historical turning point,
was suggested by several papers that declared starkly only the date, among them France's Ubération:
"11 Septembre 2001" (p. 133).
It is notable how many newspapers referred to a speech by President George W. Bush on the evening
of September 11 (see references to "evil", "terrorist" and "terrorism", p. 16). After a day in which he was
constantly in the air, avoiding Washington in fear of another attack, Bush returned to the White house
that evening for a widely televised address to the American nation. "Today, our fellow citizens, our way
of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist acts. The vic-
tims were in aeroplanes or in their offices - secretaries, businessmen and women, military and federal
workers. Moms and dads. Friends and neighbours. Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil,
despicable acts of terror" (Bush, 2001a. See Addendum C). Bush spoke of "disbelief' at seeing the
towers tumble, a "terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger". He named the attacks "acts of mass
murder" that have moved a "great people ... to defend a great nation". "America was targeted for
attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will
keep that light from shining. Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature ... "
Thirteen papers subsequently adopted the word "evil" in headlines. Five lead with Bush's exact words,
"Our nation saw evil" (see Addendum 1),14 in quotation marks, signifying not an endorsement but a re-
presentation of a notable condemnation. In fact, not a single newspaper used the word "evil" without
quotation marks." recognising through this restraint the clear prejudice the word conveys.
Not the same, though, with "terror". In 55 newspapers the words "terror" or "terrorist" and its variations
("terrorised" and "terrorism") were used - never in quotation marks (see addenda). It was the one idea
that captured not only the nature of the onslaught, but did justice to the nation's reaction - "terror"
means "extreme fear" or something which causes it (Oxford Concise Dictionary, 9th ed.). It is rich in
14 The Daily Californian, University of Cali fomi a, Berkeley, p. 4; Austin American-Statesman, Texas, p. 100, Greely Tribune, Colorado, p. 16;
Kalamazoo Gazette Extra, Michigan, p. 54; Omaha World-Herald, Nebraska, p. 64
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imagery and history - it evokes memories of sudden, brutal attacks, mostly on civilians, making it
almost less bearable than war, which, in its pure form, targets soldiers. It suggests outrage, shock, an-
xiety and fear. In its various permutations, it conveyed that terror is no longer only a foreign phenome-
non, eating away at Americans' sense of safety and imposing involuntary vulnerability. Examples are
''Terror in the Streets" (p. 46), ''Terror Hits Home" (pp. 45, 80,104, see Addenda J1, 2) and "Terrorists
Strike America" (p. 102). On the West Coast, the Seattle Times lead with "Terrorist attacks horrify
nation" (p. 116, Addendum J3), and added in a deck below, "Destruction and death far away felt close
to home". The faraway tragedy is thus localised, encouraging, in the framing by the media, a sense of
American nationhood and community. The justifiability of the use of the word "terror" and "terrorism"
will be critically considered in chapter 2 below.
1.4.2.A Discourse of war emerges
"Adate which will live in infamy." Thus American President Franklin D. Roosevelt described the Japan-
ese attack on Pearl Harbour in Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (Roosevelt speech, 1941). The attacks
were unexpected and claimed more than 2,300 lives. "Always will we remember the character of the
onslaught against us ... The American people in their righteous might will win through to absolute
victory," Roosevelt said. He then declared war with the Empire of Japan - and entry into World War II.
On September 11, 2001, the attacks in America killed slightly more than 3000 people (Time, 2002: 54)
- but unlike Pearl Harbour, they were civilians, and the attacker was not another country.
"Infamy!" cried the Albuquerque Journal in New Mexico (p. 67). "Infamy", stated the Washington Times
(p. 22). And in New York and Washington State, The Journal News (p. 74) and The Spokesman-Re-
view (p. 117) described the attacks as "A New Day of Infamy" (see Addendum K). Thus the anger,
emotion and will to military retaliation of 1941 were transposed six decades; so too a conviction of
America's "righteous mighf'. Indeed, Senator Chuck Hagel, a Republican from Nebraska, was quoted
in more than 50 papers equating September 11with December 7. "This is the second Pearl Harbour. I
don't think that I overstate if' (Associated Press report, Poynter, 2001: 76). The national edition of The
Christian Science Monitor was one of several papers that drew parallels with the destruction of Battle-
ship Row. " 'Mommy, it looks just like Pearl Harbour on lV' - an 11 year-old boy, leaving for school in
LosAngeles," read a prominent front-page quote.
15Other variations included "Evil Acts of Terror" in the Reporter-Hera/d, Colorado, p. 18, "Evil Acts" in The Miami Hera/d, p. 25; Billings
Gazette, Montana, p. 62 and The Commercia/ Appeal, Memphis, Tennessee, p. 96; "Evil" in the Lawrence Journal-World, Kansas, p. 40, and
"Bush vows to punish 'evil' acts of terror" in The Sacramento Bee, California, p. 9.
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In this subtle way, the rhetoric of war was introduced into the coverage of September 11. The implica-
tions of evoking war-like discourse into peacetime interpretations of acts of violence have been alluded
to above (p. 8): It "anticipates formal declarations ... Imagines counter-attacks ... begins to define and
dehumanise the enemy," said Clark (2001 b). Albeit arguably unavoidable in some circumstances, the
phenomenon of war is the ultimate substitute for conversation, deliberation and debate; a discourse of
war patently obviates the political search for non-violent alternatives.
The word "war" was used in 11 headlines of those newspaper surveyed, and 18 times in news copy,
and many mentioned that US military forces "around the world were put on a 'go to war' footing, the
highest state of alert next to actual military action" (San Jose Mercury News, p. 13). Although no news-
paper attributed the phrase "Acts of War" to a specific official, it was widely used - it might have been a
reference to a remark Bush had made to his staff on the 1111\ repeated in public only the next moming
(Baxter et al., 2001: 85). The Hartford Courant quoted Nebraska's Hagel saying, "If you can do this to
the USA and get at two symbols of the strength of America, that tells you essentially we are at war".
But war was never formally declared. Whereas USA Today (see Addendum L) and the San Jose
Mercury News in Califomia (p. 121, 13) used quotation marks in "'Act of War'" and "'Acts of War"', im-
plying they convey an appraisal and will attribute it to someone later, the Hartford Courant, The Day in
Connecticut and New York's Daily News were not so modest. Proclaiming "Act of War", "Acts of War"
and "It's War!" these papers (pp. 19, 20, 70) fumished the attacks in an irrefutable martial frame. Refe-
rences to "revenge", "retribution" or "retaliation" appeared 18 times in the surveyed papers, reinforcing
the perception among Americans that America was at war and its retaliation justified. 16
This interpretation was not only achieved through linguistic references, but also graphic analogy.
After the WTC collapsed, three firemen paused to raise the American flag amid the rubble. Thomas E.
Franklin of the Associated Press caught the moment on film; the Sun and the Skagit Valley Herald in
Washington State and Wisconsin's The Posi-Crescent'? saw in Franklin's photo, with its skewed flag-
post, a composition of heroic figures raising the Stars and Stripes in turbulent times (see Addendum
N1, 2). And a striking similarity to an icon of World War 11- the raising of the Iwo Jima Flag.
In February 1945 that picture by Joe Rosenthal, an AP-photographer later awarded the Pulitzer Prize,
would give Americans new hope in their desperate and expensive bid to conquer the Japanese in the
16 Besides The Dallas Morning Herald's "War at home" (p. 103), a number of international newspapers also "declared" war. In South Africa, the Cape
Town daily Die Burger led in large, black type with "Dis Oorlog!" (It's War!). InAustralia, The Sydney Morning Herald proclaimed "Bush: this means
war" (p. 123); in Rio de Janeiro, 0Dia stated "Guerra" ("War", p. 124), in London The Guardian deemed the attacks themselves "A declaration of war"
(p. 131) and in Stockholm the Afionbladet splashed the words "Terror-Krig Mot Usa" ("Terror-war with USA") across its front page (p. 145).
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Pacific. The raising of the Iwo Jima Flag on mount Suribachi by six American marines followed the
bloodiest battle in Marine Corps history (Buell, 1999: xx, see Addendum 0). Rosenthal's picture show-
ed six Americans, "all for one, working together in victory and valour; and above them, Old Glory,"
Buell wrote. "Finally, for the first time, a clear, simple statement from the Pacific gripped the United
States" (1999: 23). A large bronze statue in the image of the picture was dedicated in Arlington, Virgi-
nia, in 1954 and more than 117 million postage stamps with Rosenthal's photo were sold in America
after the war.
The incidental similarity between these two photos draws parallels to a war in which a passive Ameri-
ca was attacked by another country and became entangled in a conflict which few regarded as avoi-
dable and which America patently did not initiate (Blanning, 2000: 224). The analogy with Pearl Harbor
runs deep and fortifies nationalistic self-confidence, and by necessary inference it situates America's
"war on terror" in a moral milieu akin to that of 1941. America's press indulged (see chart 1). But such
proud analogies as the flag-raising at Ground Zero to that at Suribachi, also attests to a sense of res-
ponsibility in the press to encourage and inspire, to show images reminiscent of American grit and re-
silience and to read into its public duty more than the mere transmission of information. So, The Star-
Ledger in New Jersey portrayed a "breath of life from the rubble" after a successful search for "Survi-
vors", its main heading (p. 66). The Daily Mississippian's "One Nation ... Indivisible" (page 59) encou-
rages calm. And Franklin's picture courage.
1.5. Perpetuating the dominant view
Famously, John Stuart Mill advocated the proper environment for the emergence of truth. He argued
that, instead of suppressing information that may yet be proved valuable and accurate and silencing
views that seem inappropriate, all expression should compete freely in a so-called "marketplace of
ideas". Eventually, after thorough scrutiny, truth will be victorious. The first premise for Mill's argument
in favour of freedom of expression reads: "If any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, for
ought we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility" (Mill, 1974: 115).
Even an erroneous opinion "may, and very commonly does, contain a portion of truth; and since the
general or prevailing opinion on any subject is rarely or never the whole truth, it is only by the collision
of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied" (1974: 116).
The views of two prominent critics of America's foreign policy will show in the next chapter that ad-
verse opinions were put forward challenging the "prevailing opinion" on September 11 which appeared
from the analyses in the preceding parts of this chapter. Although prevailing wisdom dictates that Mill's
17 Los Angeles's Daily News also used the AP-photo, but not as main picture.
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"whole truth" is but a naïve imaginary ideal, his notion of a plurality of opinions in the interest of a more
thoroughly considered rendition of the truth, remains of critical importance in democracies.
The notion of a "frame" - suggesting subjective representation - should not be relinquished in defe-
rence to Mill. But acts of censorship and propaganda prevented, in the direct aftermath of September
11, the uninhibited formation of media frames of the attacks, suggesting that, in this "marketplace", a
more complete "truth" was given but half a chance. In what follows, the role of censorship and propa-
ganda in the preservation of a dominant media frame of the attacks and America's role vis-a-vis its ad-
versaries will be briefly considered. The premise is that the formation of a frame is determined as
much by what the frame includes as by that which it excludes. The process of exclusion is thus a con-
stituent part of the framing process. The substance of dissent that was targeted in the actions hence
recounted, is a matter for the next chapter.
1.5.1.Censorship
'War has never been good for freedom of expression. Before even truth, the first casualty of war is ...
this freedom: the freedom to investigate and report, the freedom to publish criticisms and revelations"
(Marthaz, 2002).
Almost eight months after September 11, Jean-Paul Marthoz, director of Human Rights Watch in Eu-
rope, focused on the toll the attacks had taken on precisely this freedom in an address for World Press
Freedom Day, 3 May 2002. Marthaz's conclusions were discouraging to those who value a free press.
The US government had put a "cloak on information that is unprecedented," said Chuck Lewis, Wash-
ington bureau chief for Hearst newspapers (cited in Shields, 2001).
These restrictions manifested in various guises. Firstly, formal legislation was passed in several coun-
tries limiting media freedom, especially after the ''war on terrorism" was formalised on October 7.
According to UNESCO, eleven countries - mostly in the West - "announced, proposed or adopted"
legal measures to regulate the press more vigorously. 18Among them were America, Britain, Australia,
Canada and members of the EU (Marthaz, 2002). These measures, however, seldom constituted
formal censorship by legislating the parameters of news reports.
Much more pervasive - especially in the US - were requests by government to limit the supposed
damage uncontrolled news coverage of the attacks and its aftermath would have on national security
and civilian morale. This tension - between the media's right to provide information to the public and
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the government's need to protect sensitive information during times of war - is rooted in the American
Civil War, argues Croteau, when generals read Southern newspapers to gain information about troop
strengths and movements (1999: 112).The media sustained a "cordial" relationship with the military in-
to the Second World War, voluntarily complying with restrictions of information "and in many ways
help(ing) promote the Allied war effort". Extensive television coverage of the Vietnam War, however,
changed this alliance after perceptions that irresponsible media coverage sapped support for war. Car-
ruthers cites an estimated 15 percentage points drop in public support for the Vietnam war as casual-
ties rose by a factor of ten (2000: 152). She doubts, however, whether television alone was responsi-
ble (2000: 110, 149). Thus, in the Gulf War, some papers carried announcements on their front pages
declaring that U.S. military censors had approved all information about the war (Croteau, 1999: 113).
In the aftermath of September 11, government "censorship" was different - presidential spokesperson
Ari Fleischer warned during a press briefing that "all Americans must watch what they say" (McMas-
ters, 2001). Pres. George W. Bush severely restricted briefings to congress to stop leaks of sensitive
information; his secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld warned the nation to "expect more secrecy"
and ordered defence contractors to cut off contact with the press, and in the Justice department, John
Ashcroft issued a restrictive policy on requests in terms of the Freedom of Information Act, aimed at in-
creasing government control of "sensitive" information. In a widely publicised request for media re-
straint, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice implored representatives of the five biggest
US television networks, including CNN, not to broadcast complete interviews with Osama bin Laden
as they may contain "coded messages" to terrorist cells, spurring them into action (Gordon Corera in
Baxter et ai, 2001: 73; Zeleny, 2001). Fleischer, however, said the Bush administration never proposed
censorship. "There are no orders," he told the Chicago Tribune on October 12. "These are requests."
Although "requests" directed at the Qatari satellite television station AI-Jazeera not to broadcast inter-
views with bin Laden were not heeded, some US broadcasters complied. Walter Isaacson, president
of CNN, replied: "After hearing Rice we're not going to step on any of the landmines she was talking
about" (Rayner, 2001).
This willingness to enact self-censorship also characterised some newspapers - in Oregon and Texas
columnists were dismissed for criticising the president (Keifer, 2001). Critics were "battered into silen-
ce". Susan Sontag, a writer, made some critical remarks on America's response to September 11 and
received letters calling her a "traitor", wrote Phillip Knightley (2002: 150). "There's a serious attempt to
18 In the United States, state departments and federal agencies withdrew information from their websites they judged too sensitive and US attorney-general
John Ashcroft circulated a memorandum urging federal agencies to exercise "extreme caution" in their handling of requests made under the Freedom of
Information Act, UNESCO reported. (Marthoz, 2002).
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stifle debate," said Sontag. "The big media have been very intimidated ... who decided no gruesome
pictures of the World Trade Centre site were to be published anywhere? I don't think there was any di-
rective but there was extraordinary consensus, a kind of self-censorship by media executives who
concluded these images would be too demoralising for the country." The perception was created that
debate equals dissent and dissent equals a lack of pafriotisrn.t?
Not all journalists welcomed more control. In response to an avowal by John Ashcroft that the news
media would be "kept in the dark" about details of the "war on terror", veteran reporter Walter Cronkite
called for a board to monitor government censorship (Campbell, 2001). This conflict illustrated the
supposed cross-purposes of joumalists and soldiers in wartime. 'The essence of successful warfare is
secrecy," wrote Susan Carruthers. "The essence of successful journalism is publicity" (2000: 157). In
opinion polls the public seemed to value successful warfare more highly. CNN found that 72% of re-
spondents had "no problem" with withholding information from the news media (McMasters, 2001);
The Pew Research Centre for the People and the Press polled 891 adults and found a 60% support
for increased military control over news of the war in Afghanistan (Associated Press, 2001). These
agree with earlier polls that suggested that the public were willing to forego the right to know in order to
sustain civilian morale and patriotism in the Gulf War. Then, the media were prohibited from filming the
flag-draped coffins of U.S. soldiers being unloaded from planes in the United States. 20 'These images
clearly did not threaten the safety of U.S. troops, but they did threaten public support for the war"
(Croteau, 1999: 113). Support for such restrictions brings into question, Philip Taylor argued (in Taylor,
1998: 161), the "role of journalists as custodians of the public's right to know."
In the absence of public pressure to expose material facts about a conflict they might go unreported. In
the Gulf, the military routinely refused estimates of Iraqi deaths. The Defence Intelligence Agency was
threatened with legal action if it would not risk an estimate. Although Colin Powell, then chair of the
joint chiefs of staff, said he was "not terribly interested" in the number of dead Iraqis, the Administration
esfimated that "in the range of 100 000" people perished (Taylor, 1998: 160).21The rationale for that
policy, argues Williams (in Belsey, 1992: 159-160), was that "the public will no longer support any war
19 The irony of dominant opinion was reflected, like in many crises, in jokes purporting to sum up the national mood in America. Wrote Phillip
Knightley in Index on Censorship (2002: 152): "An American manages to squeeze four stars and stripes on to his car and drives downtown with
them fluttering in the breeze. At the traffic lights, another car pulls alongside. It is flying five flags. The two drivers look at each other's display
of patriotism for a second or so then the driver of the car with the five flags snarls at the other: 'Get back to Afghanistan, you fucking terroris!'."
20 Almost 80% of Americans supported the Pentagon's restrictions on journalists covering the war while 60% said there should be "more
control" (Belsey, 1992: 158). In another American poll, 79% said they favoured censorship (Campbell, 1993: 16), and only 21% of respondents
in a BBC survey after the AI-Amiriya massacre in which hundreds of Iraqi civilians perished, approved of images broadcast from the sight of
destruction on the grounds that it "undermined British morale" (Carruthers, 2000: 156).
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involving a large number of civilian casualties". This, Belsey contends, is a "lesson leamed from Viet-
nam which has become the paradigm for understanding the role of the media in contemporary con-
flicts."
Refusals by the American military to allow reporters free access to combat areas in the war inAfghani-
stan made estimates of enemy and civilian deaths all but impossible (Bearak, 2002a; Schmitt, 2002).
Although detailed accounts were consistently given for American casualties, Brig. Gen. John W. Rosa
Jr., deputy director of current operations for the joint chiefs of staff, told The New York Times in Wash-
ington that "several hundred" enemy fighters had been killed. Wrote the Times: "But he and other
officers avoided giving specific numbers because they do not have precise numbers, and, by policy,
do not conduct detailed body counts" (Bearak, 2002b). Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld reportedly
opposed the release of numbers even of "combatant" deaths, fearing "echoes from Vietnam 'body
counts' - often inflated - that haunted his predecessors", the Times reported (Schmitt and Shanker,
2002). Earlier, Human Rights Watch scoffed that the military found the question of civilian deaths "an
irritant, and they avoid if'. Others did risk estimates, wrote the Times:
A few researchers have already done some arithmetic, basing their calculations on various news reports. Prof. MarcW.
Herold, an economist at the University of New Hampshire, added up at least 3,767 civilian casualties from Oct. 7 to
Dec. 6. Carl Conetta, co-director of the Project on Defence Altematives, used a more stringent distillation of media
accounts and concluded that a better guess would be 1,000 to 1,300 deaths. (Bearak, 2002a).
Herold's calculations suggest that, months before the end of the Afghan war, civilian deaths exceeded
that of the attacks on September 11. A failure to put the attacks into perspective by consistently an-
nouncing civilian deaths or pursuing estimates hampered the free flow of information, notwithstanding
reports of confessions by the US military that it did claim civilian lives in military action, such as after an
attack on May 12 in which five peasants died (Gall, 2002).
Editing from portrayals of war accounts of its human cost - on either side of a conflict - may serve
dangerously to "divorce death from war in the mediated public consciousness" (Carruthers, 2000:
275). The public and media support for media restrictions suggest that it was systematically difficult to
frame the "war against terror" in such a way as to enable society, in whose name the war was waged,
to critically examine its progress and outcomes with full knowledge of its human cost. And such know-
ledge is crucial in responsibly establishing the appropriate limits of warfare, pro-active and re-active.
21 Taylor also quotes Brent Scowcroft, George Bush's National Security Advisor, as having said, "Our goal was not to kill people. Our goal was
to destroy the Iraqi army" (1998: 179). As a hostile entity, the Iraqi army, if this discourse be allowed, becomes inanimate (other estimates of Ira-
qi deaths range between 25 000 and 200 000. See Campbell, 1993: 68-9).
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"Unless we find ways of representing war that match its causal complexities, its scale, its abstract,
functional destructiveness, its remoteness from normal human experience and agency," writes Peter
Loizos (in Allen, 1999: 105), "we are condemned to trivialise it and to glamorise it."
1.5.2. Propaganda
If information were generally value-neutral and objective - contested earlier in this chapter - it would
have been anathema to speak of "favourable information". But already in the Second World War (1939
- 1945), the establishment of "propaganda offices" attested to the need to disseminate precisely such
purposive information as but another weapon in the arsenal of modern warfare (Carruthers, 2000: 29).
The desire to portray a cause or conflict as justified has to be as old as politics itself, for where rulers
hold power at the behest of an electorate, public support for state action is crucial. So, too, is
international support - America's "public diplomacy" (a preferred synonym for propaganda, suggests
The Economist, 2001) after September 11 was aimed primarily at engaging Muslim opinion and
rallying support for the "war on terror" in the West and the Middle East especially, where opposition to
attacks on Afghanistan mounted quickly after the first bombing on October 7 (The Economist, 2001).
While diplomatic persuasion should not fall within the ambit of a definition of "propaganda", the clan-
destine dissemination of "favourable" information - true or false - which might influence views on the
justness of America's "war on terror", would qualify as propaganda. The revelation by the New York
Times on February 19, 2001 of a "propaganda office" in the Pentagon initiated a fierce debate about
the merits of such endeavours. The Times reported not only long-standing "information warfare
against hostile nations" by the American military, but exposed the existence of the "Office of Strategic
Influence" (OSI) in the Pentagon, created shortly after the September 11 attacks in response to "con-
cerns in the administration that the United States was losing public support overseas for its war on
terrorism, particularly in Islamic countries" (Oao and Schmitt, 2002). On the drawing board were plans
to "plant news items with foreign media organisations through outside concerns that might not have
obvious ties to the Pentagon", programmes of "disinformation" and "public affairs that rely on truthful
news releases". One of the office's instruments would be the army's Psychological Operations Com-
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mand (the so-called "psyop" unit), involved in dropping fliers and broadcasting radio programs22 into
Afghanistan encouraging Taliban and AI Qaeda soldiers to surrender, the Times said.
A day after the Times's revelation, Donald Rumsfeld denied that the Pentagon was issuing "disinfor-
mation" or that the OSI had plans to "place false and deceptive information in the US or foreign press
to advance the war effort" (Rumsfeid, 2002). He likened America's use of "tactical deception" to its
policy in World War II to mislead Germany into suspecting a D-Day invasion at Calais and not Nor-
mandy. Not once did he use the word "propaganda". Nevertheless, the OSI was closed after a public
outcry and the perception that the office was prepared to lie (Steyn, 2002). On July 29, 2002, the
Times reported on renewed efforts to counter "growing Anti-American sentiment overseas" by promo-
ting "cross-cultural understanding and to sell America's policies abroad" (Dao, 2002).
This initiative was not called "propaganda". But neither was the dominant portrayal of the attacks in the
American press. And neither, in the words of Rumsfeid, were the activities of the OSI. If propaganda is
aptly described as "that symbolic form of communication ... marshalled to encourage one side in a po-
litical or ideological struggle and to discourage another", as Poynter's Roy Peter Clark suggests (Clark,
2001), orthodox applications of the definition of propaganda need to be reassessed. For whether it is
right or wrong, much of joumalistic endeavour after September 11 fits Clark's definition.
Measures to stifle debate about September 11 notwithstanding, notable commentators in the West
attacked dominant views espoused in the American press and elsewhere. These challenges to
hegemonic discourse - and a challenge seated in the redefinition of "terror" - is next discussed.
22 These broadcasts filled the void after the U.S. bombed the transmitters of Voice of Shari a radio, replacing local broadcasts with "anti-Taliban,
pro-US programmes featuring traditional Afghan music, blood-curdling threats to the Taliban and soothing messages to the local populace in
Dari and Pashto ... " (Callaghan and Jayasekera, 2002). These programmes were broadcast on the same 657,1107 and 7084v kHz frequency
Voice of Sharia had previously used ... US State Department asked the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Hamid bin Khalifa al- Thani, to use his
government's influence to "soften the reporting stance of ... Al-Jazeera". The emir refused. AI-Jazeera became a sought-after source of
information especially after September 11th, as the sole distributor of video-interviews with bin Laden, which were dropped at Al-Jazeera's
. th
offices In Kabul. The US destroyed AI-Jazeera's Kabul bureau on November 13 .
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2. MANAGING DISSENT
If, in chapter 1, a dominant discourse emerged in the immediate press reaction to the attacks on New
York and Washington, as well as testimony to sometimes inadvertent compliance with government de-
mands for restraint, this chapter will show that there were other voices, more critical of America's world
role and receptive to explanations for the attacks that did not cast Americans in the role of innocent
victims and George W. Bush as "leader of the free world" (as in Newsweek Extra Edition, 2001: 32).
Proponents of dissenting views not only challenged assumptions of American innocence, but also
portrayals of September 11's aggressors as uncontroversially "evil" by framing America itself as a pur-
veyor of terrorism. The most vociferous critics posited that dissent to the dominant view in govem-
ment, the public and the media (as explicated above) was stifled by a press prone to patriotism and
self-censorship and a govemment that urged them to "watch what they say". There was, to be sure,
significant dissent inAmerica. Demonstrations of opposition to the Afghan war on university campuses
(cited by Chomsky, 2001a) and the dismissal of critical journalists (see 1.5.1. supra) suggest at least
some plurality of opinion, although suppressed. To juxtapose the dominant view with dissenting views,
two prominent critics of American foreign policy in general will be taken in this chapter as representa-
tives of a broad - and heterogeneous - stream of thought. They are not representative of the media,
although one, John Pilger, is a journalist. They are also not representative of dissent in America - only
Naam Chomsky, academic, linguist, philosopher and social critic, hails from the U.S.A. But as promi-
nent critics and recognised dissidents they poignantly point to alternative narrative frames, worthy to
be taken cognisance of.
Whereas the dominant framing of the attacks, and of the war that it spawned, became fortified in a
media seemingly unwilling to pursue truth at all cost, dissident views point to a domain outside of the
dominant frame. Inhabitants of this domain, Pilger and Chomsky among them, challenge the c0-
ordinates of and motives behind the dominant, "American" frame. And in that challenge, they question
the ethics of the approach followed overwhelmingly in the American media.
The following exposition of their views is followed by a discussion on the aptness of the term "terrorist"
in reference to the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks, in the light of critiques both by Pilger and
Chomsky. In fashioning definitions to suit ideology, a subtle form of censorship has manifested in the
mainstream media. The re-presentation of Americans as terrorists, countering such discourse, was
and still is a powerful form of dissent. The use of censorship - including self-censorship - in the
ensuing ''war on terror" will then be considered and weighed against the media's supposed duty to
pursue the truth, and the public's apparent disinterest in such a pursuit.
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2.1. Questioning the popular frame
2. 1. 1. John Pilger
In articles widely published and controversially received, Pilger23 questioned the intellectual honesty of
portrayals of America as a victim of terrorism. His response to September 11 was not provocative in
denying the attacks' atrocity - he spoke of "carnage" and "suffering" in New York (Pilger, 2001a). But it
was provocative in its opposition to historically isolated portrayals of the attacks that served a national
moral rectitude after what many in Americans perceived to have been unilateral acts of "war".
Pilger forestalled a simplified sense of victimhood in America by an analysis in the New Statesman of
"suffering" caused by Westem policies in the Middle East. He overthrew the pervasive American mo-
nopoly on the damning use of the word "terrorism" by conferring on America the title of the "greatest
source of terrorism on earth". This is complemented with an exposition of American atrocities in the
Middle East and the argument that Arab animosity is the result of a morally corrupt foreign policy and
especially the suffering of Palestinians at the hand of American-sponsored Israel. 24
"Far from being the terrorists of the world," he argued, "the Islamic peoples have been its victims - that
is, the victims of American fundamentalism, whose power, in all its forms, military, strategic and econo-
mic, is the greatest source of terrorism on earth." That the West is unlikely to condone such use of the
word "terrorism" does not surprise Pilger, as he believes that the mainstream media consistently fail to
convey the suffering caused by Western policies. He notes that on September 9th, 2001, eight people
were killed in southern Iraq when British and American planes bombed civilian areas, but this went
largely unreported. In what he succinctly and controversially terms "the slaughter known as the Gulf
war"25 an estimated 200 000 Iraqis died, according to the Health Education Trust, and a further million
civilians, half,of them children, have since perished in Iraq because of sanctions imposed by the West.
The imposition of such historical contexts force alternative interpretations on key events in the Ameri-
can consciousness of the past decades, including 11 September.
23 John Pilger is a seasoned war correspondent (working in Vietnam, Cambodia, Egypt, India, Bangladesh and Biafra), television and radio
journalist and contributor to publications as diverse as The Guardian, The Independent, New Statesman, The New York Times, The Los Angeles
Times and The Nation in New York. He is an outspoken critic of dominant Western ideology and political thinking. See
http://pilger.carlton.comlhome/biography
24 Arab hatred of America is widely attributed to America's policies in the region, as the London-based The Economist argued in an article about
failed peace initiatives in Palestine: "The Arab world's anti-Americanism [drew] vitality from the assumption that the United States, its interest in
the Middle East limited to oil and Iraq, supports Israel in its occupation of Palestinian land". (The Economist, 2002a)
25 Richard Keeble (in Kieran, 1998: 66) also asks whether the Gulf War in 1990-1 should not instead have been construed as a series of
massacres "in the absence of a viable enemy", pointing again to the possibilities of reality-construction if one defines critical moments in the
history of conflict differently.
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The very Taliban government President George W. Bush decided to attack three weeks after the
writing of Pilger's article, was a creation of America's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after its war in
cohorts with the Afghan mujahidin against the Soviets in the 1980s (cited in Baxter et al., 2001: 104).
Indeed, after commencing covert aid to the Afghan mujahidin in 1979, America provided via Pakistan
"overt aid on a massive scale" from 1986 (Marsden, 2001: 28) to the Islamist fighters who would later
build training camps from which AI Qaeda would presumably operate and who ruled Afghanistan as
the Taliban from 1996 to November 2001. This raises legitimate questions about an American foreign
policy unmoved by consistent concems over democracy and human rights and steered, instead, by
medium term interests such as removing a Soviet-sponsored Afghan government at the height of the
Cold War. It also engenders suspicions that America's war in Afghanistan may be less about a con-
cem for "democracy" and "freedom", as George W. Bush asks the world to believe, and more about
the strategic importance of Afghanistan in the distribution network of oil in the Middle East, Pilger
suggests. Such insinuations, although they may not carelessly be made, are vital for the sustenance
of healthy public debate, unimpeded by narrowly construed ideas about the "national interest".
By plunging headlong into the conflicts of the Middle-East in a piece on September 11, Pilger (2001a)
necessitates the question whether these very conflicts - in which America partakes as ally of Israel -
lie perhaps at the root of the attacks on America. Bar the references to the Gulf war, he focuses almost
exclusively on Palestinian suffering in the New Statesman article, forcing a contextualisation of
America's woes and relegating the search for explanations of the causes thereof from the exclusive
domain of the "evil" other to the self-conscious sphere of the self, now also implicated in wrongdoing.
Unusual references to phenomena such as "American fundamentalism" challenge the view that
America's style of democracy and approach to religion is the proper standard. Instead, it implicitly
transfers the pejorative connotations of "Islamic fundamentalism" onto the widely accepted American
norm. It suggests that, if the facts about suffering in the Middle-East were more widely known, and
journalists were consistent in their application of similar words to similar things, America would long
ago have been denounced as "terrorist" itself. But politicians, too, ignore this fact, says Pilger. "That
Tony Blair, whose government sells lethal weapons to Israel and has sprayed Iraq and Yugoslavia with
cluster bombs and depleted uranium ... can be taken seriously when he now speaks about the
'shame' of the 'new evil of mass terrorism' says much about the censorship of our collective sense of
how the world is managed. One of Blair's favourite words - fatuous r: comes to mind. Alas, it is no
comfort to the families of thousands of Americans who have died so terribly that the perpetrators of
their suffering may be the product of westem policies" (2001a: 11).
In two articles (2001band 2001c) published after the October launch of attacks in Afghanistan, Pilger
persists in challenging dominant views on justice and "framing". He details the "cruelty" of the use of
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duster bombs in the Afghan war, deeming them weapons "designed specifically for acts of terrorism"
(2001b). He draws parallels between the killing of innocent civilians by America in Afghanistan and the
killing of innocent civilians on September 11th. These acts of killing were equally unjustified, he insists.
By comparing the death toll of about 3000 in the World Trade Centre attacks to the similar number of
Iraqi infants who die every month because of the United Nations' "genocidal blockade ... on the
suffering people of Iraq", Pilger does not so much diminish the atrocity on September 11th as he
demands a condemnation of the concomitant suffering in Iraq in proportion to its magnitude.
He would later question celebrations marking the "conquesf' of Kabul on 13 November 2001 (Baxter
et ai, 2001: 10), challenging the framing of the Northern Alliance as liberators in the light of their
supposed cruelty and murder of "an estimated 50,000 people" in four years of "intemecine feuding"
before the Taliban conquest in 1996. Therefore America has never fought a ''war against terror", but
substituted "bad terrorists" for "good terrorists" instead. 'What this false victory has demonstrated,"
Pilger concludes (2001c), "is that, to those in power in Washington and London, certain human lives
have greater worth than others and that the killing of only one set of civilians is a crime. If we accept
that, we beckon the repetition of atrocities on all sides, again and again."
2.1.2. Naam Chomsky
"The new millennium began with two monstrous crimes: the terrorist attacks of 11 September and the
reaction to them, surely taking a far greater toll of innocent lives" (Chomsky, 2001).
Deconstructing the established binary oppositions in public discourse is a favoured activity of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professor of linguistics whom the London Independent
newspapers hails as one of the greatest living philosophers (Powell, 2001). In Naam Chomsky, John
Pilger finds an ardent academic ally in his attempts to confuse the dominant view.
If dominant discourse dictated after September 11 that a terrorist is necessarily a foreign "other",
Chomsky shares with Pilger the belief that although the attacks were "historical events" because of
their targets and the immediacy of their considerable death toll, the crimes which they constituted were
"far from unusual in the annals of violence that falls short of war" (Chomsky, 2002: 24).
Just as Pilger blamed a silent mainstream media for much of Westem ignorance of foreign parallels to
their own suffering, Chomsky lambasted the media for not reporting on the humanitarian toll of the
Afghan war. He cites the large-scale disruption of food aid to Afghans after the October attacks and
the disruption, likewise, of the planting that provides 80% of the country's grain supplies by the
subsequent war, according to the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). Air strikes
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further turned cities into "ghost towns", the press reported, and destroyed power and water supplies in
what Chomsky calls "a form of biological warfare", drawing on Westem fears of such attacks.
He referred to the Afghan war as a "silent genocide" and to the damage of unexploded US ordnance
as "torture", but fears the "fate of these miserable people will never be known, or even investigated, if
past precedents are a guide". Chomsky posits that Afghans are regarded in the West merely as an
"uncivilised tribe", echoing Winston Churchill's "contemptuous reference to Afghans and Kurds ... 80
years ago", and he deems their fate in the "war against terror" to be "conventional" (2002: 26).
Chomsky argued in Index on Censorship as in Powell's Washington Post piece that the Afghan war is
a "terrorist war" instead, but not framed that way. "In practice, terrorism is the violence that they commit
against us - whoever we happen to be. It would be hard to find a historical exception."
Fashioning his own exception, Chomsky cast America as the world's leading purveyor of "state terror-
ism" and Osama bin Laden as the "foremost private practitioner" (cited in Powell, 2001: 13). The book
in which he argues that the war in Afghanistan is morally and legally "appalling" and an act of "state
terrorism", 9-11, sold 160 000 copies in its first weeks, said the Post. Still, Chomsky is "ignored by the
Mafia that controls America's op-ed pages," according to the editor of the Los Angeles Times book re-
view, Steve Wasserman. Is this because he considers US intellectuals a "Iap-dog class, scampering
forth to bark on command of their masters", and disagreements among them as minimal- "at the level
of statistical error"? It might be because he fearlessly draws analogies between American and Nazi
attempts "to rationalise state violence in pursuit of intemational aims", which the Post ascribes to him.
Like Pilger, Chomsky frustrates clear opposition between US "good" and Taliban "evil" in citing that
America had armed and trained many of these "fundamentalists". Although he has always described
the September 11 attacks as an atrocity, he believes them to "pale next to the West's 'deep-seated
culture of terrorism'." Although Chomsky and Pilger both attempt to bring to light salient but secret
information on current affairs, specifically about the attacks and its aftermath, their foremost feat is the
exposure of a stifled discourse about the war in which America cannot but be framed as innocent.
Thus they challenge received wisdom about the definition of "terrorism" and "fundamentalism" and the
applicability of descriptors such as "slaughter" and "genocide" only to acts by foreigners and foes. In
such a counter-discourse, it would seem absurd to propagate a narrative of American innocence
(chapter 1), suggest parallels between the West's "just war" (World War II) and the "war against terror"
and intimate that, on September 11, "freedom" was attacked. Instead, America is a "purveyor" of
terrorism and instigator of a "slaughter" in Iraq - framed as a war.
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Such a framing prevents a response of moral certitude to September 11 . If such an interpretation
were pervasive, the primary reaction to the attacks might have been a critical examination of American
foreign policy, acknowledging that it might have played a role in fomenting hatred towards Americans.
It would also have shifted the logical origin of the conflict beyond September 11 to acts preceding it,
thereby forcing a more nuanced framing of aggressor and victim in the understanding that these terms
depend for its verity on the perspective of the speaker.
In the act itself of redefining terms such as "terrorism" lies one of the most poignant forms of dissent to
an orthodox interpretation of September 11. In the next section, therefore, the justness of a debate
about the meaning of this term and examples of its application after September 11will be considered.
2.2. 'Terror' defined
The purpose of considering the debate on the definition of "terrorism" is to evaluate whether its perva-
sive use in the American media, as outlined in chapter 1, was legitimate. If it can be shown that the
word is necessarily subjective - as language theory suggests - but applied only to non-Americans in
the American press, its use supports the argument not only that an unashamedly pro-American view
permeated initial reportage on the September 11attacks, but that the language used in the press deli-
neated "terrorism" in such a way that it could not be used outside of the dominant frame. A monopoly
on the definition of terrorism censures altemative interpretations of the order of events before and after
September 11, infusing only the acts of others with suggestions of aggression and the acts of the self
with an implicit innocence. Reserving a word such as terrorism only for one group constrains free ex-
pression, shaping "innocent" descriptions into acts of covert censorship.
The debate on definitions is therefore placed amid a discussion of censorship, attesting to its perva-
sive influence on what is said and what is not said in the so-called "war against terror". I will firstly show
that the meaning of the word "terror" has been rigorously debated for decades. Language theory, and
this debate, suggest that the word is not value-neutral. Its reservation in the American press for "for-
eign aggressors" suggests a double standard in applying the word, for it has been argued that America
itself has committed "terror", and the current use of the word admits to no such ambivalence. The use
of "terrorism", moreover, has consequences for the way in which those implicated by it are legally
classified, just as definitions in times of war often determine the propriety of military action. This dis-
cussion precedes the exposition in chapter 3 of orthodox joumalistic values espousing impartiality and
a new wave that permits precisely the kind of "fashionable bias" that I contend informed the use of the
word "terrorism" in the American press.
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2.2. 1. Elusive consensus
While it is easy, based on its pervasive use in the American press (see chart 1), to assume that "terror-
ism" denotes but one, "objectively" definable action, consensus on the precise meaning of the word
has been so elusive since its first use in the French Revolution (Sammonds, 2002: 8) that it is gene-
rally accepted today that its exact application depends on who uses it, and when. Groups that would
warrant, in 'Westem" eyes, the label of "terrorist", might prefer, for instance, to call themselves ''free-
dom fighters" or "guerrillas", 26 and actually be perceived as heroes in another community (Reynolds in
Baxter et aI., 2001: 93). The applicability of the word might moreover wane as political milieus trans-
form. In the Irish struggle for independence from Britain in the early zo" century, independence fighters
were labelled "terrorists" but later revered by communities as heroes of that country's independence
struggle (Keane in Baxter et aI., 2001: 53), as was arguably the case with independence movements
like South Africa's African National Congress, long labelled "terrorist", now democratic rulers.
So diverse have been interpretations of the word, especially in the latter half of the zo" century when
terrorism was regarded by some as a "political growth industry" (Horovitz in Schmid, 1983: ix), that
Alex Schmid collected 109 definitions of "terrorism" in his encyclopaedic research guide Political
Terrorism in 1983 (Schmid, 1983: ix). In its foreword, Irving Horovitz of Rutgers University intimated
that, when the word is "probed with care," one becomes "painfully aware of its manifold forms, sizes
and shapes". J. Bowyer Bell remarked: ''The academic response to terrorism has been ahistorical, ex-
aggerated, and closely associated with congenial political postures. There is no consensus on the
bounds of terrorism: some observers define as terrorism nearly every act of disruptive violence and ig-
nore violence by established regimes; some sholars want psychopaths and criminals to be examined
and others do not; and there are those who, defending a cherished cause, deny that their patriots are
terrorists ... No one has a definition of terrorism ... " (Schmid, 1983: 2). Still, many have been advan-
ced. Schmid's 109 include -
• "Terrorism is a method of action by which an agent tends to produce terror in order to impose his
domination" (Waciorski, 1939, in Schmid, 1983: 119)
• "...The threat or the use of violence for political ends" (Crozier, 1960, in Schmid, 1983: 120)
• "Terror is usually defined as a period characterised by political executions, as during revolution,
especially such a period (also called the 'Reign of Terror') during the French Revolution (from May
26 Vorster (1984: 12) states that some groups prefer to refer to themselves as "freedom fighters" or "guerrillas" to escape the "negative connotations" of
the word "terrorism". "The choice of terms used to describe acts of terror with a political objective, can be important for the way in which the public
interprets events ... The description ofa movement as 'terrorist' can colour it negatively, while 'guerrilla' lends it a degree of legitimacy."
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1793 to 1794). But sociologically, it is a person or thing or practice that causes intense fear and
suffering, whose aim is to intimidate, subjugate, especially as a political weapon or policy... "
(Roucek, 1962, in Schmid, 1983: 121)
• "A strategy of unlawful violence calculated to inspire terror in the general public or a significant
segment thereof in order to achieve a power-outcome or to propagandise a particular claim or
grievance" (Bassiouni, 1979, in Schmid, 1983: 144).27
Amid this plethora of definitions, September 11 spawned a new wave, many legally enacted. Some of
these, such as that proposed in Britain's 2000 Terrorism Act (Sammonds, 2002: 9), were severely
attacked by human rights lawyers and NGOs such as Amnesty International that derided it as "vaguely
worded and open to subjective interpretation". The UK definition might even include the actions of
protesters against genetically modified crops or those who disrupt computer systems. Moreover, it
shifts the burden of proof of innocence to the suspect.
Such a confused narrative environment did not impede the unanimous interpretation of "terrorism" as
an exclusively foreign act in the American press nor unanimity that the attacks constituted "terrorism".
That respected newspapers such as the Washington Post (Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners, Destroy World
Trade Centre, Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead"), Los Angeles Times (Terrorists attack News York,
Pentagon") and Wall Street Journal. ("Terrorists Destroy World Trade Centre, Hit Pentagon in Raid
with Hijacked Jets") labelled the attacks and attackers "terrorist", suggests a dominant understanding
of the word. The 19 men later identified as those who hijacked the four aeroplanes were labelled
"terrorists" a posteriori, after the act, because their actions induced terror28 - a seemingly appropriate
application of the current standard definition of a "terrorist" as a "person who uses or favours violent
and intimidating methods of coercing a government or community" (Oxford Concise Dictionary).
27 A recent definition of terrorism is proposed in Alexander, 1990: ix: Terrorism is "a process of deliberate employment of psychological intimidation and
physical violence by sovereign states and subnational groups to attain strategic and political objections in violation of law". Lord Chalfont defines it so in
the same book: "Terrorism is the deliberate, systematic murder, maiming, or menacing of the innocent to inspire fear in order to gain political ends" (1990:
13). It furthermore "idealises violence", "promotes totalitarianism" instead of democracy and is a "substitute for the political process".
28 Seven newspapers used only the word "terror" in large type in their main headline: The Daily Titan, California State University, Fullerton, p. 6;
Orlando Sentinel, Extra, p. 26; The Des Moines Register, Extra, Iowa, p. 38; Asbury Park Press, Extra, p. 65; The Charlotte Observer, Extra,
Charlotte, North Carolina, p. 75; Daily Press, Extra, Newport News, Virginia, p. 109, and the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, Extra, Wisconsin, p.
119. "Day of Terror" appeared in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin. Extra. p. 31; The Times, Munster, indiana, p. 36; News & Record, Extra. Greensboro,
Northern Carolina, p. 76; The Oregonian, Portland, Oregon, p. 85, and The Tennessean, Nashville, p. 98. One paper each used "Terror Strikes"
(Missoulian, Montana, p. 63), "Reign of Terror" (The Boston Globe, Extra, Massachusetts, p. 49) and "Morning of Terror" (Daily Kent Stater,
Ohio, p. 81). Other examples of the rampant use of variations on the word "terror", include "Terrorized" (The Beaumont Enterprise, Texas, p. 101, and
the St. Paul, Minnesota, Pioneer Press, p. 57),
39
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2.2. Pejorative value
Rife dissent over its definition shows that groups prefer not to be tainted by the label "terrorist", already
suggesting that any intimation of an "objective" definition is naïve. A pejorative word, "terrorism" cannot
be value-free, not least because it is a linguistic signification. As shown in chapter 1, language impo-
ses a "structure of values, social and economic in origin, on whatever is represented" (Fowler, 1991:
4). Schmid acknowledges, as Chomsky and Pilger implicitly argue when they purposely apply "terror-
ism" to American actions, that "the question of definition ... cannot be detached from the question of
who is the defining agency." Jennifer Hocking writes: "Replete with implied moral opprobrium, a so-
cially assigned value and meaning, an imputation of illegitimacy and outrage, 'terrorism' can never fit
the apparently value-neutral typologies much used in the social sciences" (Carruthers, 2000: 163).
When the language tool, in this case the word "terrorism", signifies, furthermore, an act that is not
morally neutral, its definition is bound to become the focus of an ideological tug-of-war. After Septem-
ber '11, Islamic diplomats gathered for a summit in Malaysia questioned the dominant definition of
"terrorism" on the grounds that "hundreds of countries gained liberation from occupation through arm-
ed struggle or other means and no one described such struggles as 'terrorist campaigns' before Sep-
tember 11" (Kuala Lumpur Bemama, 2002). They bemoaned the implicit symmetry that the Westem
media afforded the words "Islamic" and "terrorism" and urged the United Nations to ban the use of
"stereotype racial expressionsë' in the local and intemational media".30
One prominent media outlet in Britain, albeit not a newspaper, had already reconsidered its use of the
word "terrorism" before the April conference in Kuala Lumpur. On November 15, 2001, The Guardian
reported that the BBC had taken a "policy decision not to describe the attacks on the US as 'terrorism'
... [lest] the service [loses] its reputation for impartiality around the world if it were seen to use such a
subjective term" (Wells, 2001). The BBC's decision was based precisely on the assumption that not all
people understand "terrorism" in the same way. "However appalling and disgusting it was, there will
nevertheless be a constituency of our listeners who don't regard it (the attacks) as terrorism. Descri-
bing it as such could downgrade our status as an impartial and independent broadcaster," said Mark
Damazer, the BBC's deputy director of news. The BBC would use the word "attack" instead in recogni-
tion that the attacks may be differently viewed from an "international perspective".
29 On the use of stereotypes, Walter Lippmann wrote lucidly: "There is economy in this, For the attempt to see all things freshly and in detail,
rather than as types and generalities, is exhausting, and among busy affairs practically out of the question", What matters is the character of the
stereotypes, and the gullibility with which we employ them. And these in the end depend upon those inclusive patterns which constitute our
philosophy of life" (cited in Cohen, 1992: 163),
30 In the Gulf War, the Arab League Council complained about an "unjust, hostile and tendentious media campaign against Iraq" (Taylor, 1998: 164).
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Such a decision might also be informed by the ideal of consistency in language use. Ajoumalist would
presumably not want to be forced to refer to sanctioned Westem responses to terrorism as "terrorism"
itself just because they share certain attributes, such as the killing of civilians that was common both to
the attacks on September 11 and the war in Afghanistan. An American pressure group condemned a
Minneapolis newspaper after the attacks for presumed "double standards" in the use of the word
"terrorism" (FAIR, April 2002). The Minneapolis Star- Tribune had referred to the September 11 attacks
as "terrorism" because members of AI-Qaeda had been convicted of "terrorist" activities in America,
but not to aggressors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as "terrorists". The Tribune defended its
approach by defining AI-Qaeda as a "nongovernmental group" carrying out attacks on civilians - which
it supposed distinguished it from parties to the Palestine feud. The media watchdog FAIR that aired
the pressure group's complaints, reserved, however, harsh criticism for the group itself, after it admit-
ted it would not call the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima "terrorism" although countless more civilians
were killed than in the September attacks, because the bomb was dropped to combat an "evil force".
Whether an action is defined as "terrorism" depends undeniably on the perspective from which it is
defined, as the above examples show. Defining the acts of September 11 as "terrorism", which most
newspapers did, defines the actions of the attackers on that day as an illegitimate use of force. The
BBC World Service poses a notable antithesis to the approach of the American press, in that it
acknowledges that the same event can be described differently from different perspectives.
This does not suppose, however, that the event cannot accurately be described. It merely admits a
vantage point. Just as the impossibility of achieving complete "objectivity" in reporting (as shown in
chapter 1) does not render the search for truth obsolete, so too does difficulty in defining "terrorism"
not make the concept dispensable, writes Paul Wilkinson (Alexander, 1990: 26). The same can be
said of other disputes over terms such as democracy, imperialism and revolution, "because a sufficient
common understanding of the meaning of these terms makes them useful, indeed essential, in scho-
larly discourse and political debate." Usage of any term, however, has consequences, as I will briefly
argue below. And usage remains ever vulnerable to critical evaluation, which, if it does not negate the
term "terrorism" altogether, necessitates consistency in its application, as will be argued in chapter 3.
2.2.3. 'Deadly wordplay'
If the definition of the word "terrorism" is not cast in stone nor value-free, as contended above, then the
choice to use the word betrays a value judgement. If the word itself cannot be avoided - for if "terror"
exists, and it does, there has to be "terrorists", too - then the user has to take cognisance of the
values, judgements and possible consequences incidental to its use.
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This intimation begs the media not only to be careful and consistent when labelling someone a
"terrorist", but forces an appreciation that the label does not leave the labelled unscathed.
Whereas some celebrated the attacks on New York and Washington (Newsweek Extra Edition, 2001:
46) and cast Osama bin Laden as hero, not villain, supposed accomplices of the men who hijacked
the planes on September 11were soon being categorised by America as "enemy combatants" - with
severe consequences. These "suspects" in America's "war against terror" - which numbered 2,700 a
year after the attacks (Time, 2002: 16) - were incarcerated at a strictly guarded military facility in Cuba.
Their classification as "enemy combatants" purported to place regulations about their trial and treat-
ment beyond the reach of the Geneva convention, and was fiercely criticised by human rights groups
and the former chief war crimes prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, justice Richard
Goldstone, now heading an international task group on terror that aims to articulate ways for protecting
national security without compromising civil rights. Goldstone denounced America's refusal to classify
the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay as "prisoners of war", albeit mainly because he deems such power
of classification to lie elsewhere and not with the American military (cited in Schneider, 2001). The
classification, nonetheless, shapes not only perceptions about people but also their subsequent fate -
it affects and creates, not merely reflects.
It also ranks and categorises people according to their liability to become targets for military action. In
a war in Afghanistan which clearly purported to root out the "terrorist" network AI-Qaeda and the
Taliban which gave them succour, the lack of statistics on Afghan civilian casualties (cited above) is not
the only indication that the line between combatant and civilian was sometimes arbitrarily drawn.
It first needs to be acknowledged that the line is indeed drawn and does not exist a priori. It is easy for
someone who might consider herself a civilian to become a "combatanf' in the eyes of an enemy who
deems her a legitimate target notwithstanding prior "classification". Classificatory lines in war, delinea-
ting definitions of "legitimate" and "illegitimate" targets and so determining who might be hit with a
missile, for example, can also be re-drawn in the heat of battle: Priest (2002) avers this happened in
Afghanistan. In an article in the International Herald-Tribune, Priest details the decision-making pro-
cess of an American Special Forces Team on bombing raids over Afghanistan.
It constituted, in the words of a participant soldier, a "terminology game". He told his unit, eager to hit
but careful only to hit "legitimate targets": "Yes, it is a civilian village, mud hut, like everything else in
this country. But don't say that. Say it's a military compound. It's a built-up area, barracks, command
and control. Just like with the convoys - if it really was a convoy with civilian vehicles they were using
for transport, we would just say, 'Hey, military convoy, troop transport' " (Priest, 2002).
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This illustrates nothing directly about the media. But it shows how definitions can create a reality in
which the very same action can be either permitted or forbidden. It shows, thereby, the confluence of
reflection and affection in a way that urges responsible media reports, for they help fashion definitions.
Through inconsistent use of terms such as "terrorist", the media blurs the legitimate boundaries of
meaning to suit nationalist ends. The American press did just that by failing to ask whether Americans
themselves might not also be reasonable deemed "terrorists", as Chomsky and Pilger argue.
Perceptions about the enemy shape actions aimed at the enemy. If an enemy is "relentlessly demon-
ised", as were the British in the mind of the journalist Fergal Keane as child in Northern Ireland, they
are easily disposed of: "The version of history I was handed down emphasised the manly and honour-
able nature of our warriors, and relentlessly demonised the British. It was nonsense. But the adheren-
ce to this myth enabled men to kill without mercy and to justify their actions to future generations"
(Baxter et al., 2001: 53). Likewise, Islamic groups expressed fears after September 11 that the media's
portrayals of Islamists and terrorists would invite accusations of "terrorism" on to innocent Muslims. Ira-
nian joumalists feared that "terrorist" would be "narrowly defined as anyone who posed a threat to the
West or Israel, with everyone else fair game" (Mobassar, 2002: 156).
And at an extraordinary session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers on Terrorism held in
Kuala Lumpur in April, dr. Abdulouahed Belkezis expressed fear that the September 11 attacks would
be "used as a pretext to spread terror, fear, intimidation and coercion in international relations at an un-
precedented scale never known in modem history" (Kuala Lumpur Bemama, 2002).
Wilkinson avers that the term "terrorism" is much too often conceptually problematised, as done here,
and that some have "tried to deny that any common usage exists as a device for obstructing co-opera-
tion in policies to combat terrorism" (in Alexander, 1990: 26). As stated, this is not the intention here. In
the admitted absence of a single, ultimately true or correct definition, there is nevertheless a consen-
sus definition (see Schmidt in Alexander et ai, 1990: 27). The necessary ingredient seems to be "coer-
cive intimidation". The meaning of "terrorism", as argued, depends much on who uses it, but is not
reducible only to use. Matthew Kieran writes: "Meaning is not straightforwardly reducible to use. For
we can misuse and misinterpret the meaning of something, whether because we lack an under-
stanaing of the appropriate context or because we misunderstand the publicly governed rules which
determine how a concept or term ought to be applied" (Kieran, 1998: 29).
Indeed, there are atrocities committed against civilian populations that "indisputably come within the
definition of terrorism", as the Index on Censorship pointed out. "But definitions are self-serving, and
double standards protect the terrorist state" (Index on Censorship, 2002: 16). Double standards are
evident in the framing of terrorism against the West as a foremost abuse of human rights, while defen-
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ding similar actions by Western nations by using friendlier descriptors. By framing terrorism as the "ulti-
mate abuse of human rights," the abuse of human rights often concomitant with wars on terrorism is
reduced to merely the lesser of two evils, and therefore tolersble."
It is not suggested that the Washington Post or any American newspaper erred in describing the acts
of September 11 as "terrorisf'. They were evidently so. But applying consistent standards for its use
will anticipate and answer the complaint that "terrorisf' is merely another word for the enemy, from
whichever perspective. As in propaganda, politically motivated definitions tend to obscure other se-
mantic possibilities that may be less sympathetic to a dominating cause. After World War II the histo-
rian John Dower argued that the deception of propaganda in wartime lies not mainly in false claims of
enemy atrocities, as were widely publicised in later wars and in the Gulf, "but in the pious depiction of
such behaviour as peculiar to the other side" (cited in Campbell, 1993: 79). The same can be said for
the dominant definition of "terrorism" in the American press after September 11.
31 During the Reagan administration, the mainstream media duplicated, writes Carruthers, "the state's own (highly partial) allocation of labels, 'in such a
way as to associate an identification of 'terrorist' practice exclusively with the foreign other, and correspondingly to the self (and allies) with the identity of
a victim of terrorism ... Playing on a sense of American victimhood, sensational, high-profile reporting of terrorism also served (in the 1980's) to build
consensus ... for ... extraordinary counter-terrorism measures, which might have been questioned had the enemy not seemed both so threatening and so
impervious to less forceful treatment." (2000: 193).
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3. PARTISAN FRAMING
Amid urgent crisis and looming deadlines thousands of journalists around the world compiled a myriad
accounts of the attacks on September 11 for the next day's newspaper. In America - the nation on a
near war footing - some papers were vocal in their vilification of the attackers, almost unanimously
labelling them "terrorists". "Bastards!" barked the San Francisco Examiner (see Addendum M). Others
employed much restraint - the New York Times would later earn seven Pulitzer prizes for its coverage
of the attacks and its aftermath, introduced on September 12 with a cautious "U.S. Attacked".
Although there were critics, among them Pilger and Chomsky, who expressed different views, the
newspapers and magazines examined here were generally sympathetic to America in its assignment
of roles in the conflict (the U.S. as victim, not villain), its reaction to the aggression ("Unthinkable!" not
''we told you this might happen") and its acceptance of its own role as fiercely American institutions
('We Mourn", said the Washington Sun; "One Nation ... Indivisible", The Daily Mississippian). The
press indulged in pregnant analogies to previous violent attacks such as at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and
subsequent American victories such as Iwo Jima near the end of World War II.
In these framings of the attacks, and amid suggestions that alternatives would not gladly be tolerated,
the press emerged as more than mere spectators of an amoral event. The attacks were condemned
and labelled acts of war - without quotation marks. Victims were honoured and suspects lined up by
the media, echoing the American president. And when the reciprocal war broke, media doves were
criticised as "unpatriotic" and self-censorship was imposed with a public mandate (Scott, 2002: 9).
The result was a framing highly partisan to American interests and values. Assuming (and showing)
that orthodox media ethics demand impartiality and "objectivity" instead, this last chapter will examine
and evaluate the apparent shift towards greater partisanship in the media, tolerance of "patriotic"
journalism and demands for a different role for journalists in the resolution of conflict.
3.1. Impartiality and changing ethics
Stemming from its perceived role as an unofficial fourth branch of government, the press in America -
and in democratic societies elsewhere - is traditionally seen as an additional Constitutional system of
checks and balances, a counterweight to and guardian of government power (Rosen, 1999: 283). This
role nurtured an adversarial press that values aggressive questioning and scrutiny of public affairs.
Although deeply involved in public affairs, the watchdog-press has had to defend its integrity and abili-
ty to be critical by remaining independent from the institutions of democracy it guards. "It is a common-
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place assumption in joumalism," writes Matthew Kieran (1998: 22), "that the media have a fundamen-
tal duty to be impartial in order to achieve the goal of an objective report or analysis of events ... ari-
sing from conceiving of the media as an unofficial fourth estate." The prioritisation of impartiality aims
primarily to protect the ability to pursue the truth independently. According to orthodox ethics, such in-
dependence can only be achieved by a press that remains uninvolved in that on which it reports. For
this reason Black et al. include in their "Guiding principles for the joumalisf' the responsibility to "act in-
dependently" so as to "seek the truth and report it as fully as possible ... without being unduly influen-
ced by those who would use their power or position counter to the public interest" (1995: 2, 17). The
Society of Professional Joumalists also bids its members maintain "accuracy and objectivity" in pursuit
of "truth ... our ultimate goal" (Black et ai, 1995: 7). Several other American media institutions list "ob-
jectivity" and the avoidance of bias as core principles (Black et ai, 1995: 9, 20, and 22).
From this assumed distance between story-teller and story subject evolved perhaps the common
doctrine in most journalistic circles to define journalists merely as "observers, chroniclers and interpre-
ters of events" (Botes, 1998: 5). But changing notions about "objectivity" suggesting the inability of
joumalists merely to reflect on society without changing it (chapter 1) and the realisation that news
reports are always social constructions, themselves constitutive of the reality they purport to reflect,
have brought the mirror analogy in disrepute and forced a different view of the media's role in society.
This is no new phenomenon, and is intertwined with several factors.
The realisation that the language of news joumalism is more affective than reflective has induced the
demise of the reflective model. Affecting brings the concomitant responsibility, argues Martin Bell (in
Kieran, 1998: 19), of knowing not only what difference reporting makes, but also to be informed by an
idea of right and wrong. Thus joumalism becomes a "moral enterprise" that - unable to remain aloof of
and wholly objective about "reality" - embraces the responsibility to judge and influence for the good.
Although most would still argue, says Botes (1998: 6), that doing anything more than reporting on
parties' positions, or the 'facts', as the parties see it, is taking on a non-joumalistic task and stepping
out of role, this role-definition is "far too limited". "The idea that joumalists are simply neutral channels
of information has ... been challenged by the notion of joumalists as active participants in nearly all
forms of social interaction" (Shoemaker and Reese in Botes, 1998: 5). Botes, a journalist and conflict
resolution theorist, sees in joumalists roles parallel to that of conflict resolvers. This goes hand in hand
with the emergence of the phenomenon of public joumalism, which affords joumalists much more ac-
tive roles of "participation, conversation, taking responsibility and co-operative problem solving", as Ro-
sen (1997: 14) points out.
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The shift towards a more involved journalism has also brought calls for journalists to acknowledge the
"horizons" (Edgar in Belsey, 1992: 122) or prejudices which permeate their practise not by choice but
of necessity. This realisation, if endorsed, makes it impossible for journalists to be just "amused by-
standers", Rosen argues. "Different times call for differentjournalisms - different replies to the standing
question, what are journalists for? Journalists not only tell us about the world, they are part of the struc-
ture that holds it up. For if their accounts prove trustworthy, the entire society can trust that its affairs
are being brought into public view, made part of a consultabie record" (1999: 283).
Indeed, the American media were all but "amused bystanders" of the September attacks. It employed,
instead, a "selective impartiality" reminiscent of that of the 1970s BBC. In 1971 the British minister for
broadcasting, Christopher Chataway, said the BBC's editorial judgements should be exercised "within
the context of the values and objectives of the society they are there to serve" (Carruthers, 2000: 180).
The BBC espoused a "selective impartiality", aiming to remain impartial between government and the
political opposition at home, but not between the UK and its enemies. After the Gulf War, a report of
the then Gannett Foundation remarked that "covering war is unlike covering anything else, and it leads
inevitably toward nationalistic accounts. Historically, the consequence of such coverage is cheer-
leading rather than critical analysis" (see Gannett, 1991: 2). Likewise, journalists in America largely
threw their weight behind the war effort in Afghanistan and did not waver in its patriotism after 9-11,
thus purporting to support the "society they are there to serve". This is not an impartiality that demands
"symmetrical" coverage of the acts of "terrorists" and the West, because "terrorists" are the "enemy".
Carruthers (2000: 175) has documented complaints of politicians who say the media treats terrorists
and politicians "symmetrically" without recognising their fundamentally different status in a democracy.
Also, in Terrorism and the media, Hermon argues (in Alexander, 1990: 41) that police, who serve a de-
mocratic state, should not be treated in the same way as terrorists. "This independence (of media and
police) is right and healthy. Nevertheless, both are part of the same democratic process and belief,
and the basis for any discussion is the fact that they both should and indeed must have a commitment
to its preservation". Although no spokesperson for the press, CNN's Judy Woodruff told the journal
Press/Politics that journalists are "human" and should not remain neutral in conflict situations such as
on September 11. 'We are human, we do have judgements, and we should have judgements. I think
there are some things that are so obvious, what happened on September 11 was wrong, it was terri-
bly wrong ... There are many questions we could be asking of the conduct of this war (in Afghanistan),
but on the basics, we can agree, it was a terrible thing that happened" (Jones, 2002: 7).
It was precisely this consensus that spawned framings of the attacks as "unthinkable", an "outrage"
and a "new day of infamy" - framings indicative of journalism that judges and comments from within
society and not from a lofty distance; that relates fundamentally to the suffering of American people
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without feigning ambivalence and impartiality. This framing approach after September 11 showed that
the American press responded to an apparent need among the American people for a different kind of
news media than in less distressing times. The "people" approved of media restrictions; the newspa-
pers of the "people" - often frank pointers to the pervasive mood - rallied behind the idea of the Ame-
rican nation, its innocence in the world, and its right to strike back, just as in 1941.
This framing approach finds an avid champion in Martin Bell's thesis of a "joumalism of attachmenf',
and ample application in the phenomenon of a patriotic press after September 11.
3.2. 'Attachment', patriotism and conflict resolution
Based on the increasingly orthodox conviction that the media affect what they purport merely to reflect
(Kieran, 1998: 18) Martin Bell, the television journalist and later British member of parliament, argues
that the media's appraisal of "reality" is a moral enterprise. Joumalism "makes a difference", says Bell,
and journalists have a responsibility to be aware of what that difference is.
He speaks from experience. Having reported many wars, among them that in Bosnia for the BBC, Bell
testifies it is almost impossible to remain "objective" and "impartial" in the face of evidently immoral
atrocity. 'When I have reported from the war zones, or anywhere else, I have done so with all the
fairness and impartiality I could muster, and a scrupulous attention to the facts, but using my eyes and
ears and mind and accumulated experience, which are surely the very essence of the subjective" (in
Kieran, 1998: 16). He does not advocate what he calls "campaigning and crusading journalism" (he re-
serves such endeavour for Pilger), but a journalism which acknowledges its role in the formation of so-
cietal perceptions of right and wrong. A "journalism of attachment" (as cited" in Kieran, 1998: 16}-
• "cares as well as knows,"
• "is aware of its responsibilities," and
• "will not stand neutrally between good and evil, right and wrong, the victim and the oppressor.
'We as the press ... are part of the world," says Bell. 'We exercise a certain influence, and we have to
know that. The influence might be for better or worse, and we have to know that too." It is also based
on this conviction and the demise of the mirror analogy that Andrew Belsey has argued that claims to
total objectivity in reporting on conflict are not merely untruthful but undesirable. "The war reporter in
the world of today cannot avoid witnessing an appalling collection of atrocities, massacres, torture and
other crimes, and must not pretend that these are neutral events of no moral significance. Such pre-
tence is a failure to be objective" (in Kieran, 1998: 12).
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Thus, to avoid condemning what happened in New York and Washington and deny the aptness of the
word "terrorism" when describing the attacks, a joumalist would, by this token, be dishonest. Still,
some newspapers described the attacks in apparently neutral terms. "U.S. Attacked", said the New
York Times, and referred to the attackers as "hijackers", which they evidently were.
In general, however, the press did not attempt distanced, neutral reporting, at once apparently "pro-
ving" the inevitability of Bell's "attachmenf' and signifying their willing subscription to his approach. I
contend that the phenomenon of "patriotism" in the media agrees with the doctrine of "attachmenf', in
that it allows loyalties to be voiced and partisanship to shape the framing of news. A nuanced "attach-
menf'may, like a qualified "patriotism", still allow criticism, but the dominant frame demonstrated here
invariably became less nuanced and more simplistic; ever more patriotic and irrevocably attached. As
stated above (in the example of the BBC's defence of its "selective impartiality" in the 1970s), partisan-
ship is often shunned within a democracy but not vis-a-vis a democracy and its perceived foes.
Likewise, "attachment" to the idea of American resilience and righteousness after September 11was
not likely to be viewed within America as unacceptably partisan because it supposedly served the
national interest. The pervasive Americanism in dominant media accounts of the attacks (chapter 1),
resistance to dissenting views (chapter 2) and the introduction of American f1ags32 into newsrooms
(Steele, 2001a) suggest that the press determined not to stand neutrally towards the onslaught on
their country. Indeed, as shown in chapter 1, many newspapers embraced a nationalistic approach
("One country ... Indivisible"), which arguably constituted the "encourage[ment] of one side in a politi-
calor ideological struggle and ... [the] discourage[ment] of another" - Clark's definition of "propagan-
da" (2001a).
"Attachment" - the reporting stance that is infused with judgement and moral conviction - can thus be-
come a justification for nationalistic reporting which allows media slogans such as "America fights
back" (Clark, 2001a), that asks for accounts of ordinary, hash brown-eating Americans being killed
(Newsweek) and indulges in analogies to previous conflicts in which American retaliation was almost
unquestioningly justified (i.e. parallels to Pearl Harbor and the raising of the Iwo Jima flag).
The doctrine of "attachment", however, can also encourage the instrumentality of joumalists in conflict
resolution. In this guise, the unavoidable engagement in the reported world which Bell espouses be-
32 Displays of the flag in newsrooms were indicative ofa national reverence of this symbol of Americanism. Time (2002: 55) reported on
September Il, 2002, that Walmart stores in American sold 116,000 American flags on the day of the attacks, opposed to 6,400 on September II
of the previous year. Flags were, indeed, everywhere: "Stuck to bedroom windows, tied to car aerials, displayed in shop fronts, and hanging at
half-mast from municipal buildings, the Star-Spangled Banner became a visual short-hand for the way America was feeling ... It was if, by
clutching to 'Old Glory', Americans were trying to preserve the myth of impregnability" (cited in Baxter et al., 2001: 40).
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comes, instead, an involvement in the processes of conflict that is sensitive to the danger that journa-
lists' reporting may, in some cases, lead to the escalation of conflict (Botes, 1996: 6). Whereas Bell ad-
vocates a "caring" joumalism that is not afraid to exert moral authority and judge according to societal
custom, Botes advocates the positive involvement of journalists in affecting the outcomes of conflicts.
He recognises that the media may help "mobilise a high level of public support for violent intervention
against Iraq" in 1990, but advocates, too, an expanded involvement of journalists in "reframing" conflict
in such a way that enables conflicting parties to search plausibly for common ground (1996: 7). Thus,
joumalists can "call attention to the dangers of escalation and to opportunities for settlement that the
parties may not have recognised" (1996: 7). Joumalists become not observers, but participants,
though not as uncritical adherents of a dominant ideology, judging that which "common sense" deems
"evil" (such as Islamic fundamentalism), but as a collective "early warning system" of conflict and a
mechanism not of further polarisation but of increased debate.
An approach to a more "involved" journalism that concurs in many ways with Botes's conflict-based
proposal, is that of so-called "peace journalism". In an authoritative exposition of this school of thought,
Prof. Johan Galtung, scholar of "Peace Studies", condemned the "zero-sum analyses" that characteri-
ses many portrayals of conflict in the media (cited in The Peace Journalism Option, 1997: 12). Galtung
bemoans the apparent unwillingness of joumalists ever to contemplate in their analyses of conflict the
possibility of avoiding conflict altogether. How can this be done? Apart from avoiding the "us-them-po-
larities" that were so pervasive in coverage of the September 11 attacks, Galtung's "Peace Option"
(1997: 18) avoids the polarisation of interests and enemies and attempts, instead, to ...
• map the conflict, identifying all parties and their goals;
• seek out more than two diagonally opposed voices, articulating a range of interests;
• humanise all sides, showing sympathy by the same standard;
• promote understanding, moderate violence, and not heed calls for revenge;
• seek and publish inconvenient truths, problematising orthodox analyses;
• represent a nuanced reality, not wholly dictated by the interests of the dominant elite;
• expose untruths on all sides, and
• use human-interest stories not abusively, but by focusing on suffering on all sides (1997: 18).
This "involvement" does not attempt distance or "objectivity" but is "attached", instead, to a framing that
seeks more opposing views. In a report titled The Peace Journalism Option that included Galtung's
proposals, the authors agreed on the ideal of a joumalism that is "aware of its own orientation and yet
does not lapse into simplifications like ... 'side A is right and side B is wrong'. One which is prepared to
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discuss the framework within which judgements are made, and thus renders them visible for the
audience's inspection and assessmenf' (1997: 6). By being alert to suggestions of conciliation, such
journalism could avoid a "one-dimensional discourse of conflicf'. "In this way, peace-journalism could
fix a non-violent solution within the spectrum of options for policy-makers" (1997: 12).
The focus of Botes and Galtung is more obviously on peace joumalism than that of Bell, which is pre-
mised more fundamentally on the value-based portrayals of journalists who cannot and should not re-
main aloof, distant and "objective". But Bell, too, sees in the "joumalism of attachmenf' the duty to
avoid clear "victim--demon dichotomies, both consisting of and drawing on opposed caricatures, good
versus evil" (1997: 41). "Reality must be allowed to destroy entrenched notions of fact," he implores.
Whereas the received orthodoxy of "impartiality" begs of journalists not to allow their own value-judge-
ments to colour their portrayals of the world, evolving conceptions about the media's role and its fun-
damental inability to reflect the world as is, have necessitated new approaches. Bell, Botes and Gal-
tung have shown that a more "involved" media can foster polarisation or peace. Their approaches
amend perceptions about the duty of joumalists, and Botes especially positively expands it.
American newspapers showed in their "framings" of September 11 that they would not surrender the
right to judge and condemn in the name of an orthodox "impartiality". In its relentless condemnation of
the attacks and allegiance to a dominant discourse of American innocence and "righteous mighf'
(Roosevelt, 1941), the press generally did allow its portrayals of reality to be value-based and partisan.
But this also was a "selective partisanship", in that it initially allowed partisanship only vis-a-vis Ame-
rica's enemies in the "war on terror", while fomenting a unified patriotism and stifling dissent at home.
Domestic politics in America reflected the supposed ideal of solidarity that the media espoused, and
became "bureaucratic and ... bipartisan" in the months after the attacks, wrote Ramesh Ponnuru in
the New York Times (Ponnuru, 2002). Only after the war in Afghanistan had started, did Democrats
and Republicans begin (openly) to harbour different views on the direction America's "war on terror"
should take. For months, Democrats accused Republicans of shutting down legitimate debate, and
the White House averred that Democratic criticism irresponsibly "undermined the war on terror".
But seeing that the conduct of the war was "one of the biggest issues before the country", Ponnuru ar-
gued that it should be a partisan issue within America. "Partisanship" is arguably a simpler concept in
politics than in journalism, because it refers in Ponnuru's sense basically to party loyalty. But a biparti-
san body politic co-existed with a press that was bipartisan within America, but highly partisan vis-a-vis
America and its enemies. Ponnuru's call for "robust debate" in American politics is based on what he
dubs the "American tradition ... of wartime cynicism". "[T]he current smothering unity serves no one's
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real interests ... Reasonable people can reach different conclusions about how best to protect Ameri-
cans". A "smothering unity", however, and the unwillingness to remain committed to a search for
"inconvenient truths", also ill serves the ideal for which blood was let inAfghanistan: Democracy.
3.3. Press responsibility and democracy
Modern democracy is premised fundamentally on the freedom of society to elect its rulers and the abi-
lity to overthrow at the ballot leaders whose actions it deems contrary to its own interest. Thriving de-
mocracy, moreover, demands vigorous and constant re-evaluation of governance through unstifled
debate, tolerates criticism from civil society in order better to inform future policy decisions and upholds
the fundamental liberties that permit the practice of civil and democratic rights.
Ideas about joumalism in democracy often echo values democrats value highly in govemment as well:
Truthfulness, fairness, avoidance of conflicts of interest, honesty and openness, diversity, privacy
(Black et aI., 1995: 3). These tenets of sound journalism ideally allow an environment in which the free
flow of information can enhance the careful and responsible but lively practise of civil and democratic
rights. John Stuart Mill espoused a "marketplace of ideas" that fosters plurality of opinion and enhan-
ces the probability that sound ideas will persist. And ever since, the media have been regarded as
necessary, though not sufficient, tools for trading ideas in and selling solutions to society.
Max Frankel, former editor of The New York Times, introduced the Poynter Institute's book of news-
paper front pages after September 11with a reminder that "dependable news occupies a precious but
vulnerable place in our society" (Poynter, 2001: x). His ideas about the purpose of news in American
democracy allude to much of what has been argued above about the ineluctable tie between news
production and the values of the society it serves. Frankel wrote:
Every page of this book proves that news is no mere rendering of lifeless facts .... News is the portrayal and ordering of
information in vivid image and narrative. News is the transformation of facts into stories so that they can be understood
and remembered in ways that inform and instruct even as they delight or dismay. News not only portrays events, it
ranks them in some order of importance as defined by public needs and interests. And besides recounting events,
meaningful news digs to discover their causes and to assess their consequences. News is not neutral. Like literature,
the most important news dwells on stories of conflict, on the rivalries and casualties of life. Yet while conflict is universal,
so is the human desire to avoid and reduce it. And so news also serves the armies of reform and implicitly holds out
hope and a faith in progress. Since a free and open society is, by definition, a constantly self-correcting organism, it is
constantly nourished by news that exposes flaws and failures and so stimulates debate about how to overcome them.
News is the enemy of certainty, and therefore of tyranny.
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In unfettered truthtelling, notwithstanding the conceptual limits to the idea of an ultimate "truth", lies a
vital requirement for the incessant exposure of failures of democracy. It is therefore plausible to regard
the freedom of the media as vital in the preservation of the "self-correction" Frankel prizes.
"Press freedom", however, should be substantively explicated to entail also the real capability to
pursue inconvenient truths, also in times of conflict. The pervasive resistance to dissent after Septem-
ber 11 and the apparent consensus in the American media that reporting on "terror" demands a pat-
riotic and unified response, defies such a substantive media freedom. It follows, however, in a tradition
of compromising the pursuit of truth in times of war when it is deemed contrary to the "public interesf'.
The BBC's founding father, Sir John Reith, argued that "in total war, truthfulness could only be an
aspiration" (Carruthers, 2000: 87). Later, in Vietnam, the defeat of the military by adverse public
opinion in America fostered the perception that a free media might hurt the "national interesf' by
undermining controversial govemment projects. But it has been contended, and will be contended
here, that the "national interest" in a democracy, soundly defined, is always better served by a sub-
stantively free media, willing and able persistently to reconsider government action, than by a media
that confronts adversity with a "smothering unity" and solidarity.
Whereas patriotic media may inspire heroism, it may also relieve rulers of the duty of accountability by
censuring criticism and ignoring "inconvenient truths". In such distressing milieus, the media may be
swayed by public support of media restraint and conceal information that is vital for the execution of
democratic duties. "If a govemment is to be accountable to the people it must know what is going on,"
writes Andrew Belsey. "If the people are to cast their votes wisely and rationally they too must know
what is going on. Information is necessary (though not ... sufficient) for a successful democracy,
inasmuch it requires the free circulation of news, opinion, debate and discussion" (in Kieran, 1998: 10).
Although it is generally acknowledged that press coverage may be restricted to protect military opera-
tions (in which case publication of "sensitive" information might endanger lives), media restrictions en-
acted in the name of protecting "civilian morale" are decidedly less justifiable, Ellis insists (cited in
Kieran, 170): "A democratic people have a right to know what is happening in a war carried out in their
name even if it does sap their support for it." Indeed, the constructed need for high morale and the me-
dia's complicity in fostering it, often serves as a motive for "concealment and deception" (Gilbert in Bel-
sey, 1992: 138). A morale that persists in spite of pertinent facts, as is possible when the media equate
patriotism and pride with "public interesf', can hardly sustain democracy.
If apologists of a restricted, uniform media after September 11 were to argue that the public supports
media restrictions, the media might legitimise its fight for freedom by an appeal not to the public's
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desire or right to know - for if they do not care to know, as argued earlier, this premise for press free-
dom becomes problematic - but by an appeal to the public interest, defined by the values of openness
and accountability that are fundamental to democracy (see also Williams in Belsey, 1992: 137).
Amid calls for patriotic journalism after September 11, some commentators persisted in the belief that
a press that sports the Star-Spangled Banner as "war motif' compromised democratic values. In a
waming to overly zealous newsrooms patriots, Steele (2001a) bid journalists to consider the signifi-
cance of wearing an American flag at work or on television, as this might impair independence and
discourage interviewees and colleagues who might oppose the "war on terror" to voice their opinions.
Of editors that allow symbols of American nationalism onto newspaper pages, Steele asked: 'What is
your motive in using those graphics or slogans? Is it joumalistically honest? Is it driven by public rela-
tions? By competitive strategies? ... What situations might arise in which your use of patriotic graphics
or slogans is in tension with your news coverage?"
Steele thereby places the use of symbols of patriotism within the sphere of conflicts of interest, as such
symbols may easily be interpreted as signs of unyielding support for the government of the day and a
concomitant resistance to publish legitimate news reports that portray govemment policies and actions
negatively. Not only flags or blue and red ribbons, however, constitute "symbols of patriotism". The
same uncritical sentiment is portrayed by overly nationalistic media framings of the attacks that do not
allow for critical or dissenting interpretations of events. Graphic allusions to Iwo Jima are just as potent
in the affirmation of a proud and righteous Americanism as the display of the Stars and Stripes.
Such symbolism seems to suggest that pride and defiance in the media better serve the interests of
Americans than caution and circumspection - or the notion of a "thoughtful relativism" that lime's
Lance Morrow so detests (see Addendum A). Instead, the media serve democracy by remaining vigi-
lant, critical and professional, because only then are democratically elected govemments kept accoun-
table - even during a "war on terror". In a declaration on World Press Freedom Day on 3 May 2002,
Kofi Annan, general secretary of the UN, Mary Robinson, UN high commissioner for human rights,
and Koïchiro Matsuura, director of Unesco, highlighted what they viewed as the dangers that "terror-
ism" poses to sound joumalism. Firstly, reporters' lives may be lost in terrorist attacks.
But secondly, "terrorism may provoke governmental responses that lead to laws, regulations and
forms of surveillance that undermine the very rights and freedoms that an anti-terrorist campaign is
supposed to defend. In the name of anti-terrorism, principles and values ... may be put at risk. The
greatest service that the media can perform in the fight against terrorism is to act freely, independently
and responsibly. This means that they must either not be cowed by threats nor become mouthpieces
of patriotic sentiment or inflammatory opinion. Rather, the media must search for and publicise the
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truth; present information and views impartially; consider their words and images carefully; and uphold
high standards of professional conduct" (Marthaz, 2002).
The case for freedom of the press regardless of a state of war combines orthodox notions of the
importance of the search for truth with modem demands for sustained accountability in a democracy. It
does not blindly recognise politicians or the military as the sole legitimate authors of what it means to
act in the "public interest", because such a blindness assumes that politicians and the military never
err, and the democratic licence to replace governments and armies invariably suggests that they do.
The search for truth, however, is not sufficient if it only entails a commitment to accuracy. The notion of
"truth", even when it is qualified by the provisos in chapter 1, has to entail also a commitment to accu-
rate framing in context. No exhaustive portrayal of reality is possible, but a frame drawn too narrowly
can exclude facts without which "truth" becomes barren. Thus, historical references can adjust funda-
mentally the perspective from which blame is apportioned in any "new" conflict. And attempts to
explain the causes of events - such as terror attacks - might empower politicians to avoid
perpetuating policies that cause unnecessary harm and senselessly foment hatred.
Conflict reporting without proper context is dangerous. Thus Bates and Galtung (supra) espouse re-
porting that weighs its consequences. Foremost among the effects of isolated, simplistic framings is ig-
norance about the origins of conflict - and terrorism. Carruthers (2000: 191) maintains that by focusing
only on the violent dimensions of terrorism, "with little or no attempt to contextualise its causes, media
reports often leave readers, listeners or viewers ignorant as to the motivations of acts which, of them-
selves, may seem simply the senseless, inexplicable behaviour of lunatic extremists."
After September 11, critics of the American media and prominent media figures such as Frankel spoke
of the "danger that Americans invited when they lost their interest in the world beyond the self and in
serious news coverage of those other realms" (in Poynter, 2001: x). Mediachannel, an independent
media watchdog in America, reported that the American press had reduced coverage of foreign news
by as much as 80% in the two decades before the attacks (Mediachannel, 2001 ).
This, argued Philip Knightley, a war reporting expert, left Americans "unaware of the growing hatred
felt for the US in the rest of the world and thus contributed to the shock of the twin towers attack." Such
ignorance, he argues, is partly behind rising lslarnaphobiaêê in Britain (Index, 2002: 154). Merely
framing terrorists, moreover, as ''fanatics'', obviates the "need to examine the global environment in
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which terrorists and terrorism develop, because such people are simply fanatics" (Pedelty in Index,
2002: 170). Instead, the media should pursue nuanced explanations that do not oversimplify conflict
and demonise the enemy. An approach, argued Perves Hoodbhoy, a Pakistani columnist, that allows
"cultural relatavism". "Now is the time to ask," said Hoodbhoy, "what impelled terrorists to fly airliners
filled with passengers into skyscrapers. (... ) In the absence of such understanding, there remains only
the medieval therapy of exorcism: for the strong to literally beat the devil out of the weak" (2002: 178).
Such is the recource of mobs, not democrats. In order to enable circumspect decision-making in
govemment and civil society, a press is needed that sustains vigorous debate even when an entire
nation seeks revenge and retaliation and exorcism. Democratic freedoms become vacuous when
exercised in a marketplace of ideas that is controlled by the powerful and maintained by a timid or
overly patriotic press. A call for a critical press in America, the revered democracy, is not a call for an
anti-American press. The press cannot but assist in healing sore societal wounds, however inflicted.
But a vigilant press, which is willing to criticise declarations of war, unwilling to presuppose them, and
aware of the "hatreds of the world" and its causes, can better serve democracy by allowing decisions
informed even by disturbing truths. If a people values democracy, it cannot shun democracy's cost.
33 British commentators have claimed Islamaphobia was "as culturally deep-rooted and now more pervasive than anti-Semitism" after September
II. Knightley cites examples of "casual contempt ... directed at Muslims" that would be "widely regarded as completely unacceptable if targeted
at Blacks, Jews or the Irish" (Index, 2002: 155).
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CONCLUSION
There is no denying that the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, 2001, were hei-
nous crimes. And so, any critique of the American press that denies the right to condemn the attacks is
misplaced. For on the pages of newspapers a nation talks to itself (Miller, 1961), and a hesitant re-
sponse to terror of such magnitude would not only suggest moral ambivalence towards the death of
thousands of civilians, but would fail to grasp the magnitude of the events as news.
For news is not neutral, and although there are doubtless explanations for the reasons behind the
attacks, there may never be justifications. The press may acknowledge this. They may even - quite
reasonably - frame the attacks as "terrorist" acts, because the attacks did induce terror and were sure-
ly "terrorist" in the choice of targets. The press may, even before willingly embracing a "joumalism of
attachment", read into its role that of empathiser and comforter ("One Nation ... Indivisible" said The
Daily Mississippian), allocator of historical significance ("Our World is Changed" said The Gamecock in
South Carolina), and articulator of rife public sentiment ("Unthinkable" said the Arizona Daily Star).
But conflict and tragedy call also for a heightened sense of responsibility to protect the legitimate
interests of the public in a democracy. In mediating and framing the attacks knowing that they cannot
frame completely and precisely, the American press sampled here constructed an interpretation of
reality that spoke of solidarity, the unquestioned persistence of American society and a right to avenge
the onslaught in much the same way America avenged the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.
Whereas metaphors may convey much passion and information in few words, the economy of
simplification comes at a cost. For a simple phrase such as "new day of infamy" (The Spokesman-
Review) not only assumes a symmetry of context, foe and apt response between contests 60 years
apart, but also denies the complexities that shape contemporary conflicts. The use of simplistic
metaphors and entrenched definitions of words such as "terrorism" can serve to uphold a dominant
discourse when democracy demands pluralism, debate and a vigilant civil society instead.
Ideas about the role of the media have changed. Few would argue that the American press should
have abstained from "choosing" between America and its (faceless) adversary in the hours after the
September 11 attacks. But a de facto joumalism of attachment such as that practised in the newspa-
pers and magazines examined here, ill serves the public if it does not foster greater understanding of
the "foreign", point to the possible (and possibly avoidable) causes of conflict and apply consistently
definitions that are easily only reserved for the enemy ("terrorist", "fundamentalism"). For admitting to
the unattainability of simplistic ideals such as "impartiality" and "objectivity", a press still intent on
serving a liberally defined "public interest" should aspire to be fair in its portrayals of the world.
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In a liberal democracy such as America, faimess begs for consistency in the assignment of definitions.
It also begs for a greater commitment to unravel complex conflicts in a way that does not legitimise
only the dominant, pro-American view. A ''fair'' press should guard against becoming so involved in a
national, patriotic "proleet", that it forgets its role as critic of the powerful. As guardians firstly of the
public's interest, the press should not adopt the "official" view uncritically, nor, paradoxically, succumb
numbly to public claims for media restraint. Smothering unity forbids debate and disables democracy.
The American press served readers well by conveying colourfully and poignantly the magnitude of the
country's worst ever "terrorist" attack. Some, such as the New York Times, did so with admirable re-
straint. But knowing that hawks were hunting for a eeusus belli, most papers would have encouraged
debate and better served democracy by offering, without condoning what the attackers did, perspec-
tives that challenged the dominant framing of America and its privileged place in the world.
For the strength of American democracy is better confirmed under constant fire from within, than under
an artificial cease-fire broken by startling attack from without.
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Ifyou want toh
it makes sense to maim its
cathedrals. They are sym-
bols of its. faith, and when
they crumple and burn, it
tells US.ll(l1 are not so powerful and ~ can't be safe. The Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center, planted at the base of Man-
hattan island with the Statue of Liberty as their sentry, and the
Pentagon, a squat, concrete fort on the banks of the Potomac,
are the sanctuaries of money and power tbat our enemies.may
ima~ne define us. But that assumes our faith rests on what we
can buy and build, and that has never been America's true God.
On a normal day, we value heroism because it is uncommon.
On Sept Il,we valued heroism because it was everywhere. The
fire fighters kept climbing the stairs of the
By Nancy Gibbs tallest buildings in town, even as the steel
moaned and the cracks spread in zippers
through the walls, to get to the people trapped in the sky. We don't
know yet how many of them died, but once we know, as Mayor
Rudy Giuliani said, "it will be more than we can bear." That sen-
timent was played out in miniature in the streets, where fleeing
'iil:lims.pulled the wounded to safety, and at every hospital, where
the lines to give blood looped round and round the block. At the
medical-supply companies, which sent supplies without being
asked. At Verizon, where a worker threw on a New York fire de-
partment jacket to go save people. And then again and again all
across the country, as people checked on those they loved to find
out jf they were safe and then looked for some way to help.
This was the bloodiest day on American soil since our Civil
~£d.ouUn_realtime,_on_fast1or-
ward and not with.__soldiers._b.llL.xYith_jjel:Il1Illril:s. ~e<;_utily
guards lawyers hankers.Janitors. It was strange that a day of
war was a day we stood still. We couldn't move-that must have
been the whole idea-so we had no choice but to watch Every
city cataloged its targets; residents looked at their skylines, won-
dering jf they would be different in the morning. The s=..
'ImY.eL in Chicago was evacuated, as were colleges and muse-
ums. ~rld shut down, and Major League Baseball can-
celed its games, and nuclear power plants went to top security
status; the Hoover Dam and the Mall of America shut down, and
Independence Hall in Philadelphia, and Mount..Ru.shmm:e. It
was as though someone had taken a huge brush and painted a
bull's-eye around every place Americans gather, e.vecy..iroIuY.e
rezeze, every service we depend on, and vowed to take them out
or shut them down, or force us to do it ourselves.
SHOCK IN THE HEARTLAND In Iowa City, 1_., Mepn
Elise McFarlane, center, watches television cover.ge
ot the .!tack. on Washington .neI N_ Yorl< City
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Lance Morrow
The Case for Rage and Retribution
OR ONCE, LE1"s HAVE NO "GRIEF COUNSELORS"
standing by with banal consolations, as if the pur-
pose, in the midst of all this, were merely to make
everyone feel better as quickly as possible. We
shouldn't feel better.
For once, let's have no fatuous rhetoric about
"healing." Healing is inappropriate now, and
dangerous. There will be time later for the tears
of sorrow.
A day cannot live in infamy without the nourishment of
.rage. Let's have rage.
What's needed is a unified, unifying, Pearl Harbor sort of
purple American fury-a ruthless indignation that doesn't leak
away in a week or two, wandering off into Prozac-induced for-
getfulness or into the next media sensation (0.]. ... Elián ...
Chandra ... ) or into a_ corruptly thoughtful relativism (as has
happened in the recent past, when, for
example, you might hear someone say,
"Terrible what he did, of course, but, you
know, the Unabomber does have a point,
doesn't he, about modem technology?").
Let America explore the rich recip-
rocal possibilities of the fatwa. A policy
of focused brutality does not come easi-
ly to a self-conscious, self-indulgent,
contradictory, diverse, humane nation
with a short attention span. ~erica
_needs to relearn a lost discipline, seJi::
confid~p.tr~lentlessness-and to relearn
wl!Y-J:ll!_rn~lL!l!l,mr~_h!l,~§quippedus _al]
with a weapon (abhorred in decent
'peaCetime socTe-ties) g_<!U~q_b_~.lr_§Q.
As the bodies are counted, into the
thousands and thousands, hatred will
not, I think, be a difficult emotion to
summon. Is the medicine too strong? Call it, rather, a whole-
some and intelligent enmity-the sort that impels even such a
prosperous, messily tolerant organism as America to act. Any-
one who does not loathe the people who did these things, and
the people who cheer them on, is too philosophical for decent
company.
It's a practical matter, anyway. In war, enemies are ene-
mies. Youfind them and put them out ofbusiness, on the sound
principle that that's what they are trying to do to you. Ifwhat
~_ened on Tuesday does not give Americans the political
will needed to exterminate menTIl<eOsamabiÏÏLadeïi and
those who conspire with them in evil mischief, then.nothing
ever will and we are in for a procession of black Tues~ys. --
This was terrorism brought to near perfection as a dra-
matic form. Never has the evil business had such production
values. Normally, the audience sees only the smoking after-
math-the blown-up embassy, the ruined barracks, the ship -
with a blackened hole at the waterline. This time the first
plane striking the first tower acted as a shill. It alerted the
media, brought cameras to the scene so that they might be
set up to record the vivid surreal bloom of the second strike'
("AmI seeing this?") and then-could they be such engineer-
ing geniuses, so deft at demolition?-the catastrophic col-
lapse of the two towers, one after the other, and a sequence
of panic in the streets that might have been shot for a re-
make of The War of the Worlds or for Independence Day.
Evil possesses an instinct for theater, which is why, in an era
of gaudy and ifted media, evil ma vastl ma i its dam-
age y the power of horrific images.
It is important not to be transfixed. The police screamed to
the people running from the towers, "Don't look back!"-a bib-
lical warning against the power of the image. Terrorism is
sometimes described (in a frustrated, oh-the-burdens-of-
great-power tone of voice) as "asym-
metrical warfare." So what? Most of
history is a pageant of asymmetries. It
is mostly the asymmetries that cause
history to happen-an obscure
Schickelgruber nearly destroys Eu-
rope; a mere atom, artfully diddled,
incinerates a city. Elegant perplexity
puts too much emphasis on the
"asymmetrical" side of the phrase
and not enough on the fact that it is,
indeed, real warfare. Asymmetry is a
concept. War is, as we see, blood and
death.
It is not a bad idea to repeat a line
from the 19th century French anar-
chist thinker Pierre-Joseph Prou-
dhon: "The fecundity of the unex-
pected far exceeds the prudence of
statesmen." America, in the spasms of a few hours, became a
changed country. It turned the comer, at last, out of the 1990s.
The menu of American priorities was rearranged. The presi-
dency of GeorgeW. Bush begins now. What seemed important
a few days ago (in the media, at least) became instantly trivial.
IfGary Condit ismentioned once in the next six months on ca-
ble television, Iwill be astonished.
During World War II, John Kennedy wrote home to his
parents from the Pacific. He remarked that Americans are at
their best during very good times or very bad times; the in-
between periods, he thought, cause them trouble. I'm not sure
that is true. Good times sometimes have a tendency to make
Americans squalid.
The worst times, as we see, separate the civilized of the
world from the uncivilized. This is the moment of clarity.M
.the civilized toughen up, and let the uncivilized take their
.chances in the game they started. Ii
What's needed is a
unified, unifying, Pearl
Harbor sort of purple
American fury-a
ruthless indignation
that doesn't leak away
in a week or two
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; ~ f . ATTACK ON AMERICA: An Act of War
That message, allegedly sent by Osama bin
Laden's men, makes him suspect No.1. Can
he be stopped at last? By MICHAEL HIRSH
'We've Hit
The Targets'
TTHE TIME IT SEEMED AN EMPTY BOAST, IF A
chilling one. On Feb. 7,1995, Rarnzi Yousef, considered the
mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, was
being escorted in shackles back to New York City. The FBI
had just seized Yousefin Pakistan, and agents felt they
could crow a little. An FBI SWAT commando pulled up his
blindfold and nudged him as they flew in a heli-
copterov(~rlllld··Mlmfllattan,pointingto the World Trade Center's lights
glowing in the clear night. "Look down there," he told Yousef. "They're
still standing."Yousef replied, "They wouldn't be if! had enough money
and explosives." Recalls Lewis Schiliro, a former head of the FBI's
New York field office, "He was as cold as
ice."Thday Rarnzi Yousefis safely in prison,
as are five of his confederates from the
failed 1993 attempt. But Yousef's passion
for killing Americans is flourishing in a
loose network of tiny Islamic fundamental-
ist terror groups spread around the world.
And the main suspect in the worst foreign .
attack on ·the continental United States is
the chief impresario and financier of that
network, Osama bin Laden, the SiWII1.
QeanJed Saudi exjle wbo jn Ftbroaty 1998
declared all Americans to be legitjmate tar-
gets ofjjbad aT holy war Bin Laden has
nursed a fervent hatred of the United States
since its troops landed on Saudi soil to fight
the gulf war, and he has haunted the worst
nightmares of U.S. security officials for
years. The scion of a wealthy Saudi mag-
nate, he was li.nkcd..Jn..1he]998 twin lJ S.
Embassybombjngs jo Africa and the.explo-
sion.abcard.rhe.Uê'S.ColeIn .Yemen last
~ut until last Tuesday, bin Laden had
36 :-./EWSWEEK EXTRA KDITIO:'IJ
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not succeeded in shedding blood on Ameri-
can soil.
Bythe end of America's day ofhorror, U.S.
intelligence officials said, most people in-
side the federal government were almost
certain-about 90 percent certain, the con-
sensus had it-that bin Laden and his global
organization, AI Qaeda (The Base), were be-
hind the attacks. One key reaSOn' shortly af-
ter the suicide attacks, a SOllrce with access
to inte!Jjgence told NEWSWEEK (JS intel-
ligence picked np communjcatjons among
bin I aden associates relaying a message:
"We've bjt the taws"
On Wednesday, the FBI detained several
people whom they are now describing as
"material witnesses" in Boston and south
Florida. Authorities also said they had iden-
tified the two or three terrorists who hi-
jacked each plane. The suspects were said to
have entered the country from allover the
cworld. and some had been living in the Unit-
ed States for up to a ycar. Early leads suggest
~4
';~~~~~~!~1:~~;~>
- .~'_
: ,iV'
_;;IM'i1i@ij-
SaudleJdIe Osama bin
lidenstands at the
top ofthe 11st u
AmerIcan olllclals
_k thole responsi-
ble for the attacks
the team had domestic support networks
rooted in the Boston area, but some of the
bombers may have come from Canada,
which also harbored the terrorist cell that
planned the millennium bombing in Los
Angeles. A British intelligence source told
NEWSWEEKthat"two brothers, working on
United Arab Emirates passports, one of
them a trained pilot, have been placed at the
Boston airport," Even so, investigators had
only just begun to ferret out the full dirnen-
sions of the plot. "We're in Oklahoma mode
now," said one FBI counterterrorism agent.
referringto the frenzyof police work that fol-
lowed the 1995Oklahoma City bombing. He
added: "This is a rubble pile that makes Ok-
lahoma City look like a sandbox." New FBI
chiefRobert Mueller, on onlv his second week
of work, conducted a 6 p.m, conference call
with special agents in charge of all the 56 field
offices. He announced that Washington
would takecontrol of the biggest investigation
in the agency's history and appointed veteran
deputydirectorThm Pickard to run it. FBI offi-
cials said they knew this probe was different
from anything else they'd ever done. "This is
not going to be a classic torensic investiga-
tion," said the counterterrorism agent. "You're
not looking for a traditional bomb 'signature'
like the rear axleof the Rvdertmek. The bomb
signature is a plane in the 51...'y." Inother words,
there may be little forensic evidence to
investigate.
For the moment the link to bin Laden and
Rarnzi Yousef appeared to be large'¥d[Cnm-
.stantial. Investigators believe that radical
Egyptian organizations were directly be-
hind the suicide attacks. One, AI Gamaa al
Islamiya, was run by Sheik Omar Abdel-
Rahman, the blind Muslim cleric who is
serving a prison term in Minnesota for al-
legedJy conspiring with \Vorld Trade Center
bombing suspeets to blow up other New
York landmarks. Bin Laden recently has
turned complaints about Abdel-Rahrnan's
imprisonment and treatment by U.S. au-
thorities into a crusade. committing his fol-
lowers tofreeingthe religious leader. U.S.of-
ficials have identified Alman al-Zawahiri,
the head of another Egyptian militant group
that supports the sheik. as deputy leader of
AI Qaeda. Abdel-Rahrnan is kept in solitary
confinement, and a month ago U.S. authori-
ties seized his radio.
Thefastfingeringofbin Laden also did not
mask the fact that, like the rest of the countrv,
u.s.officials were in astare of shockoverwh~t
may go down as the most massive failure of
military and intelligence readiness in the na-
tion's history. Bush called last Tuesday's sear-
ing experience a demonstration of American
filnituW:. In truth it was a srunnmg displavof
NEWSWEEK "~XTR:\ E()ITIO~ 37
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The deadly daylight
attacks were as
sophisticated and
well coordinated as
U.S. investigators
have ever seen
America's mlDetabiIiJy-now and well into
the future. Always before, U.S.experts tended
to dismiss the idea that terrorists could com-
bine both suicidal fervor and technical skill
and sophistication. The 1993 World Trade
Center attack, in which conspirators explod-
ed a bomb-laden van in the basement, was
seen as just another ragged effort; afterward
the terrorists gave themselves away when one
was stupid enough to try·to get his deposit
back on the rental van. Similarly, when an Al-
gerianterroristwasarrested~ingthebor-
der from Canada just before Y2K, his obvious
nervousness gave him away to an alert Cus-
toms official.
By contrast, last Tuesday's coordinated
assault on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon was as sophisticated a terror at-
tack as U.S. investigators have seen. A chief
mystery was how the culprits might have
found four apparently trained pilots to fly
suicide missions. One frightening prospect
is. tbat bin I,aden iswinnjng ed"cated Arab
elites to his cause, especially as the
Palestinian intifaÓ4 inflames the
Arab world. The FBI has picked
up previous hints of high-level
help: in 1995 Abdul Hakim Mu-
rad, a Pakistani, was accused
along with Yousef of a plot to
bomb Il U.S. airliners in a single
"day of rage" against the United
States. Murad, a commercial pi-
lot, allegedly told investigators
that he had been trained as a
kamikaze pilot.
just as scary, the new attacks
also suggested that the terrorists
had an extensive domestic sup-
port network-sconfederates on
the ground who helped them
gather intelligence on the targets and possi-
bly provided shelter and logistical support,
Could the bombers have been stopped?
NEWSWEEKhas learned that udlili:J.l.S_jn-
telligence received no specific warning, the
state of alert had been high during the past
two weeks, and a particularly urgent warn-
ing may have been received the night before
the attacks, causing
some top Pentagon
brass to cancel a trip.
Why that same infor-
mation was not avail-
able to the 266 people
who died aboard the
four hijacked com-
mercial aircraft may
become a hot topic on the Hill. In testimony
to the Intelligence Committee earlier this
year, CIA Director George Tenet said bin
Uden posed the most immediate terrorist
threat to Americans around the world and
wascapahleof'tmultipleattacks with littJeor
no waming .....There is a giant accountability
issue starting today; says former Afghani-
stan CIA station chief Milt Bearden, "and in
the midst oflegitimate accountability there
will be a lot of scapegoating. They're going
to start looking for the modem-day equiva-
lent of General Short and Admiral Kimmel
[the armed-forces commanders at Pearl
Harbor J, and they're going to find them."
Tbe deeper problem for counterterrorism
experts is that bin Laden's network is so dif-
fuse and diverse-a patchwork of renegade
Algerian, Palestinian, Egyptian and other
cells-and that foreigo governments, in-
cluding friendly ones, move slowly to crack
down on people they know are his support-
ers. Only last February, a few weeks before
Tenet's testimony, a NEWSWEEK reporter
sat down in a London coffee shop with Yass-
er el-Sirri, one of bin Laden's alleged associ-
ates. El-Sirri cheerfully boasted that the
Egyptian government had sentenced him to
death for crimes of terrorism. Attempts to
snatch or kill bin Laden have been frustrated
by the difficulty of getting precise informa-
tion on where he is in the mountains of
Afghanistan, not to mention a U.S. presi-
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dential order barring assassination. Though
U.S. intelligence had wiretaps on bin
Laden's key lieutenants before the Kenya
and Thnzania embassy bombings, they were
unable to pick up enough information to
prevent them.
Some counterterrorism operatives now
speculate that intelligence picked up by U.S.
agencies about possible terrorist attacks on
Americans last june may actually have been
leaked by operatives associated with bin
Laden. Now it appears the terrorists "may
have been testing where and how we picked
up information-and what were the things
we missed," says a U.S. investigator based in
the Persian Gulf. "They saw where we react-
ed, and presumably also where we didn't re-
act." Were they casing American airports to
see if extra precautions went into effect?
"They not only know how to plan, but they
know how to test," said this source, "and they
know, obviously, where the gaps are." .
Among the worst of those gaps is the
ramshackle state of security checks at U.S.
airports. The ability of unknown bombers
to exploit these soft spots-and to do it so
jarringly, ripping a hole in the heart of
America's financial and military power-
could itselfhaveserious consequences. For
it demonstrates that it can be done again. In
fact, terrorism experts say that for years
their worst fear has been that a suicide
bomber would hit inside U.S. borders. "If
someone really wants to kill himselfin or-
der to blow up a building here, there is no
level of sustainable security in this country
that could prevent it," says one official. "We
just aren't equipped to handle it. It is be-
yond us psychologically. And the citizens of
this country are not willing to tolerate the
lack of freedom that this level of security
would mean."
Thatcouldnowchange, as partefa tecton-
ic shift in America's sense of vulnerability.
"This shows that you can have mass-
destruction terrorism without weapons of
mass destruction," says Gideon Rose, a terror
expert at the Council on Foreign Relations.
And that even a missile defense won't help.
"We're going to have to enact laws that some
people from the far left and the far right won't
like," adds a senior intelligence source. He
points to Britain's sweeping new law that, as
he puts it, extends the draconian security
measures-including surveillance and hold-
ing people on mere suspicion-already used
in troubled Northern Ireland. He adds: "We
have to understand that national securitywiU
have to take some precedence over what we
have seen as the right to privacy."
Sen.jon Kyl,a member of the Intelligence
Committee, says he's been pushing for years
for more intelligence money and less red
tape-and for dropping concerns about re-
cruiting human-rights violators as infiltra-
tors into terror groups. "My first reaction
was that my knees were weak," he said. "But
fran.kJy,my second reaction was that all of
the things we've been saying we have to do-
maybe through this disaster they'll get more
attention."Nodoubttheywill.
Willi MARK HOSENBALL. DANI!o:LKlAJDMAN and
DoNAn:UALoRCH in W<uhingnmandPfo:.G1'YRfo:.
CURISTOPU";RDICKJo."Yand
ANOREWNAGORSKl;"NnJ }ó,*
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Addendum C: Text of speech by President George W. Bush, September 11, 2001
Good evening.
Today, our fellow citizens, our way of life, our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate
and deadly terrorist acts.
The victims were in airplanes or in their offices - secretaries, businessmen and women, military and
federal workers. Moms and dads. Friends and neighbors.
Thousands of lives were suddenly ended by evil, despicable acts of terror.
The pictures of airplanes flying into buildings, fires buming, huge structures collapsing, have filled us
with disbelief, terrible sadness and a quiet, unyielding anger.
These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have
failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation.
Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the
foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve.
America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in
the world. And no one will keep that light from shining.
Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature, and we responded with the best of
America, with the daring of our rescue workers, with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came
to give blood and help in any way they could.
Immediately following the first attack, I implemented our government's emergency response plans.
Our military is powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New York City and
Washington, D.C., to help with local rescue efforts.
Our first priority is to get help to those who have been injured and to take every precaution to protect
our citizens at home and around the world from further attacks.
The functions of our government continue without interruption. Federal agencies in Washington which
had to be evacuated today are reopening for essential personnel tonight and will be open for business
tomorrow.
Our financial institutions remain strong, and the American economy will be open for business as well.
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The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for
our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice.
We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor
them.
I appreciate so very much the members of Congress who have joined me in strongly condemning
these attacks. And on behalf of the American people, I thank the many world leaders who have called
to offer their condolences and assistance.
America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world and we
stand together to win the war against terrorism.
Tonight I ask for your prayers for all those who grieve, for the children whose worlds have been
shattered, for all whose sense of safety and security has been threatened. And I pray they will be
comforted by a power greater than any of us spoken through the ages in Psalm 23: "Even though I
walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil, for You are with me."
This is a day when all Americans from every walk of life unite in our resolve for justice and peace.
America has stood down enemies before, and we will do so this time.
None of us will ever forget this day, yet we go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just
in our world.
Thank you. Good night and God bless America.
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Addendum D: The New York Times, September 12, 2001, p. 1
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'~theNews
That's Fit ID Print"
VOL. CL .. No. 51,874
Lat. Edition
New York: Today, sunny, a few after-
noon douds.. HI&h 77. TaaJllu, sJl&htly
more bumid. Low 65. Tomorrow, sun
then clouds. Hlgh 81. VeslUday, h.l.p
81, low 63. weeteer map. Page Cil.
NEW YORK, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2001 75CENTSu.s. ATTACKED
HIJACKED JETS DESTROY TWIN TOWERS
AND HIT PENTAGON IN DAY OF TERROR
A CREEPING HORROR
Buildings Burn and Fall
as Onlookers Search
for Elusive Safety
By N. R. KLEINFIELD
It kept gelling worse.
The horror arrived In episodic
bursts of chilling disbelief, .sIgnified
(lest by tremblln& floors, sharp erop-
Uons, cracked windows. There was
the actual unfathomable reo.liuatlon
o( a gapJ.na;, namlna bole In flTst one
of the tall towers, and then the same
thins all over again in its twin. There
was the merdJes.s sight ol bodies
helplessly lUmbllns OUI, some of
them in IJames.
Finally, the mlghly towers them·
selves were reduced to nothing.
Dense plumes of smoke raced
through the downtown avenue5,
coursing between the buildings,
shaped lllr.e tornadoes on tbclr Sides.
Every sound was cause for alarm.
A plane appeared overhead WIlS an-
other one coml.Qg? No, IIwas a fJeht-
er Jet. But was II friend or enemy?
People scrambled lor their lives, but
they didn't know where lO So. Should
they go nonh, south, cast, west? Stay
outside, So indooC$? People hid be-
neath cars and each other. Some
CODtemplaled Jumping Into the river.
For those trying to flee tbc very
epicenter of the collapsing World
Trade Center towers, the most ber-
rid thooPI of all finally dawned on
them: nowbere was safe.
For several panic·stricken hours
yesterday momlng. people in Lower
Manhattan wllnC$$ed the inexpress-
ible, the illcomprebensible, the un-
thinkable. "I don't know what the
gates ol bclllook UIte. but U's got to
be like this," ~Id John Maloney, a
security director for an Internet finn
in the uade center. "I'm a combat
veteran, Vielnam. and I never saw
anything like this."
The fltst warnings were small
ones. Blocks away, Jim Farmer, a
film composer, was having breakfast
at a small restaurant on West Broad-
way. He wed tbc sound ot a jet An
odd sound- too loud, it seemed, to be
Continued on Page A7
A Somber Bush
Says Terrorism
Cannot Prevail
By ELISABETII BUMILLER
wl1b DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON, Sept. II - Prest-
dent Bush vowed ton.l&bt 10 rcrauarc
again5t those responsible for today's
attacks on New Vork and Washing-
ton, declaring that he would "make
no distinction between me terrorists
who committed these acts and those
wbo harbor them."
"These acts of mass murder were
Int.ended to frighten our nation into
cbaos and retreat, but they have
faitcd," the president said in his first
sp<:ech to the nation (rom the Oval
Office. "Our country Is strong. Ter-
rorist acts can sbake the foundation
of our biggest buildings. but they
cannot touch the foundatlon ol Amer-
Ica."
His speech came after a day of
trauma that seems destined to define
his presidency. Seclc.Ing 10 .Dl once
calm the nation aDel declare hls oe-
termirkWon to exact retribution, he
told a country numbed by repeated
scene5 of carnage that "these acts
shattered steel. bUl they canoot dent
the sleelof American resolve."
Mr. Bush spoke only hours after
returning from a 1Igz.ag course
across the country. as his Secret
Service and mWlaJy security teams
moved blm from Fklrlda. where he
woke up this morning expecting to
press for his education bill. to com-
mand posts In Loul5iana and Nebres-
ka before It was decennined the at-
tacks had probably ended ~ be
could wely return to the capital
Il was a si&n ot the catastrophic
ConUnUl!d on PQ&e A4
AllDlICAN TMGETS A ball of fife exp&oded outward alter
the second of two jetlineno slammed into the World Trade
Center, Ie6s than two hours later, both of the l1(}..story
towers were gene. Hi'pckers crashed a third airliner into
the Pentagon. setting oU a huge explo.ion and fire.
President Vows to Exact
Punishment for 'Evil'
By SERGE SCHMEMANN
HJjackers rammed jeuteers into each of New York's World Trade
Center lowers yesterday, toppling both In a hellish storm of ash, glass,
smoke and leaping victims, while a third jetliner crashed into tbc
Pentagon lo Virginia. There was no oUidal count, but President Bush
said thousands had perished, and in the Immediate aftermath the
calamity was already being ranked the worst and most audacious
terror anack in American history.
The attacks seemed carefully coordinated. The hijacked planes
were all en roete to California, and therefore gorged with fuel. and
their departures were spaced wlthln an hour and 40 mmetes. The first,
American Airlines Flight II, a Boeing 7trl out of Boston for Los
Angeles, crashed into the
north tower at 8:48 am.
Eighteen minutes later,
United Airlines Flight l7S,
also headed (rom Boston to
Los Angeles, plowed Into the
south tower.
Then an American Air·
lines Boeing 757, FUght 77,
left Washington's Dulles In-
ternational Airport bound
for Los Angeles, but instead
hit the western pan of the
Pentagon, the military
headquarters where 24,000
people work, at 9:40 a.m.
Finally, United Alrllnes
Flight 93, a Boeing 757 lIy-
ing from Newark to San SECOND f"lAN[. United Airlines Flight 175
Francisco, crasbed near nearing the trade center's south tower.
Pittsburgh. raising the pos-
sibility that Its hijackers had taUed In whatever their mission was.
There were indications that the hijackers on at least two of the
planes were armed with knives. Attorney General John Ashcroft lold
reporters in the evening that the suspects on FUgbt 11 were armed
that way. And Barbara Olson, a television commentator who was
traveling on American Flight 77, managed to reach her husband,
Solicitor General Theodore Olson, by cell phone and to tell him that the
hijackers were armed with knives and a box cutter.
In all, 266 people perished In the four planes and several score
more were known dead elsewhere. Numerous firefighters, police
officers and other rescue workers wbo responded to the lnltial disaster
in Lower Manhattan were killed or injured when the buildings col-
lapsed. Hundreds were treated (or cuts, broken bones, bums and
smoke Inhalation.
BUI the real carnage was concealed for now by the twisted,
smOking, ash-choked carcasses o( the twin towers, in which thousands
ol people used to work on a weekday. The collapse of the towers caused
another World Trade Center buDding to fall 7 hours later, and several
ContlrwedonPageAl.f
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Awaiting the Aftershocks
Washington and Nation Plunge Into Fight
With Enemy Hard to Identify and Punish
By R. W. APPLE Jr.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 11 - T~ a sense of equilibrium. with war-
day's devastating and o.sumlshlng1y planes and heavily armed hellcop-
weU-coordinated attacks on tbc tcrs crossing overhead, pasl and
World Trade Center lowers in New present national security offldals
York and 00 the Pentagon outside of earnestly debated the poSSibility of a
Washington plunged the Congressional declaration of war -
News nation into a warlike but against precisely whom, and In
Analysis :~~::: ~~ :~ :~tm~~:=c:?p~~;
Identify with cenalnty New York and Washington. The
and hard 10 punish wllh precision. North AmcrtCIl.[l Alt Defense Com-
1be whole nation - to il degree the mand, which hnd seemed to many a
whole world _ sllook lIS hijacked reuc of the cold war. adopted a pos-
airliners plunged inlO buildings thai
symboUzc the financial and military
might of the United Stales. Tbc sense
of security and self-confidence that
Amerlcan, 'ake as 1ltcir birthrl<ll' MORE ON THE ATTACKS
suffered a grievous blow, from which
recovery will be slow. The ener-
shocks wUI be nearly as bad, Qt hun-
dreds and possibly thousand's of pco-
ple discover that frlt!nd.s or retenves
died awful. fiery deaths.
Scenes of chaos and ccstrucucn
evocative of the nightmare world ol
Hieronymus Bosch, with smoke and
debris blOl:tIn&OUt the sun, were ear-
ried by television into homes and
workplaces across the nntlon. Echo-
ing Prnnltlln D. Roosevclt's cescup-
1IODof the attack 00 Pearl Harbor as
an event "which wul nve in inlamy,"
Gov. Georse E. Patakl of New Vork,
a Republican, spoke of "an lncredl-
bie outrage" and Senator Charle$ E.
Schumer of New York. a Democrat,
spoke of "a dastardly anacz,"
But mere words were inadequate
vessels to contain the sense of shock
and horror that people ren.
As Washington struggJed to regain
ConLinued on poge AZ4
IIIESCUDtS _COMIE VlC11MS Fire-
fighters who rushed to the trade cen-
ter were killed.
S£A1tat fOft 5U.n'IVOItS Some pee-
ple trapped In tbe rubble for bours
were rescued. PAGE A2
omCtALS SUSI"£CT INN LADEN
Eavesdropping intercepts alter the
attacks were cited. P"-GE.ut
TUROfUSTS EXI"LOrTW£AIlNESS In-
vestl,ators had crtucued preeau-
tlons against hijacking. P"-GEAn
CASUALTIlES IN WASHINGTON An un·
known number of people were killed
at uie Pentagon. PAGE A5
o 1IlIlIIJJI~JIII,1I~lijll~JIIJI
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Addendum E: Philadelphia Daily News Extra, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 11, 2001,
p. 1
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COMMERCIAL PLANE HIJACKED
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Addendum F: Arizona Daily Star, Tucson, Arizona, September 12, 2001, p. 1
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Ari~llnallaily Star
SERVING TUCSON SINCE 1877 . WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12,2001 **
Terrorists use knives, box cutters to hijack four planes;
World Trade Center destroyed, Pentagon damaged
THE PENTAGON
RqKJrts SUIJIff!# that as many as
8OOpeopledi«lln atl«koll d~
lense headquarters. Still. sa)'3
lop qQlcial, "'TM AmlagaR Is
fuoctttmlng. -
NEW YORK CITY
Scenes qf devaslDoon. panic and
fear unfolded as thousondsfluJ
I.hedJyonfool.
TWIN TOWERS
TM engin0lll' who designed 1M
World ~ CenJu soid the
IOwtrs(DU1d ta~a 'iUlhil..
.AGE ....
THE ECONOMY
FfidCl/Jki4lsp<akingln n.c.on
.says I~ nnIIon 'sftnancial S)'s-
tem ts in no da1Jlf!T.
IN TUCSON
Rt$wenUjoin in widespread
PTU}'fT;followen Q/lslam all!
target qf'oneer; Red Oess serb
bklod donations..
.AGE142
'AGEA3
PAGEA10
" We will
make no
distinction
between the
terrorists
woo committed
these acts and
those woo har-
bor them. " PAtSldeat au.b
In an addn:ss 10 1M na.don
Death toll seen
inthousands;
rescue delayed
~~
A JRU of smoke, dust and sadl:ess reWed ova- Iowa:
Manhattan et nichtfaU 'TUesday as resrue WO~, I»-
lire and firefiChten lXl!Sscd their- ëesperate smrch Ier
survivors oflhe worn lCrrorul attack inUnited. States
history. a coordinated airbOlTl! as-sault that destroyed
lhe twin towers of Ute Wol1d Trade CeoLer and len a
portion of the Pt5lla~n in W:uhineton in smokinc: ru-
ID'.
In New York alene. it W,u feared the desUl tOll could
reach the thousands. Omda.l5 said al leasl300 ftrefiCh('
ers and iS peltee offirel'$ WCI'\! missing and txeSumed
dBad at midday. Upward Ii of:l),(ll) (EOple worked in the
110-slory Wond Trade center tewers. reduced by CJ:"pI ..
stens and fire lo ruins whnin hours oflhe initial auaca.
Sialting: TUesw.y eveninc: £rom tne White Kouse,
Pre$jdent Bush evoked a biliica1 mcssa~ in saYinelhe
United states was \\-Alkin: '1hrou~ the valley of U-.e
shadow of death" bul litilI £eared 110 evil. He (ecribed
theallackasa mass murder that had ended the lives of
thousands ofp:xlpleand called on the nation to reuen-
OOr tile victims in its Jrd}"efS.
Amid reports that lnvesuëators were rocusine their
attention on J"ereg;lOe Saudi exile Osama bin laden, te-
lievN to te in exile in Afr;ba.nistan, BuSh. JrQruised aU
the covcmmenl.'s reeources would be used to fOld and
punish the perpetratcrs of the auaek.
''TodaY. ournationsawevll," Bush said.
Said Adm, Rubert J. Nauer. commander of Ute u.S.
Allantic Fleet: ''We have teen attacked like we havent
sinee Peart Harbor."
SEE DISASTER I Al
Bin Laden links
start to emerge
.:rJ~~Io"1:,.
WASHll'CiTON - u.s. officials beean piecin&: logeU)·
era caselinkin:Osama. bin Laden to the worst terrorist
attaCk inU.S. histon', aided by an ~ of ccmmu-
nicattOlU OOtween his iUpportcrs and harrowing reu·
litoue eaUs £rom victims abOard the jetliners before
the)' crashed on TUesday.
Allthoritieli were forusinc:
some of their efforts on possi·
bie bin Laden supporters in
Flonda tased on the hlenlifl.·
cation of a suspe<ted hijacker
on ore of the manifests of the
four j:ts that crashed, law eo-
for(BDCl1l officials said.
The FBI was JIelDri.n~ to
SEm'Ch locations in Broward
Couruy in SouUt florida. and
the D1ytona Oeadl area iD
CenlIal Florida, Florida I)e..
putment of Law Enforcemenl:
spokewan Riek 'Moren said.
1lle locations had links lo
the susJ,:CCtcd bin laden sup-
porter on Ute jet manifCil. officials said.
Amon: Ute tQssen.,n was BarbiuaOlson, the ,,'ife of
a top Justice DeJDrtment official. who caUed het' nus-
tanë as the hijackil1l:took p1are.
U.S. inLeU1DYlOO int.e:r'rep(ed ccmmunkaticns be-
IWD31 blo Laden suppor\cr'S dlsa.tssine the attadt.s 00
lhe \Yond Ttade Center and Pmtaeon. accotd.ing to
SEE III. LADE. I A7
Get: Star ,tories rrem 'rues-
dayand today, or watca lo-
tal and natiooal video coy.
era", .
.. _t.oonV_
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Addendum G: San Fransisco Chronicle, San Fransisco, California, September 12, 2001, p.1
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NORTHERN CA.LlFORNIA'S LAQCoEST NEWSPAPER
'**** ••. Wt:O:>:ESlJA Y. SEI'THII!EK I;. lUUI
Joan Ryan
t::XPANDED COVERACE
Bay Area in shock Sports world reacts
A..n'cn:, unfold. 1(.~(h.·III" hxllikC' ,I,-.:all ~porlillg ncnt~ nrlll.JlIy ~hllt OO·.\TI",
lI2 ,\ du-arn. AlT rc-spufI'oChHcnomi :tlt.n,l:-.. S"Onl~. 01
I he :.zn;1..'(1)let!>IJ) ~n;)\', ihlll (Alt ~It~ \Jf
'o(.'('i.J111~i.... h IlIlbOly ib J I I.)II~'\\vuJ )(.,:_
,...........,,., ....
Test ot the president
&l~""n"tillulll,,1\\1111'.H"~.Ktuf~'c..,"OIi
,I~ilblllt(· u.s ":ll\:l'I'C'U! J !.ulltll A4
Business toll
1~~;I;.IIt1D III U_) ,md IIIlt'IiUlti':lJI hu),,,-=-,
~lifl.,t \4'I)!JIH C..UU.IItR.'i SUSl1l£,S.s_, 81
On the Web
Fer: Io=v.~ l:pd.lln, ;rd,liiro",,1 phO:r.h, \"tb....
aud ,1 ,11'1(..,"\1:1)11 glUUp. !;O In o;j~,!"..aum
Attacks stun the nation
"l (_,;uli~\ ct".L\h ItI",II..:~C\1 ~ctllnCI!lo Ulln Ihe
World Ttadc l~'flle1" h, ="L"W )'OIL: Oh'
:.:1lI the- 1\'1l1~nn nc,n \ V;lihih<;hfr' • A3
Frantic call from S.F.-bound Jet
~IH KIW", WI 111;111plltl1l'1.~lii, \,ik ~\'1:-o~I,...h:11K(,
I~,l :11Ih."l'j ih;llts;<O:'....I~h\I' i;11't"tIlI\,!\.IIII.i A5
John Carman
I'c:k-.·Woi~n~lesio>fmd il> w;;')'ln the I~
uf!lUd1 tf'~"t'Jy, DAIUOOX, El
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Addendum H: Philadelphia city paper, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, September 13-20, 2001, p.1
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Addendum I: Austin American-Statesman, Austin, Texas, September 12, 2001, p.1
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SPECIAL REPORT
Austin Amcocalt'$tatc$man
r* 50ccnts Final Wednesday. September l2. jstatesman.com
'OUR NATION SAW EVIl:
• Targets: Hijacked planes slam into World Trade Center, Pentagon • The suspect: Evidence 'strongly points' to terror mastermind bin Laden
• The toll: Thousands are killed in world's worst terrorist attack • Gridlock: ll.S. markets shut down; air travel halted; Austin airport closes
• Missing: Nearly 400 NYCfirefighters, police feared dead; 266 aboard jets • The president: Tragedy fills nation with 'a quiet, unyielding anger'
Glllr,(lmStlrrol",,',vI\~~1[t.dPrt'SS
Covered in dust and debris. people made their way through the layers ~ destruction on the streets of New York as they walked away from the World Trade Center, where bOth towers conaoseo.
U.S.has 'no blueprint'
for how to strike back
Bv PAUL RrCHTm
l..c6Anee'.esT'rre
WASIIINGTON -cTbeterrcrlst
attock 011 the United States )lui
powerful 11I'eS$l"" on Presulent
RU!'oh to 1~I:lIi:tI(' swiRly. m'en 1I~
U.S. OrflCi.1JS .. nd outside experts
w:lmcd Ih:1I ;my milillU)' opera-
lion will mvnlve rtsks nnd lous:h
ehctces.
i\lthou~h U.S.olTicialSSll.id they
""I\'C 110 rnnclustve evidence
~owin$! who w-is I'cqmnsible,
mml)' uovcrurnenr olnci<lls .:nul
terrortsn experts ccnsuter Smltli
dtssutcnt Osuna hin Laden 1I1t:
prime suscoct.Htbe Oush:ulmln·
istratinn C\"CflIW1l1y concludes be
is In bbmc. till: PtmrOigoll rnuld
moos:' ~ \"ru'ict)' or respenses.
The rnllitnrv r-ould L,unch :I;r
:11l.·u~ks uu hin Loden's camns in
Mgf1.1nisttlll ilnd seck to strike his
rolls iu the Mirldle F..nsr :111'\
around the wor-ld. As the Clintnn
»muuustronon 1e'1I1lCtl. hilling
tbc bin 1~'lden operatien with
cneunh rorcc lo deler future ter-
rerlsm will hf> lou$!h. Unlike ua-
lions with milltory inlrnstruc-
IUI1::'I!Ilul titrl:):ls Slll'h.1st:mk tti,
\'isiolls lind "k doronse b..ttter-les.
hin 1,1I1t:n's network is whlcly
IliSjlCrst'd, consisting or I'e~lti\'cly
mohi"~ terrorist cells with re\\'
easily idcntif ..abe IlIrJ!P.ts,
Also, the suicide terrorists who
1'.",.il'1l out '1'uesrlny's nll.1cks
h.;I\'C such stronnmcnvcs th.,t.,ny
counte ...nttnck m.,}' nul deter them
- and cauld evon strcnsibcn their
rcscfve. Annlhe,' cpllon rol' tbe
Pentanen would he to hit the mil-
Hw)' nml command inrrnstruo
lure orthe Tnliban gcvenuncnt in
ArgfllUlistlin. The T.,lib.-1I1, which
hns ucnuosced IQ hln 1...1rk:n's III'·
uvlnes in their country. denier!
tmy mvnlvcment nnd "MHlf!mlll~r!
Tuesdll)"s n!l;tcks.
1-!."lllosinlisshookM.ct~lnisl"n',
1'~'lli",1 or Knhul hours nne,' lhe
nnoeks in tbc United States, hut
Blish 1lI1mini!:lr.1tiotl ofTici:lls de'
nied Mr respcnslbilitv. In Il
bricnl1.~ .1( tbe Pt~llt,1glln, Defense
Secrctnry Donald Rumsf"cld s.:,id
Ih:ll "mnowavlstbc Unlted Stntcs
novcrumom cClllnf'r.tml to those
cxplcslous.'
II mny be II:I)'S, \\'l.'f·ks or even
mentbs before Il ruller picture or
TuesdJl)"s{ltl:u,:ksis.1s.~mbled,ln
s •• U.s. forces, A20
Airliners are turned
into weapons of terro
COIfMC:n r..,)-t)e·AMo::~'ed P'1;:9S
A fireball spews glass and steel out cA the world Tracte Center's
south toeer aner an airliner rammed it Tuesday moming. The
building tater collapsed as the names gutted the upper noors,
Bv seen SHEPARD
AND SHEUFr EMUNG
'\IT'CflCall,St<l:~ln:lnWit5tllflgtOf1S1iJ!f
WASIIIf\:(iTON - Unknown
crem les wugcdthc wur-st IC'T"l"ist
nll.,rk in If,S, history TIM'sd;I)",
nying lujacked au-liners into the
Wnrld Tmde Center. r.olbll$in~
the tl().!\loryhuilclin~-"into pilcsof
rubble, mul inln the PI'nt".I!On.
n)C!"C WHS no offlci.-ll count. hut
l'resldcnt Blish ~Aitl thousands
hItlIJ1l:r;~JII.
!lush r.ClnlICllllmtllhe.,llm:ks.,s
the ~(I\'cnHnf:1I1 »ssumcd :1 Will'
fOlltin~.
"Tod/.I)', uur nation So'IWevil,
Thls is" dA)'Wll(!fl;lll Americans
rrem every wnlk oflirNUlitc in cur
resolve fOf jusnee :11111PC1CC:'
Bush !'.,ill in :I nAtional address
TUf'Srttly lIi~L "'.'\merk;I 1,..15
stood down encmjcs before. mul
we will du sn thls ttrnc."
'Il ..f~ hnll'prHlous nnncks. wit-
ncsscd 011 Ielevisions across tbc
wor-ld. seerned {'1m:fillly clilInli·
rcueë. 'rney began when two
rommerelal jeutocrs Ihal were
hi~,r.kellwithin 16minlltesOrPJlr-!1
otbcr from Boslllll'S Lowm lntcr-
""IjCln.11 NII"PClrt Cl7Isll«d mtu the
Today's American·Statesman is being delivered to all weekday and Sunday subscribers.
For the latest breaking news, go to statesman.com
~imlt World Trade Couter ruw
in New YllrkCily, SIIIIIl110f'l"\\'{l
III101hel' hij.1('ked rommerevil I
liner pluwed uuo tbc 1'1'111.-,.\
outside tbc 11:10011'1' r·:IlIiI.'ll.
Ieurth hUacked pto'\llt~ ernsbed
mtjcs southcasr of Piuslnn-zh.
!loIu·cntfy hound For- the JlI~sid
11.1111~ln!,11 :11C:lmll D:will, Md
"The :<-e;lI"ch is under way
rhnsc who ;U~ behind Ih,!~'"
acts," Rush !I.,ltl ,'SI"P.Srllf'l"S r-
tinIIet! cnmhiQI! 1111"QUg,hnJlJhlt
1111' vnr i1)1I~ I fII·.e('lf~c1 sit
~IIrchin!::rnrslll"\'i\'OI'S.
No UIlt: Intik l'f:::oponsibilit)'
til(> ItIlI1f:ks. hut (plier,'ll authr
lies pouned lo Osame bin [..-111
till ('xi)(!d Saudi milllo""irc \\
hits been linked lo <111 1','11"1
bnmhin.e of the \Vorl,1 Tn
Contor.
Pnlil'CSllUr"·~s.·lili ~Ull("f"'n
1'":lIlIX'd in t!)(! twin towers III
;I.t ..extto call (lllihurilies Il/" rllll1
mombers mullhal soml' uvnu
pn Ih."Coffteers nvutc l"iulin ccnu
In crc nf the mils, whkh II
ptncc in tbc ;U\cnlonTl, a 1)\
Ilt:S!'mtUI phlll"lerl his r/lmil)' I II!
he Wi\S trapped with polleem
Se. AHacks, A19
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Addendum J1: The Washington Post, District of Columbia, September 12, 2001, p. 1
Addendum J2: The Plain Dealer, Cleveland, Ohio, September 12, 2001, p.1
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Terrorists Hijack 4 Airliners,
Destroy World Trade Center,
Hit Pentagon; Hundreds Dead
Bodies Pulled
From Pentagon;
Troops Patrol
District Streets
0)' ST(\,l:T ....·01Ll:l' 01111/\'1"1111:1. SA:n,\/Io,\
U'a,ilmp'JIli\,.J·v."n'lf":.-,,
Rescuers lOUght thrnuJPllons 0{ debris
in queslot victims 31 the Pentagon last
night after terrorists seized an airliner out-
bound irom Dulles International Airport
and plunged it into the heart ai American
military power. killing an cslilllall'ti several
hundred people.
Hampered by lires that still ragt'd as CW·
ning fell. emergency teams had carried OUt
only six bodies, bul they were preparing to
rcroxc many more, and rescuers were us--
ing dogs and listening devices to search for
~1r~~~~~~~;~~~~!~~6r:~i :
cause portions of the building were under
construction. ami many of the military and
civilian personnel had been temporarily re-
located. aceerding to Arlini,'too Hrc Chief
Edward P. Plaugher,
Calling ïess than an hoer after two hi·
jadu.'d passenger jch ~lalllnl('(l into the twin
towers oi New )brk's \\brkl Trade eenier.
the assault on the Pentagon began an un- Mi.. IH afteral A.MlNc:.lI Airlins ,la.e cr.ashd i.to th World Tooe Ce.tar i. New York City,a U.ited alrlilleris a.o.t to kit tile I:OIn,'II.
precederned day of office and school etos-
ings. panicked phone call), wild rumor and
extraordinary security in the Washinl.'1on
area.
Last night.downtown streets were large.
lv deserted as D.C. National Guard units
joined police in patrotling the rhy. D.C.
Mayor Alllholly A. V{llIiams (Dl. Marrland
Cow Parris N. Glendening (D) and \~rginia
Cov James S. Gilmore UI (R) declared
states of emergency that broadened their
power [0 govern withour legislative au-
thority.
l\:loSl 0( the regiee's school s~~tems "ill
be closed today, althoug11 President Bush
announced that the lederal go\-ernment
would reopen. after having shut down with-
in an hour of yesterday's Pcmagon attack.
At a late-evening news conference. D.C.
Police Chief Charles H, Ramsey said that
the attacks here and in New York would for·
ever change security operations in Wash.
inj.,'loll and that there was no Ionb'Cr such a
Ining 3S "business as USU;trhere.
Originally headed for Los An~Ie~, the
American Airlines Boeing 757-<arl);ng
61 people and loaded with ;·K),(XX)pounds of
fuel lor the long night to the West CoaSI,-
.'I.'i· I'E.!\T-\GON . .-111, C"I, I firefigkters hule .l.Jzesallae Peltagoa, w.k:. was.it.y a ,!ale tbl had .eel .ijacked after bki.g off froln O.IAes l.tef1latio.aIAlr,or1.
Washington
On Flight 77: 'Our Plane
Is Being Hijacked'
/,lj' !o.\'II(C FISIlt:JI
;Hili OU-"PIIIU.U'S
Il;H;''''S'I'''' Pw! SliJO'Wnrm
There was oot even the grace of
insram death. Instead. there was
lime to <:0111from the )ky over Vir·
ginia. fingers pumping cell phones.
terrified passengers talking 10
Io\-ed ones for one final time.
Herded to the back ot the plane-
by hijacl«!rs armed with knives and
~\;ul~:~~~~eorA ~~g!~~~~.
lines f1igl1177-including the wiïe
of Solicitor General 11\(.'000re Ot.
MJn, J Senale suffer, three D.e.
schoolchildren and three teachers
on an educational field trip and a
Uni\-ersil)' Park family of four
headed to Australia (or a two-
month advcnrurc-cwcrc ordered
10 call relatives to 53)' Ihe}' were
about todie.
AOOut an hour 3fter takOOij from
Dulles Imernational Airport yester-
thy morning. l:"tiglu i7. a Ucx!in).!:
757 headed for Lal Angeles with
64 people aboard. became ~ II11S·
she mis~ile aimed ~t the While
Hou!T.e. The target wouW change
~u(hj{,III)·.btn the symboli!tJlI Wh
L'quallyde\-a.nating.
By about 9:40 3.m .. when the
dhing 1)lane eilm'(J out a nussh-e
chunk of the Pental!on. its pa!'-
Skakel PeltagOI worker Trae"
Willi.u"lS watdt!5 t.e fblleS.
abte terror. hundreds died, and the
nation's greatest symbol oi security
Jay shattered. thick plumes Di
smoke (:alllouflaging a gaping hole
in its hean.
Barbara K. Olson, the former
federal l)fosecutor who re:ame ~
prominent n' commenUlOf dur·
;nJ! the impc;tchlllt.'llt oIl'rc~itlenr
Bill Clinton. caUed her hu~band
twice in the final minutes. Her last
words to him were. "What dn I tell
u.s. Intelligence Points
To Bin Laden Network
lf, 1),\;-.. El:L:!;N
lin,1 VDt~O-" 1..01:1'
1:.,.JU"~1.,'1['1)'/ Sll:n'rr-nl.-r~
The U.s.l.l\>\,(·f11I111'1lIhas )trong
evidence from multiple sources
that the suicidal terrorists whocar-
rled out }e~lerday') catastrophic
attacks in New '\brk and Washing·
ton were connected to Saudi fu{,.ri·
rive Ouma bin Laden. who prcvi-
ously was linked to the 1993
bombing of the World Trade een.
ter, senior official) said.
One scntor oficut said Uie "rol)-
ability that bin Laden is behind the
deadly assaults is in "the high ~s,~
while another US. olficial said in-
vesegators bf3therl'tl evidence
"suungly ~ug(..'l:~tillJ!"that bin Lad-
en's organization. al Qacda. was in-
voleed.
TIle evidence pointing 10 bin
Laden wa~ gathered foltov.illg the
attacks III a joint eiiort br the CI/\
and the Rli. with information from
domestic and OI'('rM:'a~ sources. a
senlor cïïlcnl said,
"lt i~more than just me analyti.
cal surmise rhat it would uke all or-
ganilatioo with incredible com-
ATTACK ON AMERICA
• Guide to coverage, A2
• Latest updates,
mand and control capability, which
bin Laden's has. to stage an attack
like this," one US. official said.
"TIlere is ocher information that
has been otxained after the attack
again~t the World Trade center
pointing in the direction of bin
Laden."
Unprecedented in scope and so-
pbisticatiou. uie coonllnatcd as-
sauh on the world's financial and
political capitals caugbt the United
States completely off guard--de--
spite a massive illte1li~nce ami
IJw enforcement nelwork tle\-ott.'tl
to detecting and thwarting such at-
tacks. With efforts focused lar~l}'
on g'U3rding against bomb threats
to overseas targets. US. author-
itic~ wllcedcd the)' were Ill-pre-
pared for hijacked jetliners pur·
posetycrasbed on American sod.
Sen. Orrin G. Hatch (R-Uuh). a
member 0( the Senale intelligence
commiuec. said he was tokl in J
briefing that electronic intercepts
)~~terda)' showed "representatives
affiliated with Osama bin Laden
over the airwaws reporting that
!Xl·1UIIIOIIISTS. A:!U, Cui. I
n IIII~~~~li~IJI,llllll~I,~~-
New York
Bush Promises
Retribution;
Military Put on
Highest Alert
BJ' ~IICIl.\l:L (;kU~'Io.\LI'
~-;",I"'I!1"'I/",,>,:l:"ffr.·nl!"l
Terrorists unleashed an astonis.hing air
assault on Arrerica's military and financial
power centers yesIerday morning. hijack-
ing iour commercial jets and then crashing
them uno the World Trade Center in New
'ïork. the Pentagon and the Pennsylvania
coumrvsidc.
There were no reliable csumnes last
night oi how man)' people were killed in Uie
1II0st devastating rerrorlu operation in
American history.The number was certain-
ly in Inc hundreds and could be in the thou-
sands.
It was the most dramatic attack on
American soil since Pearl Harbor. and it
created indelible scellc~of carnai-re and chao
es. The corumandecrcdjct s obliterated the
World Trade Ccmcr's twin JIG-story 1.0\\"
ers trom their familiar perch above Man-
hattan's sk}iine and ripped a blazing ~~I"alh
through the Defense Dcpanrnem'v impos-
:~~s~~~;i~dt~il\~~r}~S~~'r!i~~~~~nfir~~eti:
and plunging the entire nation into an un-
paraflëed state ot auxiery,
Ll.S. military Ierces at home and abroad
were placed on their hight'si state ot alen.
and a loose network or Navy warships was
de~~~::~i~t~:I~j~~~~ ;~rai~~I~:~~3.
bound planes from three airports on me
Eastern Seaboard; the airliners were load.
«t with the maximunt amount of fuel. sug-
~~~n~r:t.\~~fi~aa~~~'SI::~~~:~a~~
World 'Ihdc Center. Then an American
Airlines plane out ai Dulles International
Airport nppcd through the newly rCOO\'3t·
ed walls of the Pentagon. perhaps the
workl's toost secure office building. A
fourth jct crashed 80 miles southeast of
Pittsburgh, shortly after jl was hijacked
and turned in me direction of Washington.
Kane of the 2ffi people aboard the four
planes survived. There were even more
horrific but still umallicd ca)uallic) in the
World Trade Center and Ihe Pentagon.
;;;~hu!~~~,~~~I~A ~ ~~ ;~ :~;
firms with offices in the World Trade Cen-
ter.the Marsh & Mcl.ennan insurance bro-
s." .. -\n:-\CK. A /.J. Cvl, }
'I Saw Bodies Falling Out-
Oh, God, Jumping, Falling'
lJy l:hn1"o~(;.:I.1.~r.\,..
!/a!,"mp('lII'.),:~off"1'm.-r
NEW YORK. Sept. ll-Va1e-rie
Joonson stared. transfixed. at the in-
Ierne a thousand yards to her ~tJI
and \\CSt. Tears streamed furrows
through a film ei ash on ncr face.
Her mind tried to gra~p what her
eyes beheld: a blazing ga~h across
the to-er ei wealth that ~)111OOli7.ed
New York for her all bcr liie. The fire
marched downward. floor by 11001'.
windows bursting OUI ahead of the
flames.
Then .kXlllwrt screamed a gunur-
al. \\unlk'll~ wail. 1\ sound like nOlh·
ing she ever hrard-b.\· as thunder,
but louder and Ion~r --pre,sOO in
00 her chest for tell ld'Olxb Of
more. resounding throu.~l Centre
Street at Ioey Square. The ncnh-
ern tower. the taller 0( the two. was
gone. It \\"a~10-29 am .. an hour and
three quarters after the first of two
jetlinen ripped through Ne\\' York's
twin emblems ui b,I1c:JoollKcsLibJC.
"Oh Goo. oh Goo. my' niece
\\uks in thai building.~ Johnson
Ireathed. "Oh Goo.w
Where \l'e StcxxJ there IlO\\' came
a milingck.lod-~l1(",c and ash. tcn
storic-s lall, building ~1)('('tIas the)'
reached the can)om ei l\1anha[tan'~
f.OUthern tip, SuC\;\\)r~ Streamed.
chola..'C.I and L.":J1!l!l1l{!". behind the
Two WOIMI lIold cae. otller as Ihy
~vatcll til" World Tr.xto Cnlor hr..
blindi)' toward the Ioumain at r{)jey
Square. were Elizabeth Belleau and
Meli;~ Morales, strangers gra~ping
tuuds with all their miglll as they
ran. Belleau plUllgt'd her head into
Ihe cooling waters and retched,
cooghing OUtash and phlegm. TIlf'
fountain ~nck>sed a !.CullXure: "Tri·
umph ei the Human Spirit."'
l3cUeau had u..'('n running tor
nearly 1"-0 houn. Her llIorningcom·
mUI£- 011 tbc BM-3 bus had mlled .
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THE PLAIN DEALER
h'1#.):iL''''S''Mijjj,~!:I!i·'f·4Ii,il
Hijackers ram ? airliners into World Trade Center, 3rd plane
slams into Pentagon, 4th crashes near Pittsburgh; thousands die
Fiery btests rock the World Trade Center after il was hit by two hijacked airplanes. Both of the IlO-story lowers were toppled in the deadly terrorist auaek,
Bush vows swift revengeCall loved ones,
say you will die,
passengers told
Jar. Fl.O 1.1 I'
s t c (';\1.1. I A'
{laTently hijackt-'CI \\ithin I1Iln'1t('_,
of one allot her alalI): the Enn
Coast. were turned into killing
machines. Two or t he planes
crashed Into the twin towers of
the World Trnde Center in New
York Clt~·, a rh!nt barreled into
the renracen. and the last
crashed 80 mlle~ southeast of
Pittsburgh on a tr:lje«tnry thai of-
ficials believe might have heen
carrying it toward the prestdeu-
nat retreat :\1 C'Ul1p O'I\;d, Md.
Dy 10:29 n.rn.. bath World
Trade center towers bad cot.
lapsed. The sun over Manhattan
was hidden by dust and smoke:
screams and scbs echoed through
its concrete canyons. Ash coated
survtvnrs :15 they fled the grIsly
scene. m;'l,ngled bodies l:t}' in
doorway!': and streets, and espio-
stons (arced rescuers lo retreat.
Police fired glln~hOI!i Into the air
lo drive stunned entookers from
the scene.
At the Pentagon. the massive
svmbnl and eormuand center of
1\lIlcric.:1II might, mili!a",' person-
nel Mild ci\'ilimns pulled the dellt!
and Injured from debris. A)rc.,dy
the White J louse and the C.1.phol
had been evucuated, airplanes
had been grounded across the
ccuutrv and Americans, long
complaeent behind the barriers
of Iwo oceans, had learned just
how vulnerable even they can be.
ser. ATTACK I ,U
W.\SIIISGTOS -Therew3.5 not even the grace
cr tnsrant death. Instead, there was ume to call
(rom the sky nver Vlrginl:l to loved ones, finger!!
pumping cell phones, vcrces 5.'~;llgquick goodbyes.
Henled to the back of the plane by hijackers
armed with kntves and box-euuers. the 641)''_'I..~ell-
gers and crew of American Airlines Flight ii - ill-
cllldin,; the \\;(l' of Solicitor General Theodore Ol·
son. a Senate IIt"ffer. three D.C. schoolchildren and
three teachers on an educattonal field trip, and 11
suburban iamlly of four headed to Australia (or a
two-month adventure - were ordered lo call rele-
rives to s:aythey were about to die.
C;t!I.i'l,\H,\)I.'\"'fll.\\".\ I .\.''''Il·I.\'Inll'IU~-';
All emergency worker helps a woman injured
in the attack 011 thc World Trade center.
"rerrortsts unleashed a highly
coordinated and deadly attack on
America's political and fillancial
eapltnls yesterdnv. altering the
New York skyline, piercing lite
Pentagon and killing thousands
in the worst attack 011 U.S. soli
since r'eart Harber.
Ry late evening, there were few
answers as to how the assault had
been plotted and carried mn, who
was responsible {or it, even cr.
aell)' how man)' had died. Presi-
dent Rush assured Americans
that their government would be
up and running again today, but
It will take much longer before
the shock o(yesterdaysuru.ides.
Four commercial etrnners. np-
EVil COMES ASHORE: It's
urne to rnaster aUf fears. defe:!1
our enemies. An editorial. 110
!'Iuill !ka/u U~f'<'rl{'r
Cbssificds Ml
Deaths 18
Editorials I'D
Weathcr U
PI;)in SpeakinQ
and lOllery on A18.
lfiPAGESOrCOVERAGE
INSIDE ~~n~~~!.:;:·;::"~ow vulocrabte the na-lion has become. AS
THE RECION: Northeast
Ohio shuts down. Some
stop to pray and others
eenare blood. All
THE REACTlON: world
condemns attacks. A7
Sam Fulwood and other
columnists. AU, In
THE GREED: 'there's no
gasoline shortage. but
some Ohio stations are
iJcking up prices. A13
l'il/'llI'lC",'frf}/"'IYI~r
(IItd illl(',.tI('lil'l-jjll·III1/.~
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Jerrorlst attacks
horri nation
AMERICA IN SHOCK
1t1 PJ\(~ES INSIDE
4 jets crashed;
Trade Center,
Pentagon hit
'I looked down ...
I saw the horror'
il:!
Bush vows to
avenge deaths
A2
Suspect:
Osama bin laden
A5
How intelligence,
security failed
1\ 5, s
Dire economic
effects predicted
A't
Frantic relalives search
for loved ones
..\11
Resources for coping
:\ 15
For cominuin,l{ coverage. sec
seattletimes.com
rnr'r ....,f/ltl"tilllr_~.fOm
n'I""'t<lt'2f~1I
,', .•-!. 1,~,...'".",I'''''
,IJJIlill
2;icIS"_'.:r:.S9Ifhl\ll-U,IU].'(1
lIlIr~m~ \:':11 II \IXI:HU\:t I~L\."rl;
:;o..·r'lHI_\Sh. I\JI"'" \l'111'lr~r!1'i
I)W1S11l:''':;;:;'· [L~J:\\II[R[
I'lr\.~r ~tl. T('n'(I/"(\-': \?
, ..
Ashe!! ol what IC/IS (liJn' purl uflwill 1/O-s//JI)'/rm'cT'S 11111/1' 11'rlrlt/1'áull' Center
risr·.~(/1101'f I/u' mbbll'. h'llvill.t?lI/mJ,I( J:fI/, ill ,,,,. Nm' )1Jrltsl,·yliJ/t'.
A fiery bbst nl('h; tiu: tlhrltf Tmde CClItu iII Ncw YMk City ,,'('Mcrtlt1y after ;1 "'11$ hit hy 1/1'0"irpfmws. Offt(';t1f!l. .~,,;d ("I.mllitin: ".ill I", in ti", II"ms(IIIt!$.
Closely timed
attacks leave
America in
warlike state
IU"kWIOt'll.\l(I·\'iIlJmW'I..:.tII\\·\lrrl
Th.- :1.,,~O("i(/I,·dI'I·'· .c~
NEW YOUK - In till' lIlo~r rlC\~lst<:ltin.;:
tt'fTllri~t onslmL.d1t ever \\';).!:t-d :1,!;::limt th,'
Unitl~1 St.nes. knifl""'wliling hij;1Ckr:.-rS
l:r.I~h,_..1 1\\1> ;lirliT"'rs hue the W"dd li-:xlt_·
C'~n"·r }''''~h·nlar. l....ppliT'.!: rt~ IwiTI IJO·~IOf1·
tower-c.
The 11{'adly l';'Ilamn}' W:'H wilnc;;,:;,'(1 on
If·I.·\·i~Y1n~xr"~s the worht as allqlllcl'l'l;u,.~
,:;1;111111"''11 nu.l lilt: Pt'l.t:,,I.....>Il anll a fout1h
'·m~I"'d.I'Ils.jdt,l)ill~I}llr.l:ll.
"1; ...1,,)'. OILr n:,tinn ":IW "\,;1." I~·f:~id.:·nl
Blish ~aicl ill all ;yMr.'i'" III tho 11;11;"11 Ia"t
fl;~hl. 1~II"h ':;:1.. 1 Ihflll;;.alld~ /Jf l;n~;; \\":1'e
"suddenly ~·Il(t.,d hy evil, d""l'ic:lhlc XI1l (If
rurror.
Esl:thli~hin.!! 11ll' J ...alh 1011 l:OIlItl rake
I\','cklll.rllt i" bc·li.'wd to be in th ... Ih ....us ..nods.
Nn 'IIW'took n·spr)fl!>.ih~ily for the ;'1I1a:ks
th.,t 1''1.')':(.'(1 till" n:lIi.-m·" senrs of (nollce :t/l(1
,L!(I\·<'T1'l11Ienl. But federal :Luthoritics icl{'nti,
fied O"''lI1l:1 bin l,;xle:l1. WWI has 110::•.'11 .s::r.·ê11
a .•ylum hy :\(t:h:m;st:ul·!>. T:dih.'lI1 nll('l's. ;I~ the
prenc 'IBp€.,(1.
Aidl'd hy ;UI ;,U(,I'Cl'pl of l'Omml!rlio.'-:ltimn
hl'lw('cll his SI1[lp"111cr~ and h:ln~l\I';'ll:: cell.
phone ('ails from ;'II 1(':Is' '-'n~' tli,L!ht :I!lcnd;ult
:Iml' wo J);'ISH'tI~l'r" :I1n.'U"lllhejellincrs be-
for" ihcv crashed. U.S. Off1('T;lh b()t:tn :LS1H'm,
hlin.s:::I case linking hin Loden 10 the rlevasta-
li"n,
U,S. iTul"lIil::cllC(, int('rr('pl~ oornmunea-
!UIIS bcrwr-en hiTl I..:-.ll'll :mppnrt{'r'l di~l'lI)1;:,
ill~ Ilw nrnjcks on tlh' Wurlcl li-:...t~· Center :1:rJd
rill' 1'~'1't;I.l!:nn.a.,:('nnlul.!.: I" Ct:l.h S'·II. OITin
Destruction
and death
far away felt
close to home
HY,\I.I;'iTt7JI"
It happenedur ,hl' other o.:r":I~1.rei yl·~II'r·
d:I\"" lL'IH'r;!>' ;rll:w::ks n.;\·,'rhrl~llt·d [ikl' .m
/ln~ler.r.:nlluld ([11;,,",'.' Ihroll,l:h the n!,L!ioll, IIlIi,·
iTl.!!ti" wah ,lw n-st 'If ti,.. nluntry m n III~I'
founrl ,,!:II e- flf .I..'ri,·( :lIxl :tl'pr"hcn,:;ioll,
A~ the 1II:1,!!niultl... h,"-;I1'\L' k'lIH111 Y"~"'l'·
,lar. seenes 'If .mln\:lT}' hl!SII" miXl"l;[wjth tilt'
-«)!11ll1'rn·:lIu.:l' ;'111'Ie.' \1',· ns a 1\.'1 ir", h:-.I i-tt-
h:t'I.'f1 a IWW ,'r.'l. War II':!" 1111lo,,~.-r allin'$!
that 1\:IPI"'III'f1 ,'I~,'-
'/I'S (JH \\'h~·rr·.
efll'rybody'$ ~ht:;,:"III~~~:;lr::II'~'I1~~\'::
milld and ;11 ctoudless skv - whnt
n;rry/)o(/y's
hmrt.'
... ,~,!!}' :-~l.lnhwe~lcnl.·I'~
::::~~.I;;';~'~,~~:'-:;l(;;~:~;:
in hOlll.',. :11\<1 ,,(fll:c~ :md
CoNN'E: r.'~T:l"r~lI1L~:nXlt:I\·l'lll~.
GoDMAN hO\'l-,r'''.l: :lfT'/1IIl(1u-levi-
~II'II ~d~. walch~lg fl',
pbr" /If ill<' dl'Sll1.lClio:,,,
(If 01\1· uf tilt.' n:lI;ofl'S most impQn:ull ceo-
Homll: svmbols _ Iht· World 'Ir.III;: Ccnwr c-.
:111<1\'11,idcrillJ{ alnl,,1 :11 the death roll. wluu it
all means. :tnd wluu'v 1H'~1.
~I nIllSI[\, teet ilJ IW;tr·Ut'~~ rather then it~
f~l";;S." l'.,icl Sl';rull' author Jnn"tlL'lI1 U:lhall.
"Insofar ns rome-ism serds ::J mt'~s..'J::c. this
rn(·ss..'l~(."was 1101 da-ccted nt K('\\' '~")rknr
W:tSha".l!IOII. D.t" Ill' l'ittsbtll"J.:h. hul ó1I IIII'
;;~~' ..~~~:>llf t\J11crit:a. ;lIlt"l Sl·"uk IS .1 p.an !lf
r-.ludl.,fS\·:rllk':'p!w;II·I'flr"l:nahcl1lt 1111$1'
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Addendum K: The Spokesman-Review, Spokane, Washington, September 12, 2001, p.1
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litE.sPOKESMAN-REVlIEW
ANEW DAY
OFIN~
AJ.Uilllrhij.cked
by Ifrroristsb .. r&
dow. all OliO'
thtow.rsoftbt
World Tr.d.
Cenl.rllI Ntw
York. Tb, other
tow.,b.d .J,udy
b"nstnlckby
JRoth"j,t
TutsdIYll'lorllio&.
F!II'idlhrscoRib thrau,h tb. rIlbbl, of tile World Tr.d, Clnt.r, wblc" coUtpsed TII.$dI,. .Itu blln: struck br two bij.chd j,Hilll15 as tilt ulloft nd the world w.teh.d iR borror.
INSIDE 13 PAGES OF COVERAGE
An icon reduced to rubble Howyou can help victims
'MIere you can donate blood. unsnear
assistance: local services scheduled./ Al7
Fire, not crash Impact, suspected of
bringing down New York's twin towers'; A3
SPECI;'L SUIIOII local Muslims cautious
Police concerned about posSlbJJlty of
backlash against lslamfc community'; AISHijackers were trained pilots
AviaUon experts Sif airline crews would die
belale flyIng Jetliner Into a bulldlng.j Al3
8USltHH
'Rogue state' aid suspected
Splinter group working alone not capable of
such an elaborate operatlon.f All
Region's retailers react
Many stores close their doors Tuesday:
air-dependent businesses crlppledi All
Recession on traders' minds
Disbelief, shock, fear, anger
Every American wUI have to confront
attack's psychological ellects.f AlG
Financial analysts divided on how attack
wUIaffect the struggling economy'; All
SPORTS
'Overtaken by concern'
Spokesman-Revtew readers share their
thoughts on the terrorist attacks'; AlG
Events across u.s. postponed
Baseball schedule on hold: major college
foolball games poslponed';Cl
For home delwery: (509) 7474422; (SOO)J]S..8S01 Contact The Spokesman·Review: (509) 459·5000; lal (509) 459.5482: e·mail edltor@spokesman.com Online news: w·NW.spokesmanfevlev.'.com
Nflff//ll.·.v
U.S. suffers worst act
of terror in its history
Terrorists struck at the sYll1buh nr
Amcricus wealth and might Tuesday.
flying hijacked uirfiners into the WIHld
Trade Cellier and the Pentagon.
killing untold thousands.
As a horrified nation watched. the
twin rowers of the World Trade Center
in lewer Munhnnnncoflapscd into
flam ing rubble ufrcr IWn Boeing 767s
rammed their upper stories. t\ third
airliner. a Bocing 757. Ilaucncd one of
the Peuragen's larned five ~iLlc~.
1\ fourth hijuckcd jerliucr crashcd in
western Pennsylvania.
The as...aulu...which evoked
cumpurisuns ro Pearl I Iarbor. were
carefully planned nou coordinated.
occurring wilhin50 minutes. Nu IIIlC
claimed responsibility. bill official
suspicion quickly fell un Saudi fugitive
osama hin Laden.
Presidem Bush vowed 10 "find those
respunsihlc and bring them to justice."
This reuntry. he said. would retaliate
against -urosc behind these evil acts"
and anyone harboring them.
Altogether. the four downed planes
carried 311 people. All were killed.
Secres jumped hi their deaths IJrdied
in fire and the cutlapsing
superstructure of the towers.
Uush placed U.S. forces nruuud the
world on highest alen after the worst
~iegc of terrorism waged against the
United St;lle~ in its history.
Full cU't'er,q:ebegins on Pa&t:Kl..
I 19th year. No. 94
c>C<.",.!£I<t2001.
.'ÓjItJl..j,:.·.II'IISI:..
n"'/lrtlill.·/JI'.M,tll'~
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Addendum L1: USA Today, September 12, 2001, p. 1
Addendum L2: Hartford Courant, Hartford, Connecticut, September 12, 2001, p.1
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Steuncl impOlCt: rtanes oIld debris explode from ol World Trade Center rewer as ajetJiner sl.vns intothe struC1lXtTuesdJY.801:h towers in M.nhau~ cotl.1psedinto olpde of noble shortly theeemer.
~~.~Minute by minute, fear envelops the country
CroSS\vord 110
~Ë~",:81!~As jetliners strike u.s. landmarks, America's sense of security is shattered
Sc,1(f'-by-st.\lt 14A
Wc.:Jlhrr 20 ....
See COVERSTOR'f nut p~t ~
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- ltlartforbAnxm'sOdestContinuouslyPublished Newspaper
VCUJ.\'i CUJl,flUM:lRl55 W'l'RGH 200l THEHARifCHJ coulwn CO.
1ltourant. -WEATHERAiosdySunny. HighsIn Tbe ~nd.iOs.BIO
WEDNESDAY. SEPTEMBER 12,2001
ACTOF
WITH CHILLING PRECISION,
TERRORISTS DELIVER DEATH AS
AMERICA WATCHES HELPLESSLY
ARMED WITH NOTHING but a fire extinguisher, an unidentified man makes his way through the rubble of the twin towers ot the World Trade Cent er, shouting for victims who needed assistance. The towers dluppeared
from the Manhattan skyline Tuesday after being hit by hijacked passenger airetanes.
!lY EDMUND MAHONY
Amelica's sense ofsecurltywas smasbed With apoc-aJypttc rury Tuesdaywhen the most destruc-
tive and meticulously planned ter-
ror attack in history sbattered two of
ibe country's most potent symbols,
Shortly after leaving Boston,
Arrencan Airlines flight 11 to Los
Angeles banked south near Albany
and raced down the Hudson River
Valley, It plummeted from a crystal
blue bowl of moming sky and
punched a hole through the north
tower of !heWorld Trade Center, the
heart of the nation's financial nerve
center in lower Manhattan.
Itwasaasam. ibe stan orasertes
of calamitous attacks tbat brought
the nation face to face With its vul,
nerability, With the twin towers top-
pled In New York, the Pentagon
COURANT STAFF WRITER
burning, a Jetliner down In Penn,
sylvania, the morning's cruel work
ended the nation's normalcy,
"Today, our nation saw evU," a
grlmfaced President Bush said
Tuesday night duting his first
prime-Urne address [rom the Oval
Office. He promised !bat the United
States will avenge its ibousands of
terror victims by retallatlng agamst
"those behind ibese evil acts," and
any country that harbors them.
There were four planes hijacked
by presumed terrorists Tuesday,
and four accompanying disasters
that caused unfathomable carnage.
Rescue experts would only spec-
ulate !bat the death toll could reach
well Into the thousands, The foul'
planes alone carried :lEG people, and
PLOOI; SU A NATION, PAGEAl
"If you can do this to the USA and get at two symbols of the strength of America, that tells you essentially we are at war,"
- SE.."L OIUCX liAGEJ..,R-NEB.
Complete Coverage
TIley fatally struck our two capitals - flnanda1 and JX)Iitical
- with no warning, devastating Americans and shocking
much of the wetd. Reports trem New York, Washingtoll,
Boston and Connecucut. and reactions fran abroact
Pages Al through AlS.
~--.,..~..--~~",-_.,.
Nm~h~;-T~RWl The Fallout Photos. oiaeoreports ana updates:Ik$ness __..._._, ._.A14, Al5
ConnecliClA .. . 81
fditorial .. .__ AlB, Al9
Ufe 01
LottelY ... _ ... 0.0_ ••••••••• AU
Obi1uaries .. B8
Plblic Notices __ 85, F1G
Sports __ .__ ...•. _ Cl
We've just ste ted
grappling with CIl ate'ed
sense of who we are, and
where we go from here.
Pages AAl-AAS.
~now.com-
.IJJJJlttIJJlJllil~
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Addendum M: The Examiner, San Fransisco, California, September 12, 2001, p.1
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\ SPECIAL EDITION \
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'.. Ihe Ixaminet. I"
Wednesday, September 12. 2001 Keeping San Francisco a two-newspaper town. (Includmg ta,,)25 cents
A CHANGED AMERICA
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Addendum N1: The Post-Crescent, Appleton, Wisconsin, September 12, 2001, p. 1
Addendum N2: Skagit Valley Herald, Mount Vernon, Washington, September 12, 2001, p. 1
80
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
THE POST-CRESCENT
www.postcrescent.com
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 12,2001 SERVING WISCONSIN'S F'OXRIVER VALLEY SINCE 1853 SOc
u.s. UNDER ATTACK: ID-PAGE SPECIAL SECTION
'UNYIELDING ANGER'
President Bush says America will not falter
in face of horrific terrorist. assault / Page 2
Page2
• Investigation
targets five
terrorist
groups, Osama
bin Laden
Page3
• Leaders in
Congress make
a show of unity
page3
.U.S. air
defense not
prepared for a
suicide attack
Page3
.Tragedy
could plunge
weak economy
into a recession
Page4
• New Yorkers
with Fox Valley
connections
weigh in
• Attack stirs
emotions in Fox
Valley
• Editorials,
columns
Pages8,9
~pIoCOoc.,.T"_"'l!!r'_""
FIREFIGHTERS RAISE A FlAG at the remains of the Wor1d Trade Center Tuesday in New York City. A coordinated terrorist attack sent two hijacked jetliners
straight into the landmark skyscrapers. toppling them. Thousands of people could be dead or trapped In the rubble. and Lower Manhattan was evacuated as the
nation coped with a similar attack on the Pentagon In Washington. D.C.
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TERROR IN AMERICA: Complete coverage inside, A3-14
WEDNESDAY
SEPTEMBER12. 2001 A locally owned newspaper sefVing Northwest Washington since 1884
50 CENTS
nwip:1(I)1·Sl3JY..-,.ra~!is~0I.
700 leads
in probe
of terrorist
attacks
8J JOHN SOlOMON
Msod .. IC!dPtt!ssWr1ler
WASHINGTON - The
FBI has received 700 leads in
Ihc inval;gllion of the terror-
lst ~tl:lcks in New York and
Wuhington but no arrests
have been made, 1; Justice
Department offici.1 said
rodly.
The government believes
Ihc h ijackers were tnincd
pilots and that three to five
were eboaed each of four air-
liners IhJI a15h~TuC'Sdly in
the worst terrorist alluJc eier
in the United Sutes. uid Jus-
tice Department spokes-
woman Mindy Tucker. She
said the condusion was bued
on infonnation gathered from
frantic phone ails made by
plSscngcrs on the doomed
jees.
"It appears from what we
know thai the hijackers were
skilled pilots." nid Tucker.
Tucker declined to ccm-
ment on evidence linking the
uncks to Saudi exile Os~m.
bin udm or whetha- nnhori-
ties have executed soren war-
rants.
Lawmakers believe bin
Laden may have been behind
the attack s. '" don't think
everyone in Congress hu
CIIOUgh information to make
those Issumptions." nid
Tucker.
She said invesugatcrs are
following III credible lC1ds,
but declined to comment on
whether the government is
close to IrTest;ng anyone. The
700 lips arne from a special
FBI Web site seeking infer-
mation on the aUades.
The FBI interviewed a
Venice. Fla .• couple todlY
aboul two mm who stayed II
their house for I wedt in July
2000 while the men were tak-
~\r:i~~~~ici~i!t~:~~~g
FBI 19ents "informed me
that Iha-c were two individu-
ds thll were students at HulT·
mm A\·il1ion. my employer.
lnd FBIIoid me they were
involved in yesterd3Y's
tregedy." nid Charlie Voss,
who was interviewed with his
wife. Drew Voss. at their
home.
The couple accepted The
twe mm as house guests u 1
favor to the company. Voss
said. The men, who stayed
just a few days. t"ined at the
See PROBE. Pnga A13
AP
~o:~=~!~~~h':~'=:ë~~~~~:~~c;,~e~~i~91~~ru~r'~:!~hhij~~~~~~~~er~~s~~; ~~~~~ ener-
-t?I .
Locally, security
remains high
on state ferries,
Whidbey base
8J sam GUTtERREZ
SlnrrWrltM
Life got back 10 normal for man shop-
pers and feny passengm tod~y. hul secu-
rity al the Wbidbey Island Naval Air Sta-
tion got ellCl1 tougher.
Naval personnel on their way 10 work
were ocperimcing traffic delays because
the base WIS under the highesi level of
sC'CUrily loday. said Kim Martin, public
alTaiNolTlct'r.
All cars were inspected thoroughly, and
in some cases whh the aid of dogs trained
lo sniff for explosives. Martin said.
"Wc're doing everything 10 protect our
people and our anct~ here." Martin laid.
Only essential personnel were allowed
on base: and only essential air opcntions
will be performed. M.rtin said.
The mspections severcly congested traf-
fic this morning for these entering the
base, Martin said. She Slid two gales are
opened. the Charles Porter and the Santo-
ga gates.
A shuttle hUI from Rocky Point, near
Gold Course Road. alsc will take people
0010 the base, Martin said.
Meanwhile shoppers and employees
returned lo Cucade ~hll in Burlington.
which resumed normal business hours
aflcr being closed Tuesday.
The 5t31e ferry system retorned lo carry-
ing automobiles Tuesday IOcr being
restricted 10 p"ssenger·only sen-ice
through the aRanoon in most of the Pugd
Sound outside the San Juan Isbnds. uid
spokesperson Susan HarTis.
But stale troopers were 01'1 hind at both
the terminals Ind on the vessels lo inspect
any vehicles Ihat appear suspicious. Herris
said.
"All vehicles may be scbject tc a poui-
bic search." Harris said.
On the ground. Amtnk trains resumed
normal seevice to the area today aOer ~
thorough inspection of the shle's nil-
roads, bridges and roedweys by Depart-
ment ofTransportltion and Amtrek offl-
cials.
"Inspections will be running thruugbout
the d3y ~nd should anything unusual hlp-
pen. they will lake strong precautions,"
spokesperson Sun Suchan Slid about ser-
vice loday ... And thlt could mean lome:
See SECURITY, Page A13
Trade Center fell 'like a house of cards'
BJ JAMES GELUSO
Starr Writer
Bm Lace WI$ at work Tuesday morning in the
Commodities Exchange: building. two blocks
nom the World Tnde Cene. whee a eo-worker
came in and told people that something had hap-
pend.
Luee, a natural gas Il'lIdc:r :md 1994 Stanwccd
High School graduate. joined his colleagues
around a televislcn. where Ihey watched live
footage of the second aÏflJhne enshing into the
World TndeCenter.
Nol long afltt that. the exchange building was
evecueted, 3nd Luce and his colleagues SlW the
destraenee up close.
"We just kind of stood in shod: for about 15
minutes." he nid.
Two of his colleagues started walking north
toward midtown Manhattan, and the rest fol-
lowed. They had gotten 20 blocks when Iney
heard I low rumble and turned lfound to sC"C the
First tower fall,
Sea STANWOOD, Pnge A 12
Ben Luce In
1994.
Hijackings hit home
for school official
BJ POER KEUEY
$tolTwrttef
CO~RETE - As Marie
Phillips watched Tuesday's
horrific events unfold, she
rcmcmbered her 0\\111 days IS 1
flighlaltmdanl •• nda tife-Ind·
dealh crisis she faced one d3y.
thousands offect in the "ir.
Phinips of ~~I~~~;~PS~:~~~~~
triet now. but in 1968 she
WIS a 22·year-old night :attend.nt for Pan
American Airlines. She remembers vividty
how he- crew dnlt with a bomb threat on an
Worshippers find
solace in tune from
World War II era
By JIM FEEHAN
$lalTWriter
""IOUNT VERNON - AI the end of ~ well-
attended mass, a spontaneoul lone: voice singing
"God Blcss America" quickly WIS join ed by a
dloir of parishioners sedting spirituIl relief from
Iheday's events.
June !Iudson didn'l plan to start singing the
patriotic song It the conclusion of a noentime
Mus Tuesday at Immaculate Conceplion Roman
C31holic Church fn Mount Vernon.
Bul as the Rev. PatriCK McDcnnoll ended the
religious service and turned to wllk :llway from
See SOfIG, Page A12See HIJACKING$. PngQ A1 3
Fu .. k V~ I Skagtl Valley Herald
Allee White of Mount Vernon reacts to the terrorist attack on
the United Slates belOfe the start cl noon Mass Tuesdoy at
Irrrnaculate Concep.ion Catholic Church in Mount Vernon.
Inside
''''''_18_
TlokD Cl ~ Cl
O.>SI'ed es to 1=1 AJ
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illonesburf CTO ap;mn A4
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He.hhylMnjCl Sjxxt> BT~
~an ca Tév&ln AlO
Weather
~';;,~~~~y
wlth highs in
the 70s and
80s. Details, AU.
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Addendum 0: The Iwo Jima Flag by Joe Rosenthal, 1945
(from: Buell, Hal. 1999. Moments - the Pulitzer prize-winning photographs - a visual chronicle of our
time. New York: Kënemann)
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